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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Coal is the most abundant of all fossil fuels. In energy terms, the current coal reserves
are around 3.2 times larger than those of natural gas and 2.5 times larger than those
of oil (IEA, 2011c). Moreover, coal reserves are widely dispersed around the globe and
thus coal supply is much less affected by geo-political tensions.
Given that supply costs of coal have also been, in energy terms, much lower than
those of oil and natural gas, coal has always played a key role in energy markets, espe-
cially in the power generation sector. In 2010 more than 40% of the global electricity
generation was coal-based (IEA, 2012). Besides its role in the power sector, coal – so-
called metallurgical coal – is also an important input in steel-making. According to the
World Coal Association, around 70% of the steel produced worldwide relies on coal as
a crucial input (WCA, 2011).
Although conventional wisdom suggests that coal is a fuel from the olden days,
coal demand has been escalating in recent years; coal accounted for almost half of the
incremental global primary energy use in the decade from 2000 to 2010. Hence, world-
wide coal use grew nearly as fast as oil, natural gas, and renewable energy consumption
together (IEA, 2011c). This growth in coal use can almost entirely be attributed to
developing and transition economies, with China and India at the forefront.
These dynamic developments have reshaped global coal markets markedly and thus
also changed their underlying economics. While coal used to be a predominantly do-
mestic fuel, the share of internationally traded coal has increased continuously, with the
sharpest growth rates encountered in the last decade. Furthermore, prices for interna-
tionally traded coal soared around 2006, reached record levels in 2008, and remained
relatively high through 2010 and 2011.
1
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The supply-side has reacted to the changing market environment. Some countries,
especially China and Indonesia, have tightened governmental control over their coal ex-
porting sectors and have introduced classic instruments of strategic trade policy. More-
over, giant multinational mining companies, which hold large coal export capacities,
have benefited from the changing market structures and managed to receive high prices
for their coals. There are doubts that the allocation and pricing of coal have been com-
petitive in recent years both regarding the market for steam coals and the market for
metallurgical coals.
At the same time, China, the world’s largest consumer and producer of coal, shifted
from being a net-exporter of coal to being a net-importer of coal within a few years. Due
to the sheer size of the Chinese coal market, comparably small changes in the Chinese
energy system or the Chinese economy in general can have substantial repercussions
on the international coal trade. These repercussions impact power markets and steel
industries across the globe. This is obvious for China, with its centrally planned energy
system, but also holds true for other large domestic coal markets like the United States.
Therefore, studying the interaction between domestic energy systems and international
coal markets is important both from a short-term and a long-term perspective.
In light of the dynamic evolution of coal markets in recent years and the importance
of coal in the global energy system (and steel markets), the question of how coal markets
work and how they are organised naturally arises. Therefore, this thesis firstly seeks to
make a contribution to explaining recent coal market outcomes and thereby enhancing
the understanding of the drivers of coal markets. The analysis covers both the market
for steam coal and the thus far rather neglected market for metallurgical coal. This
is the base for hypotheses on how these markets could evolve in the future. Secondly,
this thesis addresses the special role of China in global coal markets. As Chinese plan-
ning authorities’ decisions affect the global energy system, a thorough understanding of
China’s role is key in understanding coal market economics. The Chinese energy system
is still in transition and therefore studying China’s role is as relevant for today as for
the future. In pursuing the analysis, this thesis presents various computer-based mod-
els that allow reproduction of recent market equilibria, as well as projection of future
market equilibria, taking into account the dynamics of the market.
Undoubtedly, global energy needs will continue to grow and coal is likely to remain
a cornerstone of the global energy system for many years to come (IEA, 2011c). There-
fore, understanding both the long and short-term economics of global coal markets is
crucial for investors, decision-makers, and environmentalists worldwide. The provision
of affordable and secure energy will need substantial investment as well as support from
appropriate policies. Furthermore, the combustion of coal is thought to be a key driver
of global warming. Hence, any policy targeted at mitigating climate change will have to
take into account coal market economics in order to be effective.
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1.2 Modelling Spatial Markets
The coal market’s key feature is its spatial structure, i.e. coal production is geograph-
ically separated from coal consumption and individuals incur transportation costs in
clearing the market. Coal has a low value-to-weight ratio and thus haulage costs can
be substantial. The spatial structure and the role of transportation costs lead to differ-
ent market outcomes than a spaceless model would imply. In a perfectly competitive
market the law of the uniform price does not hold if transportation costs differ. In a
non-competitive market the geographical separation of supply and demand may give
players the ability to price-discriminate over space.
Modelling spatial market equilibria has a long-standing tradition in economics and
particularly in operations research. Pioneering research by Hitchcock (1941), Kan-
torovich (1942), and Koopmans (1949) centred around the linear programming trans-
portation problem. Essentially, this problem deals with the least-cost allocation of a good
between spatially separated (fixed) demand and production. Enke (1951) developed an
analogue between spatial markets and electric circuits (Kirchhoff’s laws). Samuelson
(1952) proceeds from Enke’s formulation and shows how the least-cost transportation
problem can be converted into a maximisation problem and solved with linear program-
ming methods. Takayama and Judge (1964, 1971) further developed Samuelson’s spatial
equilibrium model and extended it to the spatial monopoly case. Later the approach
was generalised to the Cournot case, for instance by Kolstad and Abbey (1984), Kolstad
and Burris (1986), and Harker (1984, 1986a), and for the Stackelberg case, for instance
by Nelson and McCarl (1984) or Miller et al. (1991).
1.2.1 Mathematical Programming Approach
Classic methods of optimisation often reach their limits when it comes to modelling im-
perfect competition. Modelling non-competitive behaviour in spatial markets typically
implies that more than one market participant optimises an objective function. The
equilibrium is then characterised by the requirement that the market clearing vector of
variables fulfils the first-order-condition (FOC) of each market participants’ objective
function simultaneously. This is the core of complementarity programming and the rea-
son why these methods have been used extensively in modelling imperfect competition
in spatial markets.
The models presented in this thesis rely either explicitly on complementarity pro-
gramming methods (chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5) or implicitly use complementarity program-
ming to state the equilibrium conditions of a Mathematical Programme with Equilibrium
Constraints (chapter 2). Complementarity programming is based on the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions. The KKT conditions characterise the optimal solution of an
optimisation problem which consists of equations and inequalities. The KKT conditions
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can be explained using the following simple maximisation problem. Let f(x) be a con-
cave function to be maximised, e.g. a profit function, and g(x) = a − x ≥ 0 a convex
restriction, e.g. a production capacity limit. The Lagrangian Z of the problem is then
defined as Z = f(x) + y(a − x) with y being the Lagrangian multiplier of g(x). The
KKT conditions of this problem can be expressed as follows:
∂Z/∂x = f ′(x)− y ≤ 0, x ≥ 0, x · ∂Z/∂x = 0 (1.1)
∂Z/∂y = a− x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, y · ∂Z/∂y = 0 (1.2)
As figure 1.1 shows, there are four candidates M for a maximum of the above outlined
optimisation problem that all fulfil the corresponding KKT conditions. In case (I), M is
characterised by f ′(x) = 0 and x > 0, as well as y = 0 (restriction g(x) is non-binding),
hence x · ∂Z/∂x = 0 and y · ∂Z/∂y = 0 hold. In case (II) f ′(x) = 0 and x = 0 as well
as y = 0 hold, and hence x · ∂Z/∂x = 0 and y · ∂Z/∂y = 0 hold too. In case (III) the
KKT point is similar to case (II) but f ′(x) < 0. Since x = 0, x · ∂Z/∂x = 0 still holds.
Case (IV) is probably the most interesting one. Here M is characterised by f ′(x) > 0
and x > 0 as well as ∂Z/∂y = 0. For x ·∂Z/∂x = 0 to be fulfilled, y = f ′(x) has to hold.
Consequently, y is the shadow-price of restriction g(x).
•
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Figure 1.1: KKT-point candidates
In terms of the above outlined optimisation problem f ′(x) corresponds to marginal
profit and y can be interpreted as the value of the marginal unit of production capacity.
All four possible candidates for maxima fulfil all KKT conditions simultaneously. Hence,
the KKT conditions constitute the first-order necessary conditions of an optimisation
problem with non-negative choice variables. Furthermore, the Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency
theorem states that for a maximisation problem a KKT point is a global maximum
and the KKT conditions are necessary-and-sufficient if the following specifications are
satisfied (see Chiang, 1984):1
• the objective function is differentiable and concave in the non-negative orthant
1The Arrow-Enthoven sufficiency theorem relaxes the concavity-convexity requirements of the Kuhn-
Tucker sufficiency theorem to quasiconcavity and quasiconvexity but require additional conditions to be
met (see Arrow and Enthoven, 1961).
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• each constraint function is differentiable and convex in the non-negative orthant
• the KKT first-order conditions are all satisfied simultaneously
Complementarity modelling techniques are also useful when one seeks to optimise
an objective function subject to a system of equilibrium constraints. Such a problem
is typically called a Mathematical Programme with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC).
Essentially, MPECs are constrained non-linear programmes (NLP) and can be solved as
such. With slight modifications of the above example, the MPEC modelling approach
can be cast as follows:
Maximise
S(z, x) (1.3)
subject to:
h(z) ≥ 0 (1.4)
z, x, y ≥ 0 (1.5)
∂f(z, x)/∂x− y · g′(x) ≤ 0 ⊥ x ≥ 0 (1.6)
g(x) ≥ 0 ⊥ y ≥ 0 (1.7)
The outlined MPEC can be interpreted as a sequential-move Stackelberg model with
S(z, x) being the profit function of a Stackelberg leader whose profits depend on his own
output z and his follower’s output x. The follower’s profits f(z, x) depend on his output
decision x and the leader’s output z. The leader decides on his output first and thereby
takes into account the (complementarity) FOCs of the follower and his own production
capacity constraint h(z) when maximising his objective function. An MPEC is typically
not a convex programme which could potentially lead to irregularities in the feasible
region. Convergence of solvers has improved substantially, particularly when the orginal
MPEC is reformulated to alternative NLPs. Yet, the problem of spurious stationary
points can still complicate the solution of MPECs.
1.2.2 Accuracy, Assumptions, Caveats, and Limitations
The major characteristic of a spatial market is the allocation of a good between geo-
graphically separated participants. Therefore, assessing whether the models are able to
reproduce real-market trade-flows either qualitatively (chapters 3 and 5), or in a more
rigorous way, by applying statistical measures (chapters 2 and 4), is a key component
of the analyses presented in this thesis. Besides the validation of the primal variables
(typically trade-flows), the validation of the models’ dual variables, i.e. the regional
price levels, are another aspect of the prediction quality assessment.
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The analyses in this thesis are based on a unique dataset that covers a wide range of
coal market parameters in great detail. Although coal market data was gathered with
due diligence and edited with care, the heterogeneity of the sources, the comparably
long time-spans, and data-complexity, as well as the scope of the data needed, inevitably
result in some noise and bias. Similar issues potentially apply to the data and statistics
compiled by other institutions and organisations that were used as input data or in
validating the models. Furthermore, in some cases, limited data availability required
assumptions on missing data points. All of these aspects could lead to distortions and
biases in the model results and validation.
The models are based on the assumption that competition is in quantities in coal
markets. Capacity constraints are relevant in coal markets and therefore one would
expect quantities to be the strategic variable (see Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). More-
over, in a bulk-commodity industry that runs on production and export targets and a
demand side that is relatively price-inelastic, this assumption does not appear to be too
problematic. Yet, it should be clear that competition in prices could lead to different
results.
A common critique of partial equilibrium modelling as applied in this thesis is that a
wide range of seemingly plausible market outcomes can be (re-)produced by arbitrarily
varying conduct or data assumptions, e.g. parameters of the inverse demand function.
Indeed, the equilibrium modelling approach gives the developer several degrees of free-
dom regarding model calibration. This problem is typically aggravated by limited data
availability for long range back-testing of the model results. Given the large size of the
problem-set regarding the number of market participants and their supply and demand
parameters, the data limitations for other methods and/or long range back-testing are
evident. For instance, data in a yearly resolution is usually the best one can obtain.
In this regard, partial equilibrium modelling is often the only conclusive approach to
analysing such markets. The inherent degrees of freedom of the approach are therefore
both a blessing and a curse.
Generally the problem of limited long range back-testing can be mitigated by val-
idating model results for a few recent years. A variety of model assessment tools are
available and should preferably be used and interpreted in concert to cover a wide range
of prediction accuracy aspects. Assessing primal and dual variables is compulsive as
they are closely linked. A good fit in only one of them is inconclusive. Moreover, the
allegation of arbitrariness can typically be overcome by flanking numerical results with
realistic qualitative backing of the underlying assumptions. Finally, some cases call for a
sensitivity analysis regarding key parameters to check for the robustness of the numerical
results (chapters 2 and 3).
In this respect, future research could combine equilibrium modelling techniques with
other methods to overcome arbitrariness of data assumptions. For instance, econometric
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techniques could help gaining insights into the price responsiveness of coal demand and
could be used to estimate the parameters of the demand functions.
Another common critique of the approach applied in this thesis is its static nature.
The analyses in chapters 2 to 4 are essentially snap-shots of the market structure of the
coal trade in recent years. The strategic interaction of players is modelled as one-shot
games although, in reality, the players interact repeatedly. This causes two problems:
first, the results are simply best-supply equilibria and cannot explain the investment
in capacities. Second, the best-supply equilibria might be biased in a sense that in
a repeated game the outcome might differ from the one-shot game equilibrium. For
instance, depending on the time preference of the players, repeated interaction might
lead to implicit collusion.
The latter problem is not so severe in coal markets and can sometimes be overcome
by explicitly modelling cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes (see chapter 2). Ne-
glecting the capacity investment equilibrium is a more serious issue in a market where
capacity constraints are relevant. In this case however, the approach is justified as the
market structure evolved exogenously due to the dynamic development of the global
coal market in recent years. Yet an analysis with a short or medium-term outlooking
focus where both strategic behaviour and capacity investment matter would have to
take into account strategic capacity planning. Modelling such games is however still
computationally expensive.
Nevertheless computational tractability advances rapidly in this field. State-of-the-
art methods might already allow solution of two period games, with supply and invest-
ment as strategic variables, in a system with a manageable size such as the market for
metallurgical coals. Modelling endogenous market structure evolution in the medium-
term future could be another interesting avenue for future research.
Hence, in light of the caveats and limitations, the goal of applying spatial equilibrium
models to global coal markets cannot be producing high resolution and high precision
results. Typically, the approach applied in this thesis only provides trajectories and
ranges for assessing real market outcomes. Therefore, the goal is rather to understand
the drivers and mechanisms of the market and to assess whether a specific market
structure performs systematically and robustly better than another.
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis
The thesis comprises four interrelated essays featuring modelling and analysis of coal
markets. Each of the four essays has a dedicated chapter in this thesis. Chapters 2 to
4 have, from a topical perspective, a backward-looking focus and deal with explaining
recent market outcomes in the international coal trade. The findings of those essays
may serve as guidance for assessing current coal market outcomes as well as expected
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market outcomes in the near to medium-term future. Chapter 5 has a forward-looking
focus and builds a bridge between explaining recent market outcomes and projecting
long-term market equilibria. The body of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2, Strategic Behaviour in International Metallurgical Coal Markets (see
Tru¨by, 2013), deals with market conduct of large exporters in the market of coals used
in steel-making in the period 2008 to 2010.2 I am the sole contributor to this work.
In this essay I analyse whether prices and trade-flows in the international market for
metallurgical coals were subject to non-competitive conduct in the period 2008 to 2010.
To do so, I develop mathematical programming models – a Stackelberg model, two va-
rieties of a Cournot model, and a perfect competition model – for computing spatial
equilibria in international resource markets. Results are analysed with various statisti-
cal measures to assess the prediction accuracy of the models. The results show that real
market equilibria cannot be reproduced with a competitive model. However, real mar-
ket outcomes can be accurately simulated with the non-competitive models, suggesting
that market equilibria in the international metallurgical coal trade were subject to the
strategic behaviour of coal exporters.
Chapter 3 and chapter 4 deal with market power issues in the steam coal trade
in the period 2006 to 2008. Steam coals are typically used to produce steam either for
electricity generation or for heating purposes. This research strand was jointly developed
and pursued with Moritz Paulus.
In Chapter 3 we analyse market behaviour of key exporting countries in the steam
coal trade. This chapter features the essay Market Structure Scenarios in International
Steam Coal Trade3 (see Tru¨by and Paulus 2012). I am the leading author of this essay.
In the presented paper, we analyse steam coal market equilibria in the years 2006 and
2008 by testing for two possible market structure scenarios: perfect competition and an
oligopoly setup with major exporters competing in quantities. The assumed oligopoly
scenario cannot explain market equilibria for any year. While we find that the compet-
itive model simulates market equilibria well in 2006, the competitive model is not able
to reproduce real market outcomes in 2008. The analysis shows that not all available
supply capacity was utilised in 2008. We conclude that either unknown capacity bot-
tlenecks or more sophisticated non-competitive strategies were the cause for the high
prices in 2008.
Chapter 4 builds upon the findings of the analysis in chapter 3 and adds a more
detailed representation of domestic markets. The corresponding essay is titled Nations
as Strategic Players in Global Commodity Markets: Evidence from World Coal Trade of
2This article is copyrighted and reprinted by permission. The presented article first appeared in
Energy Economics, Vol. 36.
3This article is copyrighted and reprinted by permission from the International Association for Energy
Economics. The presented article first appeared in The Energy Journal, Vol. 33, No. 3. Visit The Energy
Journal online at http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/journal.aspx.
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which I am a contributing author (see Paulus et al., 2011). In this chapter we explore the
hypothesis that export policies and trade patterns of national players in the steam coal
market are consistent with non-competitive market behaviour. We test this hypothesis
by developing a static equilibrium model which is able to model coal producing nations
as strategic players. We explicitly account for integrated seaborne trade and domestic
markets. The global steam coal market is simulated under several imperfect market
structure setups. We find that trade and prices of a China - Indonesia duopoly fits the
real market outcome best and that real Chinese export quotas in 2008 were consistent
with simulated exports under a Cournot-Nash strategy.
Chapter 5 looks at the long-term effect of Chinese energy system planning decisions.
The time horizon is 2006 to 2030. The analysis in this chapter combines a dynamic
equilibrium model with the scenario analysis technique. The corresponding essay is titled
Coal Lumps vs. Electrons: How Do Chinese Bulk Energy Transport Decisions Affect
the Global Steam Coal Market? 4 (see Paulus and Tru¨by, 2011). I am a contributing
author to this essay. The essay demonstrates the ways in which different Chinese bulk
energy transport strategies affect the future steam coal market in China and in the rest
of the world. Increasing Chinese energy demand will require additional energy to be
transported from the supply to the demand regions. If domestic transport costs escalate,
Chinese coal consumers could increasingly import coal. We analyse two settings: one in
which coal is increasingly transported by rail and one in which coal energy is transported
as electricity. A key finding is that if coal were converted into electricity early in the
supply chain, worldwide marginal costs of coal supply would be lower than if coal were
hauled by train. Furthermore, China’s dependence on imports is significantly reduced in
this context. Allocation of welfare changes particularly in favour of Chinese consumers
while rents of international producers decrease.
4This article is copyrighted and reprinted by permission. The presented article first appeared in
Energy Economics, Vol. 33, No. 6.
Chapter 2
Strategic Behaviour in
International Metallurgical Coal
Markets
2.1 Introduction
Economies all over the world crucially rely on commodities that are procured from inter-
national resource markets. One category is energy resources such as imported natural
gas and thermal coal for electricity generation or crude oil for petroleum production.
Another field is natural resources and minerals that are essential in industrial produc-
tion: iron ore for steel making, lithium for batteries, bauxite for aluminium production,
or rare earth elements for various high-tech products to name but a few. Recent price
spikes for such commodities have given rise to concerns about security and reliability of
supply of natural resources. Moreover, many markets for natural resources and minerals
are highly concentrated and do not appear to be competitively organised at first glance.
The international metallurgical coal (or coking coal) trade – metallurgical coal is a
key input in steel-making – is another such example.5 Prices for this coal variety have
reached record levels in recent years and the market structure is oligopolistic. Specifi-
cally, four giant multinationals, BHP-Billiton, Rio Tinto, Anglo-American, and Xstrata
(henceforth the “Big-Four”), together control around 50% of the global metallurgical
coal export capacity. The Big-Four produce their metallurgical coal in Australia and
compete against a handful of smaller players mainly from Canada, the United States,
and Russia.
5Metallurgical coals (hard coking coal, semi-soft coking coal, Pulverised-Coal-Injection coal) are used
to produce the coke utilised in blast furnaces or as in the case of Pulverised-Coal-Injection (PCI) coal, to
reduce the consumption of coke in blast furnaces. Often the terms metallurgical coal and coking coal are
used interchangeably, although strictly speaking PCI coals are not necessarily coking coal. Metallurgical
coal is distinct from thermal (or steam) coal which is typically used to produce electricity or heat.
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In the context of the oligopolistic market structure and the high prices in recent years,
the presented paper seeks to shed light on the question of whether metallurgical coal
prices were indeed subject to non-competitive market conduct and if so, which strategy
may have prevailed in reality. It is a priori unclear which model of oligopoly captures
the characteristics and market conduct in the international metallurgical coal trade best.
Therefore the analysis comprises four different strategies with regard to the oligopolists’
output decision: first, assuming quantities to be the strategic variable and exporters
to engage in Cournot-Nash competition is the obvious baseline scenario (henceforth
“Cournot oligopoly” scenario). Second, there are also specific market characteristics
that suggest a first mover advantage of the Big-Four in this market. The key price in
the international metallurgical coal trade is the so-called “hard coking coal benchmark
price”. This price, and the corresponding delivery-contracts, is regularly determined in
negotiations between major Australian exporters, essentially the Big-Four, and large
Asian steel mills. Other exporters subsequently use this benchmark price for their
pricing, subject to their respective coal qualities (Bowden, 2012, Chang, 1997).
Although the benchmark price is mostly set by BHP-Billiton, the other three multi-
nationals set the price occasionally too, and the Big-Four provide mutual support in
enforcing this price (McCloskey, 2012a).6 There is no hard evidence for the Big-Four
cooperatively determining the benchmark price but the revolving system of individual
companies setting the price suggests that there is a potential for (tacit) collusion. To
account for the potential first mover advantage and the possibility of collusion between
the Big-Four I employ a Stackelberg model. In this model the Big-Four cooperatively
determine their output in the benchmark price negotiations, taking into account the
other exporters’ reaction to their decision. Third, I combine the Cournot-Nash model
with the hypothesis of collusive behaviour between the Big-Four. Specifically, I as-
sume that the Big-Four determine their output cooperatively but simultaneously with
their competitors (henceforth “Cournot cartel” scenario). Finally, various market char-
acteristics can lead to perfectly competitive equilibria despite an oligopolistic market
structure. Consequently, in the fourth scenario I test for perfectly competitive conduct
of all players.
To test which of the outlined market structures explains the real market best I de-
velop mathematical programming models in the presented paper – a Stackelberg model,
two varieties of a Cournot model, and a perfect competition model – for computing
6This became obvious in recent negotiations between Anglo-American and the South Korean steel
mill POSCO. As POSCO did not accept the benchmark price proposed by Anglo-American, the company
refused to supply high quality coking coal to the steel maker for the whole quarter, supported by other
exporters, most notably BHP-Billiton and Xstrata, who also refused to deliver this specific quality for
the whole quarter (McCloskey, 2012a).
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spatial equilibria in international resource markets. The models are applied to the inter-
national metallurgical coal trade in the period 2008 to 2010. The models for Cournot-
style and perfectly competitive behaviour are implemented as Mixed Complementarity
Programmes (MCP). The Stackelberg model is initially formulated as a Mathematical
Programme with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) and then automatically reformu-
lated as a standard non-linear programme to facilitate solution. The models are based
on a detailed supply-side focused dataset comprising e.g. mining and transport costs
of individual mines, seaborne freight rates and supply cost developments. As the price
elasticity of demand is a key unknown in my analysis, I test for a large bandwidth of
elasticity cases. Model prediction accuracy is assessed using various statistical measures
like Theil’s inequality coefficient, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, and linear hy-
pothesis testing. The numerical results suggest that market equilibria in the seaborne
metallurgical coal market cannot be explained by perfectly competitive behaviour. How-
ever, the Stackelberg and the Cournot oligopoly scenarios reproduce market outcomes
accurately. Departing from different market structure assumptions both models pro-
duce similarly convincing results for slightly different, but in any case realistic, ranges
of elasticities.
Literature on market conduct in international coal markets is relatively scarce and
most papers focus on thermal coal markets (e.g. Abbey and Kolstad, 1983, Haftendorn
and Holz, 2010, Kolstad and Abbey, 1984, Tru¨by and Paulus, 2012). Yet, there are two
notable exceptions, Bowden (2012) and Graham et al. (1999), who specifically deal with
market power in the coking coal trade. Bowden (2012) is an excellent qualitative anal-
ysis of the history of the coking coal trade in the Pacific basin. The author investigates
the rise and fall of a buying cartel in this market and describes the emergence of a pow-
erful oligopoly of coking coal exporters since 2001. Graham et al. (1999) quantitatively
analyse international metallurgical coal trade in the year 1996 using a mathematical
programming model. The authors test for various non-competitive market structures
and find that an all consumer oligopsony reproduces actual market data best.
The contribution of the presented paper is threefold: first, by modeling some players
as a cooperative Stackelberg leader and implementing it as an MPEC, I apply a novel
approach to resource market analysis, which potentially delivers insights for other mar-
kets as well. Second, I show that prices and trade-flows in the international metallurgical
coal market are consistent with strategic behaviour by coal exporters in the period 2008
to 2010. Third, by extending the analysed period to three years and using most recent
data, I am updating the research started by Graham et al. (1999) and provide empirical
evidence for Bowden (2012) most recent findings with regard to market power exertion
of large resource companies.
The remainder of the presented paper is organised as follows: section 2.2 briefly
introduces the international metallurgical coal market. Section 2.3 describes the models
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developed in this paper. The data is presented in section 2.4. The statistical measures
used to validate the models are described in section 2.5. Results are shown in section
2.6. Section 2.7 discusses the results and section 2.8 concludes the paper.
2.2 The Seaborne Metallurgical Coal Market
Supply-side market power is a rather recent phenomenon in the metallurgical coal mar-
ket. For more than 40 years the metallurgical coal trade, especially in the Pacific basin,
was characterised by a buying cartel keeping prices low. The Japanese Steel Mills (JSM),
one of the world’s largest metallurgical coal consumers, was the core of this cartel. The
JSM’s trade strategies were underpinned by other Asian steel mills, mainly from South
Korea and Chinese Taipei, subordinating to the negotiations led by the JSM. From
a strategic perspective, the buying cartel faced a trade-off between constantly driving
down prices at the risk of making some mining operations unprofitable and paying a
price premium to maintain a diversified procurement portfolio (Bowden, 2012).
A phase of unsustainably low coking coal prices during the 1990s resulted in an exit
of producers and a wave of industry consolidation striving for efficiency gains. This
reversed the market structure and, by the early 2000s, the JSM faced an oligopoly of
large and efficient mining companies. Bowden (2012, p.19) for example concludes that
“the shift to a seller’s market, dominated by a handful of giant mining conglomerates –
BHP-Billiton, Rio Tinto, Xstrata (formerly Glencore), and Anglo-American in Australia
and the Fording-Teck consortium in Canada – was confirmed in the decade after the 2001
price increases.”
The consolidation on the supply side was complemented by a sharp increase in de-
mand for metallurgical coal from entrant Chinese and Indian steel mills that have so
far not subordinated to the JSM’s pricing policy and hence may have further eroded
buyer-side market power. These structural changes were paralleled by steeply rising
hard coking coal benchmark prices since the mid-2000s. In recent years, hard coking
coal benchmark prices reached an unprecedented 300 USD/t in 2008, plummeted to 129
USD/t in 2009 and rose to 227 USD/t in 2010.7
In this context the Germany-based coal importer’s association VDKI notes in their
annual report (VDKI, 2011, p.24) that “the small number of coking coal producers is
essentially an oligopoly which is able to dictate prices...with relatively little effort.” The
Big-Four are thought to have substantial market power due to good coal qualities, large
7All prices FOB (“Free On Board”) Australia.
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Table 2.1: Market shares in the international metallurgical coal trade, 2010
Australia Canada Russia USA Other Total
Europe and Mediterranean 8.4% 2.0% 1.7% 11.3% 0.3% 23.7%
Japan 18.7% 3.5% 0.9% 1.1% 0.2% 24.3%
Korea 7.1% 2.2% 0.5% 1.1% 0.3% 11.1%
Chinese Taipei 3.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 3.4%
China 8.9% 1.8% 1.0% 1.6% 0.5% 13.7%
India 13.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 14.1%
Brazil 1.7% 0.7% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 5.3%
Other Latin America 0.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4% 0.3% 1.5%
Other 1.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 1.0% 2.7%
Total 63.0% 10.7% 4.3% 19.5% 2.6% 100.0%
Source: IEA (2011a).
export capacities and their close location to the main importers.8 This hypothesis is
not only backed by soaring prices but also by the fact that recently a single company,
BHP-Billiton, pushed the pricing system away from annual contracts towards a quar-
terly and then monthly benchmarking mechanism – despite heavy resistance from steel
mills (McCloskey, 2009, 2011). The Big-Four compete with metallurgical coal exporters
from several other countries. In most countries (Canada, Russia, New Zealand, Poland,
Indonesia, and South Africa) there is only one dominant company that exports metallur-
gical coals. In the United States, the main export port for metallurgical coal (Lambert’s
Point, Norfolk, Virginia) and the railway lines serving the ports are controlled by one
player suggesting market power exertion via the infrastructure.9
Metallurgical coals are traded both domestically and internationally. With a market
volume of 245 million tonnes (mt), roughly a quarter of the global production (891
mt) was traded internationally (almost exclusively seaborne, using dry bulk vessels) in
2010.10 Interactions between the domestic markets and the international market are
minor in the metallurgical coal trade. Domestic metallurgical coal producers are usually
separated from the export market due to coal quality, contractual obligations, export
regulations (e.g. quotas or licences), as well as a lack of access to export infrastructure.
8The exertion of market power may be supported by important barriers to entry and capacity ex-
pansion restrictions in the metallurgical coal market. High political risk and/or the lack of financial
resources and technical capability are effective barriers to solo market entry of developing countries with
so far untapped metallurgical coal resources. Furthermore, export capacity expansion usually requires
coordination of infrastructure and mining capacity upgrading with different stakeholders being involved
– a very time consuming process (for details and examples see IEA, 2011b). Such restrictions are partic-
ularly delaying for greenfield projects which also need the construction of export infrastructure. A good
example is Mozambique where metallurgical coal projects have been underway since around 2005; the
first small-scale coal shipments began in 2011 but sizeable coal exports are not to be expected before
2016 (IEA, 2011b).
9US coal exporters have regularly alluded that the railway operators influence exports strongly
through rail rates. Rail rates can fluctuate by 300% depending on market conditions (McCloskey,
2012b,c). Moreover, several analyses have argued that in the United States’ coal markets market power
is exerted via the infrastructure (e.g. Wolak and Kolstad, 1988).
10Unless otherwise stated all figures in this section refer to the year 2010 and stem from IEA (2011a).
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The key countries in the seaborne metallurgical coal market are clearly Australia and
Japan with an export share of 63% and an import share 24% respectively (table 2.1).
The second largest exporting country is the United States with a market share of around
20%, followed by Canada with a market share of around 11%. Small exporting countries,
with market shares below 5% are Russia, Colombia, Indonesia, South Africa and New
Zealand. Besides Japan, major importing regions are Europe and the neighbouring
Mediterranean countries (24%), India (14%), China (14%), and South Korea (11%).
2.3 Model Description
In this section I develop three spatial market models – Cournot-Nash behaviour, perfect
competition, and Stackelberg leadership – for typical resource markets in which exporters
and importers trade with each other. Although these models are based on specific
fundamental data for the seaborne metallurgical coal market in this analysis, the basic
model structure could also be used for analysing other spatial natural resource markets
or, for instance, agricultural products’ markets.11
The modelling approach for competitive and Cournot-Nash equilibria (sections 2.3.1
and 2.3.2) dates back to Samuelson (1952), with his work on the programming of com-
petitive equilibria in spatial markets, and was generalised for various non-competitive
market structure scenarios, e.g. by Takayama and Judge (1964, 1971), Harker (1984,
1986a), and Yang et al. (2002). This approach has been applied numerously in various
fields, e.g. the international wheat trade (Kolstad and Burris, 1986), natural gas market
analysis (Zhuang and Gabriel, 2008 and Holz et al., 2008), or electricity markets (Hobbs,
2001 and Bushnell, 2003).
The Stackelberg model (section 2.3.3) deals with sequential move games (see Tirole
(1988) for some examples) in which one player, the leader, maximises his profits given
a set of complementarity conditions. Such problems are typically called Mathematical
Programmes with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC’s) in the literature (e.g. Harker and
Pang, 1988 or Luo et al., 1996).
The MPEC class of problems has been used for applications in various fields of
research e.g. tax credits and biofuel production (Bard et al., 2000), non-competitive
behaviour in markets for NOx allowances and electricity (Chen et al., 2006), or the role
11Generally, the models presented here are particularly well-suited to scrutinise such spatial markets
where the focus is on variable costs and not so much on fixed (e.g. investment) costs. Typically, the
supply costs of resources and minerals produced by mining and quarrying industries (e.g. coal, iron ore,
bauxite, manganese, copper ore, rare earth elements) have a much larger variable cost and smaller fixed
cost component than for instance (conventional) natural gas and oil production. In markets that are
characterised by a larger share of (constant) variable costs, or more precisely marginal costs, the short-
run supply rationale of equating marginal costs to marginal revenues appears to be a better predictor
for prices.
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of dominant utilities in the European power system (Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010) to
name but a few.
In all three models coal exporters control one or several export assets and coal
importers (steel mills, coke producers, etc.) are assigned to importing regions. It is
assumed that the exporters’ objective is to maximise their respective profits. In the
Stackelberg and the Cournot cartel scenarios the Big-Four control their mines as one
player. In the Cournot oligopoly and the perfect competition scenario each of the four
multinationals control their respective mines. In all the scenarios, players other than the
Big-Four are modelled as national oligopolists. This assumption is typical for this strand
of research and unproblematic in the presented paper as there is only one dominant
player exporting metallurgical coal per country. Importers are assumed to behave as
price takers.12 Coal is traded via dry bulk vessel shipping routes.
The model consists of a network NW (N,A), where N is a set of nodes and A is
a set of arcs between the nodes. The set of nodes N can be divided into two subsets,
N ≡ M ∪ J , where m ∈ M is an export mine and j ∈ J is an import node. Players
i ∈ I control coal mines m ∈Mi. A mine can only be controlled by one player. Mining
costs (includes washing/upgrading), loading and inland transport costs, as well as port
handling fees add up to a specific mine’s constant FOB (Free On Board) costs cm per
produced unit of coal xm,j . Seaborne transport costs amount to τm,j per unit xm,j
shipped. For simplicity τm,j is the same for all mines m ∈ Mi controlled by player
i ∈ I.13 In all three models, import demand in region j ∈ J is represented by a linear
function of the form:
pj = Pj
(∑
m∈M
xm,j
)
= aj − bj ·
∑
m∈M
xm,j (2.1)
where pj denotes the price in region j as a function Pj(.) of the imported quantity∑
m∈M xm,j . The parameter aj denotes the reservation price, and parameter bj specifies
the slope of the demand function.
2.3.1 Cournot-Nash Model
In the Cournot-Nash model, the producers choose their optimal export quantity simul-
taneously. The amount of coal supplied by player i ∈ I to region j ∈ J is defined as
Xi,j =
∑
m∈Mi xm,j ; let me define X−i,j as the quantity supplied by all other producers
to region j ∈ J :
X−i,j =
∑
m∈M 6=Mi
xm,j (2.2)
12Although historically this assumption is debatable, recent research by Bowden (2012) has pointed
out the erosion of buyer-side market power since the early 2000s.
13This simplification is unproblematic as the exporters’ mines are typically clustered in one region and
hence their coal is exported through the same port.
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Player i’s profit maximisation problem Ωi consists of the profit function (2.3) and the
constraints (2.4) and (2.5):
maxm∈Mi
∑
j∈J
[Pj (X−i,j +Xi,j) · xi,j − τm,j · xm,j − cm · xm,j ] (2.3)
subject to:
Capm ≥
∑
j∈J
xm,j (µm) (2.4)
xm,j ≥ 0 (2.5)
Restriction (2.4) ensures that production in mine m ∈Mi does not exceed the available
mining capacity Capm in this mine. The strictly quasi-concave objective function (2.3)
and the convex restrictions (2.4) and (2.5) form an optimisation problem, which has a
unique solution. The first-order optimality conditions are thus necessary and sufficient
for deriving a unique optimum if the set of feasible solutions is non-empty. The equi-
librium conditions (KKT conditions) are derived using the first order derivatives of the
Lagrangian of Ωi. The Lagrangian multiplier µm is the shadow price of mining capacity
of mine m ∈Mi controlled by player i ∈ I. It represents the value of a marginal unit of
mining capacity, i.e. the increment of profits if the producer had an infinitesimally small
unit of additional capacity. The FOCs correspond to the following complementarity
conditions:
τm,j + cm + µm + bj · xm,j − [aj − bj · (X−i,j +Xi,j)] ≥ 0 ⊥xm,j ≥ 0 (2.6)
−
∑
j∈J
xm,j + Capm ≥ 0 ⊥µm ≥ 0 (2.7)
Equation (2.1), constraint (2.5) and the first order conditions (2.6) and (2.7) for all
players i ∈ I together constitute the optimisation problem. The unique solution for this
set of inequalities yields the equilibrium for this market. This mixed complementary
problem is implemented using the software GAMS and solved with PATH.14
2.3.2 Perfect Competition
In the competitive model, the players face a similar optimisation problem as in the
Cournot-Nash model, given by (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5), with the exception that the players
cannot influence the market price in region j ∈ J . This leads to the following objective
14See Rutherford (1994) or Ferris and Munson (1998) for detailed information on complementarity
programming in GAMS.
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function for competitive players:
maxm∈Mi
∑
j∈J
[
Pj
(∑
m∈M
xm,j
)
· xm,j − τm,j · xm,j − cm · xm,j
]
(2.8)
Given the non-negativity of output condition and constrained production capacity,
player i’s profit maximisation problem Θi consists of profit function (2.8) and constraints
(2.4) and (2.5).
The term bj · xm,j in (6) represents the oligopolistic mark-up on the market price in
j ∈ J . However, in the perfect competition model, none of the players i ∈ I has the
ability to influence the market price in import region j ∈ J by strategically choosing
the amount of coal supplied. Therefore, the FOC (2.6) simplifies to (2.9) under the
assumption of a linear demand function.
τm,j + cm + µm −
(
aj − bj ·
∑
m∈M
xm,j
)
≥ 0 ⊥xm,j ≥ 0 (2.9)
FOC (2.9) states that i ∈ I will supply coal to region j ∈ J until the marginal costs
of supply (i.e. transport costs plus the shadow price of capacity plus marginal FOB
costs) equal the price in this region. FOCs (2.7) and (2.9) as well as equation (2.1)
and constraint (2.5) constitute an optimisation problem with a unique solution (see
section 2.3.1) which is implemented in GAMS and solved with PATH. Furthermore,
the outcome of the model presented here corresponds to the outcome of a least-cost
allocation determined by a benevolent social planner.
2.3.3 Stackelberg Model
The interaction between a leading player (leader) and the following players (followers)
can be interpreted as a sequential move game with two periods in which the leader
(irrevocably) decides in the first period how much to sell in the second period, taking
into account the followers’ best response in the second period to his decision. In the
second period the followers engage in a Cournot-Nash game given the leaders’ fixed
output. It is assumed that the leader can commit to his decision taken in period one.
The market is cleared in period two. Such problems can be modeled as an MPEC (see
e.g. Dirkse and Ferris, 1999) where the leader maximises his profit given a set of the
followers’ optimality conditions, formulated as complementarity conditions (profit and
capacity constraints).
In the Stackelberg setup, leader S controls the mines m ∈ Ms which have individ-
ual FOB costs specified by κm.
15 The leader incurs seaborne freight costs fj for coal
15The leader’s production and transport costs are renamed for the sake of simplicity but rely on the
same data as above.
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shipments to import region j ∈ J . The leader’s production in mine m ∈ Ms is denoted
by qm,j whereas Qj =
∑
m∈Ms qm,j denotes the leader’s total production. The followers
i ∈ I export coal Xi,j =
∑
m∈Mi xm,j to j ∈ J which they produce in their respective
mines m ∈ Mi. Let me define Yj =
∑
i∈I Xi,j as the sum of all followers’ exports to
j ∈ J .
The leader’s profits are characterised by (2.10) whereas (2.11) is the mining capacity
restriction and (2.12) states, that only positive output is possible.
maxm∈Ms
∑
j∈J
[Pj (Qj + Yj) · qm,j − fj · qm,j − κm · qm,j ] (2.10)
Capm ≥
∑
j∈J
qm,j (2.11)
qm,j ≥ 0 (2.12)
As the leader’s profits depend on the output of the followers, Yj , the leader also
has to take into account the followers’ best response to his decision. The followers
essentially face the same optimisation problem as in the Cournot-Nash model which
is given by (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5). However, in the Stackelberg model an individual
follower’s profit not only depends on his output Xi,j and the other followers’ output
X−i,j (see definition (2.2)) but also on the leader’s output decision Qj . This leads to
the following best-response function (2.13) in its complementarity form:
τm,j + cm + µm + bj · xm,j − [aj − bj · (X−i,j +Xi,j +Qj)] ≥ 0 ⊥xm,j ≥ 0 (2.13)
The upper-level optimisation problem (2.10) to (2.12) and the lower-level optimality
conditions for all followers i ∈ I (2.7) and (2.13) as well as inequality (2.5) and equation
(2.1) together constitute the MPEC which is implemented in GAMS and solved with
CONOPT using the GAMS convert tool for MPECs (see Ferris et al., 2002).16
2.4 Dataset
2.4.1 Supply Side Data
The supply side of the coking coal market is represented by a dataset comprising mining
costs, inland transport costs, port handling costs, and seaborne freight rates between
exporting and importing regions. The data used are on a mine-by-mine basis (about
100 export operations) for the years 2008, 2009, and 2010. The dataset covers dedicated
export mines and mines that serve both international and domestic markets. The latter
16See appendix A for additional information on solution of the Stackelberg model and for the outline
of a test model for ex-post optimal follower behaviour.
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type of mines is particularly relevant for the USA and to some degree for Russia as
well. The data stems from various sources such as company presentations (e.g. CoAL,
2009), annual reports, investment reports, business plans, market reviews (e.g. IEA,
2011b,c), research projects (e.g. Franke, 2011), articles written by industry experts (e.g.
Rademacher, 2008; Bayer et al., 2009; Rademacher and Braun, 2011), expert interviews,
etc. Mining cost changes were accounted for using the mining cost index published by
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (see ABS, 2006 for details) according to the share
of underground and open-cast mines in the dataset. For the United States and Canada
mining costs were escalated based on the cost structure of the mines (share of the costs
of inputs such as fuel, steel, explosives, labour, tyres, etc. on total costs) using input
price data from the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS, 2011; see also Tru¨by and
Paulus, 2012; Paulus and Tru¨by, 2011; and IEA, 2011b). Figure 2.1 presents the supply
cost curve example (FOB) for the year 2008 for all players.
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Figure 2.1: FOB supply cash costs of export mines as implemented in the models, 2008
Source: own analysis.
Maritime shipping costs τm,j between mines controlled by player i ∈ I and importing
regions j ∈ J were calculated based on dry bulk freight rates data from McCloskey.
Specifically, the freight rate data were regressed against shipping distances to determine
the parameters γ > 0 and 0 < ϕ < 1 of a freight cost function of the form W (dm,j) =
τm,j = γ · dϕm,j where dm,j denotes the distance between m and j. The individual
transport cost functions were calculated for every year. These cost functions are used
in the model to determine consistent freight rates for every possible shipping route.
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2.4.2 Demand Side Data
As described in section three, the inverse import demand function for metallurgical
coal is assumed to be linear. Such a function can be characterized by a reference price
and a reference quantity, i.e. real market outcomes in each year and a point elasticity
parameter eta. Coking coal benchmark prices plus average freight costs were used as
import reference prices and the actual import volumes of each importing region were
used as reference quantity (table 2.2). The elasticity parameter determines the slope of
the function in the reference point. Clearly, the elasticity is the most critical parameter
in the demand representation. It is likely that the elasticity varies over time e.g. due to
the dynamics of downstream steel markets. For reasons of limited data availability an
estimation of the price elasticity of demand is not in the scope of the presented paper.
Yet, to take into account the fact that the elasticity parameter is one of the key drivers
of the model results, I test for a bandwidth of elasticity assumptions ranging from -0.1
to -0.8. Previous analyses have pointed out that coking coal demand is inelastic to price
changes, i.e. eta < 1. Ball and Loncar (1991) estimate the price elasticity of coking coal
demand to fall into a range of -0.3 to -0.5 in Western Europe and -0.15 to -0.4 in Japan.
The authors however suggest that the price elasticity of demand is likely to increase in
the future with market penetration of the PCI technology. Graham et al. (1999) consider
an elasticity value of -0.3 to be most likely to have prevailed in this market in the year
they analysed i.e. 1996.
Table 2.2: Reference import demand quantities in million tonnes
Europe and Chinese Other Latin Other/
Mediterranean Japan Korea Taipei China India Brazil America Unspecified Total
2008 63 64 16 8 3 26 11 4 18 213
2009 43 51 20 4 22 26 12 3 10 191
2010 58 60 27 8 34 35 13 4 7 245
Source: IEA (2011a).
2.5 Statistical Measures
Analysing actual and predicted trade flows between exporting and importing regions
is one way to assess the accuracy of a model. In doing so, I apply several statistical
measures: Theil’s inequality coefficient, a linear hypothesis test, and Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient. These are standard procedures for testing prediction accuracy
of this model class (e.g. Kolstad and Abbey, 1984; Kolstad and Burris, 1986; Graham
et al., 1999; Bushnell et al., 2008). For consistency reasons and as there is no data on
company-level trade-flows available, all actual trade-flows are on a national level and
stem from IEA (2011a). Firstly, Theil’s inequality coefficient U is used to gain insights
into the differences between predicted and actual values (Theil, 1961). The set k ∈ K
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denotes trade flow pairs between importing regions j ∈ J and exporting regions i ∈ I
(section 3.3).17 The inequality coefficient is basically the root-mean-squared error of the
model-based trade flows Xk and the corresponding actual Ak trade flows:
U =
√∑
k∈K(Xk −Ak)2(√∑
k∈K X2k +
√∑
k∈K A2k
) (2.14)
As can be seen in (2.14), I use the scaled version of U in which the coefficient lies between
0 and 1. An inequality coefficient of 0 indicates that the predicted values are equal to the
actual values whereas a coefficient close to 1 suggests that there is a large spread between
predicted and actual values. Therefore lower values (in a relative sense) are considered
a better indicator for model accuracy. Hypothesis testing is not possible as Theil’s
inequality coefficient is distribution-free. Additional information can be gained from a
decomposition of U into its covariance proportion UCOV (2.16), its variance proportion
UV AR (2.17), and its bias proportion UBIAS (2.18) using the mean-squared-error MSE
(2.15).
MSE =
∑
k∈K
(Xk −Ak)2 + (σX − σA)2 + 2 · (1− rXA) · σX · σA (2.15)
UCOV = 2 · (1− rXA) · σX · σA/MSE (2.16)
UV AR = (σX − σA)2/MSE (2.17)
UBIAS =
∑
k∈K
(Xk −Ak)2/MSE (2.18)
The standard deviation is denoted by σ whereas r is the correlation coefficient. The
subscript A denotes actual trade-flows data and the subscript X denotes predicted trade-
flows data. The covariance proportion measures the spread of data points along a 45◦ line
that would result if the trade values of a perfect prediction model were plotted against
actual trade values (Kolstad and Abbey, 1984). The covariance proportion measures
the degree to which a regression line through the scatter plot of actual versus predicted
trade-flows deviates from 1 (i.e. the slope that would result if the predicted values were
equal to actual values). As suggested by Kolstad and Abbey (1984) and Kolstad and
Burris (1986), I interpret a large value of the covariance proportion as an indicator for
a good model as one would expect some random component in model predictions.
Following Bushnell et al. (2008), a more formal test can examine whether the values
of the predicted trade flow matrix are meaningfully different from the values of the
actual matrix. Although the arrangement in this analysis is different from Bushnell
et al. (2008) the basic idea of employing a linear hypothesis test for model validation
remains the same. The empirical model is that actual trade-flows equal predicted trade-
flows. In my case, this can be done by regressing actual trade-flows Ak on the predicted
17There are 45 observations (trade-flows) per year, per elasticity assumption, and per model.
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trade flows Xk:
Ak = β0 + β1 ·Xk + k (2.19)
I estimate equation (2.19) using ordinary least squares (OLS). In order for the respective
model’s trade-flows to be consistent with the actual values, I require that β0 = 0 and
β1 = 1 cannot be rejected on typical significance levels. Finally, I employ Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s rho) to analyse the correlation of the market
shares of exporters in importing regions. The ranking of trade-flows according to vol-
ume corresponds to a ranking of the market shares of exporters in importing regions.
Spearman’s rho is generally expressed as
rho = 1−
∑
k
d2k/(n
3 − n) (2.20)
where dk is the difference in the ranks of the predicted and the actual trade-flows and n
is the sample size. A large value of Spearman’s rho (one at maximum) indicates a good
reproduction of the market shares (ranking of the trade-flows) in the model. However,
just looking at rho can be misleading. Consider two equal trade flow matrices. They
would deliver a rho of one. Now divide one of the matrices by two. The ranking of the
trade flows would remain the same although one market is twice as large as the other.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Trade-flows
The accuracy of predicted trade-flows is a key indicator for the quality of a spatial market
model. Actual and predicted trade-flows of all market structure scenarios for all years
and elasticities were analysed with the statistical measures described in section 5.18 With
regard to Theil’s inequality coefficient and its covariance proportion, two observations
stand out (figure 2.2): first, the Stackelberg model performs best for all elasticities
and years. However, the coefficients for the Stackelberg and Cournot oligopoly models
converge with increasing price sensitivity and produce virtually the same results for
higher elasticities i.e. eta < −0.2 (except for 2009). Second, the perfect competition
model performs better than the Cournot cartel model for lower elasticities whereas the
Cournot cartel scenario performs better for higher elasticities. Yet, both models appear
to be relatively poor predictors for trade-flows, as they typically exhibit markedly higher
inequality coefficients than the Stackelberg and Cournot oligopoly models.
18All trade-flow matrices can be found in appendix A.
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The analysis of Spearman’s rho supports the above findings (figure 2.2). Clearly,
all non-competitive models perform substantially better than the perfect competition
model. This result is robust for all years and all elasticity cases. Among the non-
competitive models the Stackelberg and Cournot oligopoly models generally perform
slightly better than the Cournot cartel model.
The results of the linear hypothesis test confirm these findings (table 2.3). The
hypothesis that the perfect competition model predicts trade can generally be rejected
on the 99.9% level, irrespective of the year and the elasticity. The Cournot cartel scenario
can generally be rejected on typical significance levels for high elasticities in 2008 and
2010 and for all elasticities in 2009. The Cournot oligopoly scenario can be rejected only
in 2009 for eta = −0.1 and eta = −0.2 and in 2010 for eta = −0.1. Linear hypothesis
testing does not suggest rejecting the hypothesis that the Stackelberg model actually
predicts trade for any of the elasticities or years analysed.
With regard to accuracy of trade-flows, the oligopolistic models typically perform
better than the competitive model due to a higher diversification of trade. This higher
trade diversification in the non-competitive models stems from the players’ profit max-
imisation: an oligopolist exports to a certain importing region until his marginal revenue
equals marginal costs there. With a high market share in a certain importing region,
perceived marginal revenue for the exporter is low, hence making it attractive to diver-
sify the export structure. This rationale may cause trade with regions that would not
occur for cost reasons in a perfectly competitive market.
Chapter 2. Strategic Behaviour in International Metallurgical Coal Markets 26
































	





















































































	
























































 
































	







































































	




 













	



	
			




































































	




 













	



	
			




















































 














	




 













	



	
			





































































	

	

















	



	






































































	

	

















	



	




















































 
















	

	





















	



	


























































F
ig
u
r
e
2
.2
:
T
h
ei
l’
s
in
eq
u
a
li
ty
co
effi
ci
en
t
a
n
d
th
e
co
va
ri
a
n
ce
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
S
p
ea
rm
a
n
’s
rh
o
a
s
fu
n
ct
io
n
s
o
f
et
a
S
o
u
rc
e:
ow
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s.
Chapter 2. Strategic Behaviour in International Metallurgical Coal Markets 27
2.6.2 Prices
As a second indicator for model prediction accuracy I compare coking coal benchmark
prices to corresponding coal prices from the four market structure scenarios (figure 2.3).19
The first finding is that the perfectly competitive model systematically underestimates
real market prices irrespective of the elasticity parameter and the year. The second
finding is that the non-competitive models can explain real market prices for a range
of elasticities. The Stackelberg model can reproduce prices in 2008 for eta = −0.2
to eta = −0.4, in 2009 for eta = −0.5 to eta = −0.8 and in 2010 for eta = −0.4
to eta = −0.6. The Cournot oligopoly model can reproduce prices for slightly higher
elasticity parameters, specifically in 2008 for eta = −0.3 to eta = −0.4, in 2009 for
eta = −0.6 to eta = −0.8 and in 2010 for eta = −0.5 to eta = −0.6. The Cournot cartel
model can reproduce prices only in 2008 and 2010 and requires the highest elasticity
parameters to do so i.e. eta = −0.5 for 2008 and eta = −0.6 to eta = −0.8 for 2010.
19Although the analysis accounts for all metallurgical coal qualities (hard coking coals, semi-soft coking
coals, and PCI coals), these coal-types are substitutes and compete in the same market. The relevant
prices for comparison of model results and actual market outcomes are nevertheless hard coking coal
benchmark prices. The reason for this is that the hard coking coal benchmark price is also the driver of
semi-soft coking and PCI coals prices, with the latter two typically being a function of the hard coking
coal benchmark price. Furthermore, hard coking coal trade volume is larger than semi-soft coking coal
or PCI coals trade volumes.
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Figure 2.3: Model-based prices as a function of eta and real market benchmark price
Source: own calculations. Benchmark prices taken from ABARES and McCloskey.
2.6.3 Profits and Export Volumes
In terms of profits, the Big-Four can typically gain most in the Stackelberg model by
colluding and benefitting from their first mover advantage (table 2.4). This becomes
clearly visible when comparing the Big-Four’s profits in the Stackelberg model with the
corresponding profits in the Cournot cartel scenario. In the Stackelberg model the Big-
Four export more than in the Cournot cartel scenario. This is detrimental to the other
players – the followers – who reduce their exports. The market price is c.p. lower in the
Stackelberg scenario than in the Cournot cartel scenario (figure 2.3) but the expansion
in sales overcompensates this effect for the leader, rendering this strategy profitable.
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Table 2.4: Aggregated profits (2008 to 2010) from metallurgical coal exports in billion USD
Cournot Cournot Perfect
Stackelberg cartel oligopoly competition
eta = −0.1
Big-Four 94.97 81.27 94.82 16.16
Others 91.32 207.47 143.19 15.47
eta = −0.2
Big-Four 60.22 52.83 58.49 22.65
Others 61.07 115.06 81.32 23.93
eta = −0.3
Big-Four 49.96 43.50 49.14 27.10
Others 53.80 83.54 62.14 29.78
eta = −0.4
Big-Four 45.15 40.03 44.62 30.32
Others 47.78 68.88 52.94 34.08
eta = −0.5
Big-Four 42.54 38.13 42.03 31.81
Others 45.03 59.82 47.64 36.06
eta = −0.6
Big-Four 40.53 37.30 40.45 33.39
Others 43.93 53.74 44.81 38.12
eta = −0.7
Big-Four 39.13 37.33 39.07 34.60
Others 43.03 50.31 43.74 39.81
eta = −0.8
Big-Four 38.51 37.80 38.50 35.69
Others 42.90 47.51 43.41 41.30
Source: own calculations.
However, in the Stackelberg scenario the Big-Four’s profits are only marginally higher
than the sum of the individual four multinationals’ profits in the Cournot oligopoly
scenario. These two models are based on different market structure assumptions but
produce similar results in terms of trade-flows, prices, and profits: compared to the
Cournot oligopoly scenario there are fewer players in the Stackelberg model since the Big-
Four act as one single player. In absence of a first mover advantage, this would typically
imply a reduction of exports by the Big-Four (table 2.5) and an expansion of exports
by the other players (compare Cournot oligopoly with Cournot cartel). However, the
strategic effect of the first-mover advantage implies that the Big-Four, as a Stackelberg
leader, export more whereas the other players reduce their output. Hence, the strategic
effect of the first mover advantage partially compensates the effect of higher market
concentration leading to similar results of the two models. This outcome is amplified by
the fact that for higher elasticities and for the years 2008 and 2010 the Big-Four do not
have sufficient export capacity to fully benefit from their first-mover advantage. In these
two years, the Big-Four produce close to their capacity limit in the Cournot oligopoly
scenario. For higher elasticities they would want to export more in the Stackelberg
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Table 2.5: Exports in million tonnes
Stackelberg Cournot cartel Cournot oligopoly Perfect competition
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
eta = −0.1
Big-Four 99.6 89.9 111.4 48.4 39.3 56.9 72.5 66.7 84.2 99.6 99.6 111.4
Others 101.4 83.5 115.9 131.1 119.6 146.3 118.6 100.2 131.7 124.3 94.4 142.9
eta = −0.2
Big-Four 97.2 92.6 111.4 54.7 46.2 64.0 77.8 70.0 90.7 99.6 99.6 111.4
Others 110.6 84.7 120.2 132.7 113.0 147.0 122.5 100.3 133.1 130.6 97.0 146.4
eta = −0.3
Big-Four 98.9 87.6 105.3 61.1 49.9 71.0 84.4 73.5 99.3 99.6 99.6 111.4
Others 114.9 90.4 127.5 134.3 113.0 147.8 123.2 100.2 130.5 132.9 99.8 149.2
eta = −0.4
Big-Four 98.4 93.3 111.4 67.5 52.7 79.1 91.2 77.1 103.4 99.6 99.6 111.4
Others 119.6 88.9 128.7 135.8 112.5 145.8 123.3 99.7 132.8 134.6 102.7 149.2
eta = −0.5
Big-Four 99.6 99.6 111.4 73.5 56.3 86.4 96.2 80.4 108.2 99.6 99.6 111.4
Others 122.6 87.1 133.0 137.6 112.1 145.5 124.9 99.6 134.6 137.8 104.5 149.7
eta = −0.6
Big-Four 99.6 96.0 111.4 80.2 60.0 92.5 99.6 83.0 111.4 99.6 99.6 111.4
Others 127.3 92.2 137.3 138.2 111.4 146.7 127.3 99.8 137.3 139.4 106.0 149.7
eta = −0.7
Big-Four 99.6 98.4 111.4 86.4 63.8 96.6 99.6 86.2 111.4 99.6 99.6 111.4
Others 132.1 92.8 141.5 138.0 110.7 146.9 132.1 100.0 141.5 140.0 108.4 149.7
eta = −0.8
Big-Four 99.6 99.2 111.4 92.6 67.3 103.4 99.6 89.5 111.4 99.6 99.6 111.4
Others 134.6 94.4 145.8 136.8 110.3 146.9 134.6 99.9 145.8 140.0 110.3 149.7
Source: own calculations. Bold case indicates binding capacity constraint.
scenario, yet short of capacity they are constrained to the corresponding Cournot output
(table 2.5).
Another interesting result is that in the Cournot cartel scenario collusion is detri-
mental to the profits of the Big-Four. In a basic Cournot model it is unclear if partial
cartelisation (or a merger) leads to higher profits for the colluding players (Salant et al.,
1983). Whether collusion is profitable depends on the number of players inside and
outside the cartel and the amount of spare capacity held by the outsiders. In the inter-
national metallurgical coal trade, the players outside the assumed cartel have sufficient
spare capacity to expand their exports and thus the Big-Four cannot increase their
profits through collusion.
2.7 Discussion of results
When interpreting the results of the model runs, one has to keep in mind two aspects:
first, the elasticity of demand is a key unknown in this analysis but at the same time
a major driver for the results. Therefore, I presented results for a large bandwidth of
elasticities. For the sake of simplicity I chose single digit equidistant elasticity points.
However, in reality the elasticity is neither a single digit parameter nor a constant
over time and geography. Second, there is some inevitable noise in the data used to
compute the model runs as well as in the real market trade-flow data used to assess
prediction accuracy. Hence, the goal of the analysis cannot be to exactly reproduce
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market equilibria but to analyse whether a specific market structure systematically and
robustly performs better than another.
In this respect, the main findings of the presented paper are threefold: Firstly, per-
fect competition cannot explain market equilibria in the metallurgical coal trade in the
period 2008 to 2010. The statistical measures suggest that the competitive model pre-
dicts trade-flows poorly and in most cases markedly worse than the non-competitive
models. Moreover, the competitive model systematically underestimates prices. Often
it is argued that prices exceeding marginal costs are not due to market power exertion
but due to capacity scarcity leading to demand rationing. Indeed, in a market without
a spatial structure it might be very difficult to detect strategic behaviour if capacity
scarcity is also an issue. In a spatial market a competitive model would however still
produce the least-cost trade matrix even if capacity was scarce leading to a low degree of
trade diversification. Consequently, given the weak performance of competitive models
with regard to trade-flow reproduction and the fact that the supply capacity data sug-
gests sufficient capacity availability, the argument of scarce capacity forcing up prices is
implausible in this market.
Secondly, non-competitive models, specifically the Cournot oligopoly and Stackelberg
models, reproduce trade-flows and prices accurately for mid-range elasticities. These
elasticity ranges are in line with the results of previous studies on coking coal demand
elasticities. Interestingly, these two models lead to very similar results in terms of trade-
flows, prices, and profits. This implies that, under the given set of assumptions, the
Big-Four could hardly benefit from a potential first mover advantage even if they would
determine their exports cooperatively. The poor performance of the competitive model
and the comparably good performance of the non-competitive models suggest that the
metallurgical coal trade was subject to strategic behaviour in the period 2008 to 2010.
Finally, under the given set of assumptions, cartelisation between the Big-Four is
unattractive. In the Cournot cartel scenario collusive behaviour is detrimental to the
total profits of the four multinationals. Although cartelisation combined with a first-
mover advantage was shown to be by and large a profitable strategy, the profit increment
in the Stackelberg model was marginal when compared to the Cournot oligopoly scenario.
Hence, the incentive to collude is small for the Big-Four. Moreover, the performance
of the Cournot cartel model with regard to trade-flow prediction accuracy and price
reproduction is mediocre, especially in 2009.
2.8 Conclusions
Three optimisation models for typical resource markets were developed in the presented
paper and applied to the international metallurgical coal market, from 2008 to 2010,
based on a detailed dataset representing the supply side characteristics of the market.
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The demand side price responsiveness was accounted for by computing model runs for
a large bandwidth of elasticities. Predicted trade-flows were analysed using statistical
measures and model-based prices were compared to actual market prices.
The numerical results suggest that market equilibria in the seaborne metallurgi-
cal coal market cannot be explained by perfectly competitive conduct. However, two
non-competitive models reproduced market outcomes reasonably well. Specifically, a
Stackelberg model, in which the Big-Four act as a cooperative leadership cartel and
a Cournot oligopoly model in which the members of the Big-Four compete individu-
ally with other players in the market were employed. Both models produced similarly
convincing results for slightly different, but in any case realistic, ranges of elasticities.
Hence, which of the two models is indeed the better predictor depends essentially on a
high resolution estimation of the temporal and regional price elasticity of demand. Yet,
for want of hard evidence of a first mover advantage and in light of the small incentive to
collude in this market, the Cournot oligopoly scenario has a strong qualitative backing.
Strategic behaviour in metallurgical coal markets should be taken seriously due to
the importance of this coal variety in steel-making and the crucial role of steel in global
economic activity. Vertical integration could be a promising strategy for steel mills
to reduce their exposure to the oligopolistic pricing. Although detrimental to welfare,
pooling demand could – as in the past – be another viable strategy to reduce supply
side market power.
Based on the insights of the presented paper, modelling other forms of sequential
strategic interaction in metallurgical coal markets could be worthwhile. Although cur-
rently computationally challenging, an example for this could be a two-stage game with
a leader-group of firms engaging in Cournot competition in the first stage and taking
into account the reaction of a follower-group of firms engaging in Cournot competition
in the second stage.
Chapter 3
Market Structure Scenarios in
International Steam Coal Trade
3.1 Introduction
Behind oil but ahead of natural gas, coal is the second-most important primary energy
source. It is mainly used for electricity and heat generation. About 36% of the global
electricity generation is based on hard coal20. Although most of the coal is produced and
consumed domestically, international steam coal trade is on the rise21. Price volatility
has increased too, and the years 2007 and 2008 both saw unprecedented price spikes.
Steam coal prices in North Western Europe reached a maximum of 210 USD/t in mid-
2008 and averaged 147 USD/t for the whole year; this is more than 130% above the
average price of 64 USD/t in 2006.22 Prices decreased with the fall of the financial crisis
in the second half of 2008 but remained relatively high throughout 2009 and 2010.23
The price increases on the spot markets for internationally traded coal in recent years
were paralleled by significant structural changes on the demand and the supply sides.
During the last decade total trade volume grew by more than 60% between 2000 and
2009 on the seaborne market. This development is mainly caused by a strong growth
of energy demand in Asian economies. Recently, India and South East Asian economies
have become major importers in the Pacific market. Moreover, China, a major net
exporter at the beginning of the last decade has drastically increased imports since
2005.
20See IEA (2010b). Data for 2008.
21The classification of hard coal (distinct from lignite) comprises steam coal and coking coal. Steam
coal (or thermal coal) is mainly used in electricity generation whereas coking coal is used for metallurgical
purposes.
22See Ritschel (2009a).
23The Asian marker (North Western European marker) was 79 USD/t (70 USD/t) in 2009 and 105
USD/t (92 USD/t) in 2010.
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The supply side is dominated by countries with mainly export-oriented mining indus-
tries like South Africa, Australia, Indonesia, and Colombia. The latter two countries are
relatively new players in this market and have expanded their supply capacity quickly
during the last decade. Moreover, in some countries, governments have developed na-
tional coal strategies during the last years, often tightening their control of coal exports,
for instance in China or Indonesia24. Due to governmental control in some countries or
the influence of large company consortia and industry associations in other countries,
steam coal supply tends to be aggregated on a national level rather than on a firm level.
In this context, the international steam coal trade market structure appears oligopolistic.
Given the growing importance of several new suppliers, the emergence of national
energy and coal strategies in several countries and the dramatic recent steam coal price
evolutions, we test whether market structures in 2006 and 2008 can be described either
through competitive or oligopolistic conduct. To do so, we develop an optimisation
model for computing spatial market equilibria in competitive and oligopolistic interna-
tional trade markets. The equilibrium modelling approach was introduced by Samuelson
(1952), with his work on the programming of competitive equilibria in spatial mar-
kets and generalised for various non-competitive market structure scenarios: e.g., by
Takayama and Judge (1964, 1971), Harker (1984, 1986a) and Yang et al. (2002). The
model is implemented as a mixed complementarity programme (MCP) with the software
GAMS and based on a unique coal market dataset of EWI. This dataset comprises inter
alia supply capacities and costs, including time-dependent supply cost functions based
on input price evolutions to account for recent supply cost increases.
We find that actual prices in 2006 are in line with the competitive benchmark in
Europe, but prices in Asian importing regions exceed marginal costs. In 2008, prices
and volumes are not consistent with the competitive benchmark. Furthermore, trade
flows are more diversified in the real market than in the competitive scenario. However,
for both years, actual prices were lower than the oligopolistic prediction. Generally,
the results indicate that competitive models are not able to fully reproduce coal market
equilibria, particularly in 2008.
Literature on market conduct in international steam coal trade is relatively scarce.
Abbey and Kolstad (1983) present a qualitative analysis of the potential to exert market
power in steam coal trade. Kolstad and Abbey (1984) were the first to quantitatively
analyse strategic behaviour in international steam coal trade in the early 1980s using
an equilibrium model. In addition to perfect competition, they model various imperfect
market structures. The authors find that a non-competitive market structure consisting
of a duopoly and a monopsony effectively simulates the actual trade patterns. However,
24China constantly reduced export licences (from 80mt in 2005 to less than 20mt in 2011). Fur-
thermore, the Chinese government started a programme to restructure and consolidate the coal mining
industry (Peng, 2011). In Indonesia only Indonesian companies or consortia are eligible for mining
concessions (Baruya, 2009).
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since that time the steam coal trade market has changed substantially. We follow the
approach of Kolstad and Abbey (1984) by using a partial equilibrium model and update
their research with recent data. Haftendorn and Holz (2010) produced a paper most
closely related to ours. They model a number of major seaborne coal trade routes and
apply a mixed complementarity model to test if the trade volumes on these routes fit
competitive or Cournot-Nash behaviour in the years 2005 and 2006. They conclude
from their results that the steam coal trade market is better represented by perfect
competition.
We add three important aspects to their analysis. First, while their research focuses
on selected major trade routes, we extend the analysis to cover the full seaborne steam
coal trade market25. Second, we use a different database and generalise the model for
multi-production plant players to account for cost differences in mining regions and
mining technologies. It is reassuring that, for 2006, in an independent approach we find
qualitatively similar results to those of Haftendorn and Holz (2010). Third, and most
important, by extending the time considered up to 2008, we are able to show that the
actual market equilibrium deviated significantly from a perfectly competitive benchmark
equilibrium.
The remainder of the presented paper is structured as follows: First, we will briefly
outline the current situation on the seaborne steam coal trade market. Section 3.3
proceeds with a detailed description of the model and its properties. Then, in section
3.4 the supply and demand side data input is described. The scenario design is outlined
in section 3.5. Section 3.6 presents the model results. Section 3.7 discusses results for
2008, and finally, section 3.8 concludes the presented paper.
3.2 The Seaborne Steam Coal Trade Market
The majority of steam coals are not traded internationally but are produced and con-
sumed in domestic markets. In 2008 total global hard coal production reached 5850 mt.26
The two largest domestic markets are China and the USA, together comprising more
than 65% of total production. About 13% of the global steam coal production is traded
internationally, and more than 90% of international steam coal trade is seaborne. In this
submarket, two different types of suppliers interact with each other: countries that have
a dedicated export-oriented mining industry and countries with chiefly inland-oriented
25The larger coverage might not only be an advantage in terms of higher completeness. Note that
the omitted volumes in Haftendorn and Holz (2010) stem from smaller producers and are accounted
for in our oligopoly model as part of the competitive fringe. This systematically leads to lower prices
compared to just ignoring these quantities. Furthermore, a higher demand side coverage leads to a
higher production of exporters that are modeled in both analyses. With an increasing marginal cost
function, this systematically raises prices compared to ignoring these demand regions.
26See Ritschel (2009a); includes coking coal.
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mining industries27. The former type primarily comprises South Africa, Colombia, Aus-
tralia, and Indonesia and represents most of the supply capacity for the international
trade market. These export industries usually have a cost advantage over domestic in-
dustries due to good coal qualities, low mining costs, and economical access to transport
infrastructure. The latter type primarily consists of China, the USA, and Russia. These
countries have some dedicated export collieries, but most of the potential export capacity
can serve both the national and the international markets. Depending on the relation
of export prices, to domestic prices these mines supply either domestic consumers or
maritime trade markets (swing suppliers). The majority of domestic mines are always
extramarginal to international markets due to low coal quality, contractual obligations,
high supply costs, or lack of access to infrastructure.
The seaborne trade market can be divided into Pacific and Atlantic market regions28.
Major importing regions in the Atlantic market are the USA and Europe (including
neighbouring Mediterranean countries) with the United Kingdom and Germany at the
top. Traditionally, these importing regions are primarily supplied by South Africa,
Colombia and Russia.
The Pacific market has grown faster in recent years. High quantities are imported
by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, all three of which have virtually no indigenous
coal production and therefore rely heavily on imports. However, most of the growth has
come from emerging import regions like India, South East Asia, and China. The supply
side is dominated by Australia and Indonesia, although the sustained high prices in Asia
have attracted increasing spot volumes from South Africa, and very recently, also from
Colombia.
3.3 Model Description
We develop a spatial equilibrium model for the seaborne steam coal market in which
exporters and importers trade with each other. Coal exporters control one or more
coal-producing regions (including the infrastructure), and coal importers are assigned to
demand regions. These players trade steam coal with each other via bulk carrier shipping
routes. It is assumed that the exporters’ objective is to maximise their respective profits.
Importers are assumed to act as price takers29. The optimisation model is formulated as
a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) by deriving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
27See e.g. Kopal (2007) or Rademacher (2008).
28During the last decade trade flows between the two regions grew considerably and recent research
has pointed out that the global steam coal market is well integrated (see e.g. Warell (2006) or Li (2008)).
Nevertheless, we use these terms in the presented paper in a geographical sense to better structure our
analysis.
29Since all coal flows are adjusted to a calorific value of 25.1 MJ/kg coal is a homogenous good for the
importers. Importers are not able to influence market prices through strategic (oligopsonistic) market
behaviour.
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conditions. In equilibrium, the set of prices and quantities simultaneously satisfies all
first-order-optimality conditions.
The model consists of a network NW (N,A), where N is a set of nodes and A is
a set of arcs between the nodes. The set of nodes N can be divided into two subsets,
N ≡ E ∪ I , where i ∈ E is an export region and j ∈ I is a demand node. Players z ∈ Z
control export regions i ∈ Ez. Export regions can only be controlled by one player,⋂
z∈Z Ez ≡ . The set of arcs A ≡ Ez × I consists of arcs f(z,j). Table 3.1 gives an
overview of demand regions, export regions, and the corresponding players as modelled
in the presented paper30.
Table 3.1: Model regions
Exporting regions Corresponding players Demand regions
New South Wales/open cast Australia Europe (including Mediterranean)
New South Wales/underground Australia Japan
Queensland/open cast Australia South Korea
Queensland/underground Australia Taiwan
Mpumalanga/open cast South Africa China
Mpumalanga/underground South Africa India
Kalimantan & Sumatra Indonesia Latin America
Kuzbass & Donbass Russia North America
Eastern Kuzbass, Yakutia and far East Russia South East Asia
Colombia Colombia
Shanxi China
Central Appalachia USA
Venezuela Venezuela
Vietnam Vietnam
Poland Poland
Spitsbergen Norway
Mining costs, average inland transport costs, and port terminal costs add up to a
quadratic free-on-board (FOB) supply function31 depending on the produced quantity
qi per export node Si(qi). Seaborne transport costs τz,j per unit xz,j shipped. However,
the transport cost parameter τz,j(dz,j) depends on the distance dz,j between z and j.
Individual transport cost functions were calculated for every year based on historical
data32. Import demand is represented by a linear function of the form:
pj
(∑
z
xz,j
)
= aj − bj ·
∑
z
xz,j (3.1)
30The model export nodes cover about 98% of real market exports. The remaining 2% of exports is
divided among the model regions according to their share of total production. Import side coverage is
about 95%. The import balance is divided among the import regions according to their share of total
imports.
31Quadratic marginal functions had the best fit when regressed against a dataset of mining costs.
Furthermore, quadratic marginal cost functions capture important characteristics of steam coal supply
e.g. an increasing increment of marginal costs the more capacity is utilised.
32Bulk carrier freight data were provided by McCloskey Coal Information, Frachtkontor Junge & Co.,
and Baltic Exchange. See section 3.4.2 for a detailed description of transport cost data.
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where pj denotes the price in region j subject to the imported quantity. The parameter
aj denotes the reservation price, and parameter bj specifies the slope of the demand
function. Production costs Wi in node i ∈ E correspond to the integral under the
quadratic FOB supply function:
Wi(qi) =
∫ qi
0
Si(q)dq =
1
3
· αj · q3i +
1
2
· βi · q2i + ρi · qi (3.2)
The amount of coal supplied by player z ∈ Z to region j ∈ I is defined as xz,j ; let us
define x˜z,j as the quantity supplied by all other producers to region j ∈ I:
x˜z,j =
∑
k∈Z
k 6=z
xk,j (3.3)
Producer z’s profit maximisation problem Ωz consists of the objective function Fz and
the constraints (3.5)-(3.7):
Fz =
∑
j
pj (x˜z,j + xz,j) · xz,j − xz,j · τz,j −Wi(qi) → max
x,q
! (3.4)
Subject to: ∑
i
qi ≥
∑
j
xz,j (µz) (3.5)
Ci ≥ qi (γi) (3.6)
qi ≥ 0 (3.7)
Restriction (3.5) states that production in i ∈ E has to be at least as high as the
total exports. The second restriction (3.6) ensures that production in i ∈ E does not
exceed the available capacity Ci. The strictly quasi-concave objective function (3.4) and
the convex restrictions (3.5)-(3.7) form an optimisation problem, which has a unique
solution. The first-order optimality conditions are thus necessary and sufficient for
deriving a unique optimum if the set of feasible solutions is non-empty. The equilibrium
conditions are derived using the first order derivatives of the Lagrangian of Ωz (KKT
conditions). The Lagrangian multipliers µz and γi are shadow prices for player z ∈ Z
and in region i ∈ E, respectively. The variable µz represents the value of a marginal
unit of exports, whereas γi corresponds to the value of a marginal unit of production
capacity. The KKT conditions can be expressed as follows:
τi,j −
(
∂pj
∂xz,j
+
∂pj
∂x˜z,j
∂x˜z,j
∂xz,j
)
xz,j − pj
(∑
z
xz,j
)
+ µz ≥ 0 ⊥ xz,j ≥ 0 (3.8)
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∂Wi
∂qi
+ γi − µz = αi · q2i + βi · qi + ρi + γi − µz ≥ 0 ⊥ qi ≥ 0 (3.9)
−
∑
j
xz,j +
∑
i
qi ≥ 0 ⊥ µz ≥ 0 (3.10)
− qi + Ci ≥ 0 ⊥ γi ≥ 0 (3.11)
The derivative (∂pj/∂xz,j + ∂pj/∂x˜z,j · ∂x˜z,j/∂xz,j) ·xz,j in (3.8) expresses player z’s
ability to influence the market price in j ∈ I by strategically choosing the amount of
coal supplied, subject to his conjecture of the other producers’ reaction. In the case
of a Cournot-Nash oligopoly, ∂x˜z,j/∂xz,j = 0 holds and KKT-condition (3.8) simplifies
to (3.8a) under the assumption of a linear demand function. In a competitive market,
however, a change of player z’s supply will be fully offset by the other producers, and
therefore, ∂x˜z,j/∂xz,j = −1 holds. In the case of perfect competition and for fringe
suppliers condition (3.8) simplifies to (3.8b).
τz,j + µz + bj · xz,j − pj
(∑
z
xz,j
)
≥ 0 ⊥ xz,j ≥ 0 (3.8a)
τz,j + µz − pj
(∑
z
xz,j
)
≥ 0 ⊥ xz,j ≥ 0 (3.8b)
Equation (3.1), the first order conditions (3.8) and (3.9) as well as capacity constraints
(3.10) and (3.11) for all players z ∈ Z together constitute the optimisation problem.
The unique solution for this set of inequalities yields the equilibrium for this market.
This mixed complementary problem was implemented using the software GAMS33.
3.4 Dataset
The database used in this analysis stems from several extensive research projects con-
ducted at the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne. Steam coal
market data have been acquired from a multitude of different and potentially hetero-
geneous sources. Although steam coal market data seem scarce at first glance, vari-
ous institutions, researchers, experts, and companies have published useful information.
General steam coal market data are for example, published by institutions like IEA and
EIA34. Detailed data on supply chain costs, steam coal demand, and production of major
players are available from the IEA Clean Coal Centre35. Further publications include
33See Rutherford (1994) or Ferris and Munson (1998) for detailed information on complementarity
programming in GAMS.
34See IEA (2009) and IEA (2010c), EIA (2010a) and EIA (2010b).
35See Baruya (2007, 2009), Minchener (2004, 2007) and Crocker and Kowalchuk (2008).
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analyses from employees working for international utilities and coal industry newslet-
ters36. National statistics bureaus and ministries concerned with minerals, energy, and
resources provide detailed information37. Furthermore, company annual reports and pre-
sentations related to the steam coal market have been evaluated and expert interviews
conducted. Moreover, our database is regularly discussed and reviewed with industry
experts.
3.4.1 Mining Costs and Export Capacity
Costs for mining consist of overburden removal and extraction costs, processing and
washing costs, and transportation costs within the colliery. The data on mining costs
are based on expert interviews and the evaluation of annual reports and literature sources
as described above. Since these data stem from heterogeneous sources and are mostly
based on cost ranges and mining costs of representative mines, we regard our data only
as proxy for real mining costs. The lack of data on some mines might cause distortions if
we would model every single mine explicitly. Therefore, we fit the available data of mine
mouth cash costs and mining capacity to a quadratic marginal cost function by ordinary
least squares. This method yields a supply curve that comprises the main characteristics
and cost levels of each mining region. Figure 3.1 gives an example of Colombian mining
costs and the approximated marginal cost function. As coal qualities vary between the
mining regions, calorific values are generally adjusted to 25.1 MJ/kg using data from
Ritschel (2010), BGR (2008), and IEA (2009).
20
25
30
35
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
U
SD
/t
 a
d
ju
st
e
d
 t
o
 2
5
.1
 M
J/
kg
million tonnes
Figure 3.1: Example of FOB costs for Colombia and approximation of marginal cost function
for 2006
Source: EWI coal database.
These supply curves are complemented by country and technology-specific min-
ing cost structures and are escalated using input price data. These cost structures
36See e.g. Kopal (2007), Rademacher (2008), Bayer et al. (2009) and Ritschel (2007), Ritschel and
Schiffer (2005). The McCloskey Coal Report is regularly reviewed.
37Notable examples are ABARE, US Geological Survey, Bundesanstalt fu¨r Geowissenschaften und
Rohstoffe, Australian Bureau of Statistics, DANE, BLS and Statistics South Africa.
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are derived from a number of sources. Detailed information for Australian open cast
and underground mines is found in ABS (2006). Meister (2008), Baruya (2007), and
Ritschel (2007), for instance, provide information on cost structures on a global scale.
Longwalling and Room/Pillar are the predominant underground mining technologies,
whereas open cast operations rely either on draglines or truck/shovel or a mix of both
technologies. The cost structures indicate how much diesel fuel, steel, explosives, tyres,
chemicals, electricity, and labour is used per mode of technology. The proportions of
these commodities vary significantly between the four predominant extraction technolo-
gies dragline, truck/shovel, longwalling, and room/pillar (see table 3.2). Labour cost is
one of the factors that typically differ among the coal-producing countries. For example,
while salaries are low in countries like South Africa or Indonesia, they are considerably
higher in the USA or Australia.
Table 3.2: Input factors and relative importance in coal mining 2006
Diesel fuel Steel mill Industrial
in % and lubricants Explosives Tyres products Electricity Labour Chemicals
Room/Pillar 5-8 0-2 0 23-34 10-18 28-39 9-13
Longwalling 5-10 0-2 0 25-35 10-17 28-45 4-8
Dragline 15-19 15-21 5-10 22-27 6-11 18-33 1-4
Truck/Shovel 17-26 17-23 8-11 19-26 0-3 18-35 1-4
Source: ABS (2006), Meister (2008), own database, see also Paulus and Tru¨by (2011).
The mining cost curves are escalated according to the cost structures using the
price index data for the above-mentioned commodities from various statistical offices.
Furthermore, productivity figures and country-specific exposures to fluctuations of ex-
change rates are included. This method yields the shifts in supply curves for the period
of 2006-2008.
Generally, coal supply costs increased world-wide during 2006 and 2008 due to in-
put price escalation. Table 3.3 presents an overview of the cost increases for the model
mining regions. Clearly, mining cost escalation affected producers differently. Major ex-
porters with a large share of open cast production, like Indonesia or Colombia, generally
experienced higher cost increases. Producers with a high proportion of underground
mines, like the U.S., South Africa, or Australia, were less affected. This is due to the
different cost structures of underground mining operations. Underground mining tech-
nologies rely to a larger extent on labour costs, electricity prices, and locally sourced
materials. With the exception of steel products, which are also an important input in
deep mining, the increasing prices of fuel and oil derivatives, explosives, and tyres did
hardly raise underground mining costs.
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Table 3.3: Average FOB costs in USD/t and export capacity (adjusted to 25.1 MJ/kg)
Average costs Export capacity
2006 2008 cost increase 2006 2008 capacity increase
Indonesia 33 44 33% 154 197 28%
Colombia 31 42 34% 59 74 25%
China (Shanxi) 34 44 30% 62 45 -27%
USA (Central Appalachia) 46 57 23% 25 31 25%
Venezuela 32 38 19% 9 9 0%
Vietnam 29 38 32% 27 22 -18%
Spitsbergen 41 52 26% 2 4 67%
Queensland/open cast 33 41 24% 33 37 13%
Queensland/underground 33 37 14% 8 8 5%
New South Wales/open cast 34 42 23% 52 59 12%
New South Wales/underground 34 41 21% 27 31 15%
South Africa/open cast 28 36 28% 45 46 4%
South Africa/underground 32 41 25% 24 25 5%
Russia (Baltic) 48 64 34% 61 69 14%
Russia (Pacific) 40 48 19% 15 19 22%
Poland 58 79 36% 8 5 -38%
Total 611 681 12%
Source: Own calculations/EWI coal market database; export capacity data based on Kopal (2007),
Rademacher (2008),Bayer et al. (2009).
Steam coal export capacity increased by about 12% between 2006 and 2008 (table
3.3). In the Pacific basin, much of the growth came from Indonesia and Australia,
thus expanding their supply capacity. In the Atlantic market, Colombia increased its
export capacity by about 25mt and became the largest steam coal exporter in the At-
lantic market in 2008. Export capacity data were primarily derived from Kopal (2007),
Rademacher (2008), and Bayer et al. (2009) and adjusted for energy content.
3.4.2 Transport Costs, Port Handling Fees, and Seaborne Freight Rates
Inland transport costs depend on the transportation mode and the distance from the
coal fields to the export terminal. Coal is mainly hauled by rail and truck and, in some
cases, by river barge. Inland transport costs vary between the mining regions. While
they are below 4 USD/t for the bulk of the Colombian production, they may be as
high as 25 USD/t for transport from the Russian Kuzbass basin to the Baltic ports.
We estimated the relative impact of diesel fuel and electricity cost escalation using the
relative importance of truck and railway haulage for the main transport routes. Port
handling fees include costs for unloading, storage, and loading onto vessels. Country-
specific average inland transport cost and port handling fees are added to the mining cost
curve to derive FOB supply functions. Seaborne bulk carrier freight rates are a major
cost component of internationally traded steam coal. For determining seaborne transport
costs we use root-functions as freight cost functions based on distance. To determine
these functions we regressed distances against a dataset of freight cost observations for
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Table 3.4: Steam coal reference demand in million tonnes adjusted to 25.1 MJ/kg
Europe Japan India Latin America China Taiwan Korea North America South East Asia
2006 187 110 26 9 46 60 62 42 29
2008 184 118 35 16 46 60 72 38 36
Source: IEA (2008, 2010a), Ritschel (2007, 2009a).
both model years. We use these cost functions to determine consistent freight rates for
every possible shipping route in the model.
3.4.3 Demand Data
As described in Section 3.3 we assume linear steam coal demand functions for all im-
porting regions based on reference quantities and prices as well as elasticities (see table
3.4 for reference volumes). We used the MCIS steam coal markers for reference price
data in the model. A general shortcoming of the literature on market conduct in global
steam coal trade is the treatment of the demand side. Usually, assumptions on elastici-
ties are drawn from empirical analyses found in the literature and subsequently elasticity
sensitivities are computed38. This paper presents an elasticity analysis for Europe, the
largest import demand region on the maritime market. Demand elasticities for other
regions are based on an extensive literature review.
Several econometric analyses on short-run steam coal demand elasticities and inter-
fuel substitution have so far been published (see table 3.5 for an overview of the most
important articles). Empirically estimated elasticities fall in the range of −0.05 to
−0.57. Although the analyses differ with regard to coverage, time-frame, and method-
ological approach, all authors find that price elasticity of steam coal demand is inelastic
(|Elasticity|<1).
Table 3.5: Overview of short-run coal demand elasticities in the literature
Article Methodology Time period Sector Region |Elasticity|
Dahl and Ko (1998) Panel data analysis 1991-1993 Electricity U.S. 0.16-0.26
Ko (1993) Time series analysis 1949-1991 Electricity U.S. 0.25
Kulshreshtha and Parikh (2000) Time series analysis 1970-1995 Electricity India 0.34
So¨derholm (2001) Panel data analysis 1984-1994 Electricity Europe 0.05-0.29
Masih and Masih (1996) Time series analysis 1970-1992 all sectors China 0.25
Ball and Loncar (1991) Time series analysis 1978-1988 Electricity OECD 0.16
Chan and Lee (1997) Time series analysis 1953-1994 all sectors China 0.26-0.32
Ko and Dahl (2001) Panel data analysis 1993 Electricity U.S. 0.57
Short-run steam coal demand elasticity depends on various factors, such as the power
plant mix, the price of alternative fuels (particularly natural gas and, in some regions,
fuel oil), the price of emission certificates, and total electricity demand, to name but a
38See e.g. Haftendorn and Holz (2010) who choose elasticities during the calibration process based on
Dahl (1993) or Graham et al. (1999) who test for several elasticities figures. Kolstad and Abbey (1984)
assume demand elasticities of −0.6 for all regions.
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few. Since these factors vary over time, it is likely that some of the figures presented in
table 3.5 are outdated today.
We therefore conduct a steam coal demand analysis for Europe using the dispatch
module of a Dispatch and Investment Model for Electricity markets in Europe (DIME).
DIME is a large-scale linear optimisation model for the European electricity market
that simulates hourly dispatch taking account of conventional and renewable generation
technologies39. We calibrate the model with actual data for the years 2006 and 2008,
including the European power plant fleet, gas, fuel oil, and CO2 emission prices as well
as country-specific load data. Then, we iteratively test a high number of (equidistant)
steam coal price points. The model computes the cost-minimal power plant dispatch
and steam coal consumption subject to the coal price. Subsequently, we fit a linear
function to the data using OLS, from which we derive the elasticity at the reference
point. Steam coal demand elasticity for the European electricity sector is estimated to
be −0.12 in 2006 and −0.43 in 2008. The difference between these two figures stems
from the varying gas and CO2 emission prices and thus their impact on the clean dark
spread in the reference point40. During 2006 the clean dark spread was favourable for
coal-fired power plants, whereas in 2008, with an increasing emissions price and a similar
gas price as in 2006, the clean dark spread decreased. Hence, around the reference point
(high coal price in 2008; low coal price in 2006) the elasticity was higher in 2008 than
in 2006.
However, these results cannot be generalised for all demand regions, since they de-
pend on a number of factors that usually differ regionally41. In the presented paper, we
use the estimated elasticities for Europe and assume a steam coal demand elasticity of
−0.3 for all other importing regions for both years. This assumption is based on the
above-mentioned literature review.
3.5 Simulation Design
The focus of our analysis is on seaborne steam coal trade for which a spot market with
several well-established price indices exists42. Hence, we model only dedicated export
39See Bartels (2009). For applications of this model see e.g., Paulus and Borggrefe (2010), Nagl et al.
(2011) or Fu¨rsch et al. (2012). A detailed description can be obtained from www.ewi.uni-koeln.de.
40The clean dark spread is the margin that a coal-fired power plant earns given a certain electricity,
coal, and emissions price. European gas spot market prices were 22 EUR/MWh in 2006 and 24 EU-
R/MWh in 2008 (APX, 2010). CO2 emission prices were 17 EUR/tCO2 in 2006 and 22 EUR/tCO2 in
2008 (EEX, 2011).
41For instance, regionally differing gas prices or the installed capacity, availability, and efficiency of the
fleet. In some regions, the competing generating technology may not be gas-fired plants. Decreasing or
increasing electricity demand also has an impact on coal-demand elasticity. Moreover, emissions trading
systems are not implemented in all regions (the U.S., for example, has no GHG emissions trading system
but has an NOx trading system).
42See Ekawan and Ducheˆne (2006).
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mining capacity43.
The supply structure in the steam coal trade market is heterogeneous. It consists of
large state-run mining entities, several privately-owned international mining companies,
and a large number of small national players. Furthermore, production regions are
widely dispersed over the globe, and so far no formal cartel such as the OPEC has been
established. Therefore, in one scenario we test for a competitively organised steam coal
trade market.
However, the majority of internationally traded coal is produced by only four coun-
tries with a primarily export-oriented mining industry and a favourable cost situation:
Indonesia, Australia, South Africa, and Colombia. Indonesia was a member of OPEC
until 2008, when its oil reserves were depleted. Very quickly it has become the world’s
largest steam coal exporter (Indonesian coal exports grew by 45% between 2005 and
2008). The issue of mining concessions is government controlled and is nowadays only
granted to Indonesian companies44. Hence, currently, the majority of steam coal pro-
duction and infrastructure is controlled by large Indonesian conglomerates or the gov-
ernment. International coal trade is an important national revenue earner, which may
favour non-competitive behaviour on a government level. Australia, Colombia, and
South Africa have privately owned mining industries45, but the crucial export terminals
are controlled by consortia consisting of the major players in the country46. Clearly,
all of these countries have the potential to act strategically and can be interpreted as
national oligopolists.
Similar to Kolstad and Abbey (1984), we assume that individual producers act as
price takers, but oligopolistic rent is accrued on a country level, for example through
taxes, royalties, quotas, or collusive port throughput agreements. This allows us to
use aggregate national supply functions47. The non-competitive scenario is designed
as follows: Australia, Indonesia, Colombia, and South Africa act as non-cooperative
Cournot players. Additionally, China is assumed to act as a Cournot player. China is the
largest steam coal producer in the world and has the potential to influence the seaborne
43Export capacity data are based on Kopal (2007) and Rademacher (2008) but are adjusted for energy
content and in some cases downgraded if other sources suggested so.
44See Baruya (2009).
45Nevertheless between 65% and 95% of steam coal exports of South Africa, Colombia and Australia
are controlled by six large multinational companies (Xstrata, AngloAmerican, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto
and Drummond). See Murray (2007) and Wacaster (2008).
46BHP Billiton and AngloAmerican, are major shareholders of the Newcastle Infrastructure Group,
which operates the Newcastle Coal Terminal, the main export hub in New South Wales. The largest
coal terminal in the world, Richards Bay (South Africa) is jointly owned by all major producers in
the country amongst them: BHP Billiton, AngloAmerican and Xstrata. The main export terminal in
Colombia, Puerto Drummond, and Puerto Bolivar are owned by Drummond and a consortium consisting
of Xstrata, BHP-Billiton, and AngloAmerican, respectively. Moreover, these companies are vertically
integrated and also own and operate the domestic coal transport infrastructure (Baruya, 2007).
47Our Cournot model formulation can be interpreted as a quota system that restricts exports to
the Cournot-Nash outcome. Other Cournot model formulations with taxes instead of quotas of course
produce equivalent outcomes (see e.g., Kolstad and Abbey (1984)).
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market significantly. Chinese authorities have intervened regularly in resource markets
and have continuously reduced steam coal export quotas48. Russia, USA, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Norway and Poland act as price takers and constitute the competitive fringe.
All of these countries have a mining industry that primarily serves the domestic market
or is very small.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Simulation Results for the Year 2006
Figure 3.2 depicts actual price data and simulated model prices for the perfectly com-
petitive and the Cournot oligopoly scenario for four major importing regions49. Clearly,
the marginal cost-based price matches the actual import price in Europe. Actual prices
were, however, higher than marginal costs of delivery in Japan, Taiwan, and South
Korea. From a price perspective, the hypothesis of Cournot-Nash behaviour can be
rejected, since oligopolistic prices exceed actual prices significantly in 2006.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of actual and simulated prices in 2006
Source: Own calculations/MCIS-steam coal marker prices.
Table 3.6 reports actual and simulated steam coal trade volumes between exporting
and importing regions for the year 2006 in million tonnes. In comparison to the price
analysis, the picture is less clear-cut when the focus is on trade flows. In general, trade
flows in the perfect competition setup fit the actual trade pattern better, since total
48Chinese coal policy shares some interesting similarities with its policy on rare earths. Chinese
government has introduced an export limit on coal and on rare earths and has repeatedly cut these
limits (Hurst, 2010, Sagawa and Koizumi, 2008). Moreover, it restructures and consolidates both its
coal mining and its rare earths mining industries to gain more control (Hurst, 2010, Peng, 2011). In
the coal sector, companies have to qualify as exporters. So far only state-run companies are eligible for
export licences (Baruya, 2007).
49For reasons of consistency, we use the McCloskey’s Asian marker, North West European marker,
and Japanese marker for deliveries in the 90-day forward period. These markers are adjusted to 6,000
kcal/kg and serve as a spot price indicator.
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supply is too low in the non-competitive scenario. Main trade relations in the real market
match the major importer/exporter relations in the perfectly competitive scenario well
in the Atlantic market50. This supports the hypothesis that the international steam
coal trade market was, to a certain degree, subject to competitive market mechanisms
in 2006. However, the actual trade pattern is more diversified than the competitive one,
particularly in the Pacific Basin51.
Table 3.6: Comparison of actual and simulated trade flows in million tonnes (energy adjusted)
South
Africa Russia Venezuela Vietnam Indonesia Colombia China USA Australia Poland Norway
Actual 2006
Europe 56 59 2 1 17 28 3 6 3 8 2
North America 2 5 3 26 6
Latin America 2 1 2 3 1
China 1 22 14 1 8
Taiwan 2 29 16 13
Japan 9 3 23 16 60
Korea 3 1 20 17 20
India 3 17 5 2
South East Asia 1 2 24 2
Total 62 78 8 27 149 58 60 6 113 8 2
Perfect competition 2006
Europe 69 58 6 31 13 8 2
North America 9 28 5
Latin America 9
China 27 18
Taiwan 61
Japan 13 13 89
Korea 1 62
India 26
South East Asia 30
Total 69 71 9 27 154 59 62 13 103 8 2
Cournot oligopoly with fringe 2006
Europe 17 61 2 20 17 11 19 16 8 2
North America 6 6 7 7 4 7
Latin America 2 1 2 1 1 2
China 6 1 10 5 7 8
Taiwan 8 9 12 6 8 10
Japan 13 15 9 20 11 15 17
Korea 8 5 13 7 10 11
India 4 1 6 3 3 5
South East Asia 4 3 7 3 4 5
Total 68 76 8 27 95 59 62 19 81 8 2
Actual Perfect Competition Cournot oligopoly with fringe
Total seaborne trade 571 577 506
Source: IEA (2008, 2010a), own calculations.
Although the oligopolistic trade pattern differs substantially from the actual trade
flows, it features a higher degree of diversification. This diversification of exports stems
50In reality, South Africa, Russia, the U.S., and Colombia are the main suppliers to Europe. Small
high-cost producers like Poland or Norway are located close to the European market and generally ship
their product to Europe. The North American demand region procures most of its imported coals from
Latin American suppliers.
51Several reasons may account for the deviations between the actual trade pattern and the competitive
pattern. First, economies with a high import dependency like Taiwan, Japan, or Korea may apply import
diversification strategies for reasons of security of supply. This may also explain the slightly higher prices
in the real market, since these economies would usually pay a premium for their import diversification.
Second, calorific values are indeed the most important quality parameter and are accounted for in the
analysis. However, the chemical composition of coals in regard to ash and sulphur content, moisture,
and volatile matter may be important efficiency determinants for power plants. Some power plants may
be adjusted to a specific coal type, or certain types of coal from different regions are often blended to
optimise coal quality at the import terminal. Third, long-term bilateral contracts are still quite common
in international coal trade. Finally, statistical errors and differences in energy-mass conversion may
cause differences in statistics of traded volumes.
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from the oligopolists’ profit maximisation: a Cournot player exports to a certain market
until marginal revenue equals marginal costs there. With a high market share in a certain
importing region, perceived marginal revenue for the exporter is low, thus making it
profitable to diversify the export structure. This may justify trade with regions that
would not occur cost-wise in a perfectly competitive market.
Especially, major players in the Pacific Basin like Australia, Indonesia, and China
have an especially diversified supply structure in reality. Competitive behaviour would
suggest that China ships all of its exports to Korea, whereas in the actual market,
China trades the bulk of its exports with three Asian economies: Japan, Taiwan, and
Korea. Although Indonesia’s supply structure is more diversified by nature due to its
high production, the cost-minimal solution would imply that Taiwan procures all of
its imports from Indonesia. Although Taiwan is a major importer of Indonesian coal,
it sources its imports from several exporters. In the non-competitive market structure
setup, even high-cost fringe producers like the U.S. or Russia increase their market share.
Since oligopolistic players withhold exports, prices rise and the fringe can capture rents
by expanding its supply.
The results for 2006 reveal a relatively high degree of competition, particularly in
the Atlantic market. In the Pacific market, we note that prices exceed marginal costs of
delivery and that the actual trade pattern is more diversified than the competitive one.
Hence, the market outcome is not fully efficient from a welfare perspective, suggesting
that some non-competitive mechanisms also apply. Furthermore, we reject our non-
competitive oligopoly with competitive fringe scenario. In this setup, too much quantity
is withheld, and consequently, prices are high when compared to actual data.
Haftendorn and Holz (2010) also find that prices deviate from marginal costs and
real market trade flows are more diversified than in the competitive scenario. Our
results are qualitatively consistent with their conclusion that steam coal trade is better
characterised by perfect competition than by a non-cooperative Cournot game in 2006.
3.6.2 Simulation Results for the Year 2008
Analysis of the seaborne steam coal market in 2008 reveals a different picture. In 2008,
steam coal import prices soared to very high levels of more than 140 USD/t on average
in the core demand regions (see figure 3.3). Clearly, by comparing competitive (marginal
cost-based) prices of 2006 (see figure 3.2) with corresponding prices of 2008 (see figure
3.3), we see that marginal costs of supply increased significantly between 2006 and 2008,
too. However, the cost increment is not high enough to cause price spikes as those
seen in 2008. For example, import prices in Europe were 147 USD/t, while simulated
marginal cost prices (including seaborne freight rates) are 100 USD/t. Consequently, the
remaining spread of 47 USD/t between marginal costs and actual prices is too large to
Chapter 3. Market Structure Scenarios in International Steam Coal Trade 49
justify perfectly competitive conduct on the seaborne trade market in this year. However,
we can also reject the hypothesis of the Cournot-Nash oligopoly with competitive fringe
in this market from a price perspective. Oligopolistic mark-ups are too high, and prices
in the Cournot setup again exceed actual prices substantially.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of actual and simulated prices in 2008
Source: Own calculations/MCIS-steam coal marker prices.
With regard to trade patterns, we observe that (as in 2006) certain competitive mech-
anisms seem to apply (see table 3.7). Trade relations in the Atlantic market are quite
accurately simulated in the competitive setup. The export structures of Colombia and
Russia, both major suppliers for Europe, are still well approximated by the competitive
model. However, the role of South Africa clearly changed. While South African ex-
porters shipped 90% of their production to Europe, this share has decreased to less than
70% in 2008. This shift of exports to the Pacific Basin is not efficient. The competitive
scenario shows that, from a cost minimisation perspective, South African coals should
be directed to the European market. Thus, in the real market, South African exporters
could accrue higher rents in the Pacific Basin, indicating that prices were inefficiently
high in Asian import regions.
Furthermore, U.S. exports to Europe deviate significantly with that of the U.S.,
supplying about 15 mt more than in reality. This result may be explained by the neglect
of the U.S. domestic coal market in the model. Some of the export mining capacity
attributed to the U.S. in the model normally serves the domestic market but generally
has access to export infrastructure and the necessary coal quality to trade its product on
the maritime market. However, exports depend not only on prices in the international
market but also on domestic prices and contractual obligations. These issues can only
be addressed by explicitly modelling the domestic markets.
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Table 3.7: Comparison of actual and simulated trade flows in million tonnes (energy adjusted)
South
Africa Russia Venezuela Vietnam Indonesia Colombia China USA Australia Poland Norway
Actual 2008
Europe 44 64 3 1 14 32 2 15 2 3 3
North America 1 2 2 31 1
Latin America 2 1 1 1 8 1 1
China 1 19 25 1
Taiwan 1 29 11 19
Japan 1 11 2 27 11 67
Korea 1 9 1 26 16 19
India 12 22 1 1
South East Asia 2 26 2 1 5
Total 64 87 6 23 172 73 42 16 116 3 3
Perfect competition 2008
Europe 72 69 25 31 5 4
North America 5 37
Latin America 4 12 2
China 22 29
Taiwan 67
Japan 133
Korea 19 17 45
India 38
South East Asia 41
Total 72 88 8 22 192 74 45 31 135 5 4
Cournot oligopoly with fringe 2008
Europe 20 69 31 24 3 28 5
North America 4 5 7 6 2 5 7
Latin America 2 3 3 2 1 3
China 6 5 11 5 5 10
Taiwan 7 13 13 7 6 11
Japan 13 5 23 13 12 26 22
Korea 9 13 15 8 9 14
India 5 8 4 3 7 4
South East Asia 5 4 9 4 4 8
Total 72 88 9 22 119 74 45 31 109 5 4
Actual Perfect Competition Cournot oligopoly with fringe
Total seaborne trade 606 677 577
Source: IEA (2010a), own calculations.
Simulated trade flows are again more distorted in the Pacific market. In reality, the
three major players in the Asian market, Australia, Indonesia, and China, decide on a
trade pattern that deviates significantly from the welfare efficient solution. Although
the trade pattern of 2006 already suggested this, the effects are more pronounced in
2008. In light of competitive prices that are considerably lower than actual prices, the
hypothesis of perfect competition on the seaborne market is arguable in 2008.
Moreover, in 2008, the efficient equilibrium quantity of 677 mt was not supplied.
Instead, the total trade volume stood at 606 mt, implying that not all available supply
capacity was in operation. There are, in fact, a number of possible reasons that export
capacity may have been scarce during 200852. Although such short-run bottlenecks are
hard to quantify it seems unlikely that they add up to more than 70 mt. However, steam
coal allocation also does not appear to be non-competitive in terms of the selected non-
competitive setup of Cournot behaviour. As in 2006, the diversified supply structure
52The national market in the USA may have had an impact on exports due to contractual obligations
or high demand. U.S. exports remained under their nominal capacity potential. Secondly, some export
collieries may not have reached full production capacity due to strikes and bad weather conditions (see
Ritschel (2009a) and Xstrata (2008)). Thirdly, interactions between the thermal coal market and the
coking coal market may have had an impact. As a small proportion of a specific steam coal quality may
also be upgraded to low quality metallurgical coal by washing, the boom on global steel markets in 2008
may have forced some steel mills to use coals that otherwise would have served as thermal coal.
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in the Cournot setup has some appeal, but total traded volumes are again too low and
simulated prices too high.
3.6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Different assumptions for demand elasticities can have a large impact on simulated prices
and traded volumes if the reference equilibrium deviates from the simulated equilibrium.
We will illustrate this effect in figure 3.4. Let S be the linear marginal cost curve, D
and D’ the linear demand curve for different elasticity values, and Eref the reference
equilibrium. The reference equilibrium is determined by the reference quantity qref
and the reference price pref . The capacity limit is denoted as qmax. The graph on the
left depicts a situation in which the reference equilibrium coincides with a simulated
competitive equilibrium. In this case, different elasticity values have little or no effect
on prices and trade volume, as just the slope of the demand function changes, but not
the intersection of demand with the supply curve.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of competitive market equilibria under different elasticity assump-
tions
The graph on the right outlines a situation in which the real market equilibrium and
the simulated competitive equilibrium in 2008 do not coincide. In contrast to the first
setup, the reference equilibrium is not on the marginal cost curve, and different price
elasticity values have a large effect and imply different model-based equilibria E’ and
E”. In such a situation, a competitive model cannot reproduce the reference equilibrium.
Hence, either the capacity limit qmax was temporarily shifted to the left due to short-term
bottlenecks or prices were strategically raised over marginal costs.
Consequently, we test our results presented in sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 for robustness
by performing a sensitivity analysis regarding price elasticities of demand of importing
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regions. We test for the following values, which broadly fall in the range presented in
table 3.5: −0.1, −0.3, −0.5 and −0.6. Elasticities are assumed not to differ between the
importing regions in each simulation run. Figure 3.5 presents a model and real market
prices for different elasticity runs for the year 2006.
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Figure 3.5: Prices in USD/t for different elasticity values (eta) in the year 2006 for oligopoly
with fringe (left) and perfect competition (right)
Source: own calculations.
Clearly, model prices are more robust with regard to different elasticity assumptions
in the competitive scenario, indicating that reference and simulated equilibrium are close
to each other. Prices in the non-competitive scenario are significantly above actual 2006
price levels for all tested elasticity values. Also, capacity utilisation remains stable at
95% to 96% (see table 3.8) for different elasticities. These are indicators for competitive
mechanisms to have applied in the real market during this year.
Figure 3.6 presents corresponding simulation results for the year 2008. In this case,
the picture is less straightforward. In the competitive scenario, prices differ widely with
regard to different elasticity values, thus indicating that reference and simulated equilib-
rium differ significantly. Also, simulated prices remain lower than actual prices for any
elasticity tested. Although the supply capacity limit is reached in the competitive sce-
nario for higher elasticities (−0.5 and −0.6), model prices are still below actual prices53.
The simulated competitive market size is larger than the historic market volume (refer-
ence quantities).
53Actually, traded quantity (reference quantity) is lower than the competitive market volume in the
simulation runs. Hence, demand would have to be infinitely price elastic (horizontal demand curve) to
match competitive model prices with real market prices at the capacity limit (vertical part of the supply
curve).
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Figure 3.6: Prices in USD/t for different elasticity values (eta) in the year 2008 for oligopoly
with fringe (left) and perfect competition (right)
Source: own calculations. Note: Results for eta = -0.1 were omitted in the left graph for the sake of
clarity. In this case, prices are well above 280 USD/t in most demand regions.
Both the oligopolistic and the competitive scenarios show relatively robust prices for
higher elasticities (−0.5 and −0.6). However, oligopolistic prices fit actual prices better.
In the case of an elasticity value of −0.5, model prices are close to real market prices in
major importing regions (except for China), and total model market volume is close to
the real market outcome. However, trade flows are again distorted under the oligopoly
market structure and therefore we still reject the oligopolistic scenario as an explanation
for real market outcomes. See appendix B for a comparison of simulated trade flows
with actual trade flows in this case.
Table 3.8: Capacity utilisation for different values of elasticity, in %
Oligopoly with fringe Perfect competition
Capacity utilisation 2006 2008 2006 2008
eta = -0.6 85,9% 91,6% 96,0% 100,0%
eta = -0.5 85,3% 89,5% 95,9% 100,0%
eta = -0.3 83,9% 84,9% 95,5% 99,6%
eta = -0.1 82,2% 79,6% 95,0% 93,2%
Source: own calculations.
Furthermore, coal demand elasticity of more than −0.3 might seem to be unrealistic
for major Asian importing countries. South Korean and Japanese coal-fired power plants
experienced a major cost advantage compared to natural gas-fired power plants during
most of 2008, which was also significantly higher than the cost advantage of coal in
Europe (figure 3.7). As outlined in section 3.4.3, a detailed bottom-up analysis yielded
a coal demand elasticity of −0.43 for the European power system in 2008. Due to
the even higher advantage of coal in power generation in Asian import regions, it is
therefore rather unlikely that coal demand elasticity for Asian importers has been as
high as in Europe. Even after taking into account ramping capabilities and long-term
fuel contracts, such high-cost advantages would probably lead to lower elasticity figures
of around −0.3, the value we initially assumed in our base scenario for 2008. The cost
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advantage of coal in Asia in power generation stemmed mostly from the very high oil-
indexed LNG prices in 2008. LNG imports in these countries comprise virtually the
total gas supply in Asian countries.
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Figure 3.7: Cost advantage of coal vs. natural gas in power generation
Source: IEA (2010a,b), EEX (2011). Note: We assume average coal power plant efficiencies of 41%
(Japan), 40% (Germany), and 36% (Korea) (IEA, 2010b). Assumptions for average gas power plant
efficiencies are 47% (Germany, Korea, Japan). Carbon intensities are 0,335 tCO2/MWhth for coal and
0,201 tCO2/MWhth for natural gas (Nagl et al., 2011).
3.7 Discussion of 2008 Results
In general, the elasticity analysis confirms that competitive models are unable to repro-
duce real market outcomes in terms of prices and traded quantities in the year 2008.
This result is, however, dependent on the availability of supply capacity. The supply ca-
pacity analyses conducted by Kopal (2007), Rademacher (2008), Bayer et al. (2009), as
well as Rademacher and Braun (2011) demonstrate that substantial capacity expansion
projects came on line in 2007 and 2008. According to our analysis, total (name-plate)
supply capacity would have been sufficient to meet demand in 2008 without rationing
for elasticities below −0.3. For higher elasticities, demand is rationed to some degree,
but actual prices still exceed model prices.
The elasticity analysis also confirms that a Cournot market structure for trade market
players is also not able to explain the market outcome in 2008 satisfactorily. However,
some objections regarding competition in steam coal trade remain: first, port ownership
structure in major exporting countries like Colombia or South Africa, where consortia
of multinational mining companies commonly operate the crucial export terminals, may
give them the potential to withhold quantities by adjusting coal through-put. Second,
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Indonesia and China have recently developed national coal strategies that give their
national authorities tighter control over production and exports and thus the potential
to restrict exports. Both countries have intervened in resource markets before – Indonesia
as a former member of OPEC and China as the dominant supplier of rare earth elements.
Other non-competitive strategies which differ from simple simultaneous-move Cournot
games might also help in explaining trade in 2008. In our opinion, another quite suitable
non-competitive concept is that of pivotal suppliers. In a tight market, one or several
individual suppliers may be pivotal in a sense that, without (part of) their supply, capac-
ity demand would have to be rationed. A prominent historical example of such pivotal
suppliers can be seen in the case of the Californian Electricity market during summer
2000 (see e.g., Joskow and Kahn, 2002). In the steam coal trade market, short-term bot-
tlenecks may have additionally tightened supply in 2008 so that even individual large
companies may have been pivotal in this year54. Even though a supplier may be pivotal
occasionally, it is unclear if the exertion of market power is also profitable. Profitability
depends on the distribution of his assets along the global supply curve (the slope of the
individual marginal cost curve) as well as on the gradient of the demand curve and thus
the price increment a withheld unit yields. Such a strategy may explain why interna-
tional steam coal trade appears competitive in one year and non-competitive in another
year.
3.8 Conclusions
In the presented paper, we analysed the allocation and pricing of steam coal in the
seaborne trade market in a model-based approach. We tested for a competitive and
an oligopolistic market structure in the years 2006 and 2008. Our principal findings
are three. First, despite some distortions in the Pacific market, trade flows and prices
in the competitive scenario fit the actual market data well in 2006. This result is
qualitatively consistent with Haftendorn and Holz (2010) and is robust for different
elasticity values. Second, the competitive scenario is not able to reproduce real market
outcomes in 2008. Generally, prices are too low, market volume is too high, and trade
flows show an unrealistically low degree of diversification in this scenario. Third, the
assumed oligopoly scenario cannot explain market equilibria in any year either, but the
trade pattern is generally more realistically diversified in this scenario. Yet, model prices
and total market volume fits real market data well only under certain, quite unrealistic,
demand elasticity assumptions in the oligopolistic scenario.
The analysis illustrates that not all available supply capacity was utilised to satisfy
import demand in 2008. Name-plate supply capacity would have been sufficient for most
54Other than electricity, steam coal generally is a storable commodity; however, there exist no large-
scale strategic stocks like those in oil and gas markets.
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elasticity values to serve demand without rationing. However, it remains unclear whether
capacities were withheld strategically or if unknown bottlenecks restricted exports during
this year. Although bad weather conditions and social tensions may have hampered
coal exports locally, there is so far no evidence regarding the impact of such bottlenecks
on the whole steam coal market. However, in light of the sustained high prices for
internationally traded steam coal, it is arguable whether such bottlenecks have persisted
over several years.
In the context of the pivotal role of individual suppliers in times of high demand,
the importance of coal in energy supply and the inability of competitive models to
reproduce recent market equilibria, further research on steam coal market economics
may be interesting. We suggest that future research focus on including domestic markets
as well as other non-competitive pricing strategies, such as pivotal supplier behaviour.
Chapter 4
Nations as Strategic Players in
Global Commodity Markets:
Evidence from World Coal Trade
4.1 Introduction
Recently, the development of global commodity prices has given serious cause for con-
cerns about the competitiveness of global commodity markets. This is especially true
for natural resource markets and the trade of fossil energy fuels in particular. While the
existence of a coordinated strategic trade policy on the world crude oil market has been
evident since the foundation of OPEC in the 1960s, other markets for natural resources
have been politicised only recently. A prominent example is the rare earth elements
industry in China. Since around 2008, the Chinese government made significant efforts
to bring this resource sector under tight control by industry consolidation, creation of
strategic stocks, and, most importantly, by imposing trade restrictions upon exports
of rare earth elements. Whether the aim of this policy was indeed the conservation of
domestic resources, the preparation of monopoly power exploitation, or an ’economic
weapon’ against high technology nations like Japan and the West has been recently
discussed (Stone, 2009). Both examples also indicate the variety of trade policy instru-
ments. Next to cartelisation and export quotas, governments levy taxes on imports or
subsidise exports. In markets where production takes place by a large number of small
units, e.g. for agricultural products, marketing of exports is often conducted by trade
associations. In other markets, exporting firms might be partly or entirely nationalised,
being subject to governmental strategic influence (for instance natural gas exporters).
Such trade policy instruments are intended to increase national welfare by influencing
the market outcome in a non-competitive manner.
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Another commodity market that has raised doubts about its competitiveness is the
market for internationally traded steam coal (Tru¨by and Paulus, 2012). For decades,
international coal trade was considered competitive since production is geographically
dispersed and is carried out by a mixture of multinational private mining companies,
large state-run entities, and various smaller national players. Yet recent developments
in the international steam coal trade have led to concerns about market structure and
conduct. And indeed, several institutional developments support the hypothesis of steam
coal market distortion. Firstly, strong economic growth in Asia has led to increased coal
demand and has thus shifted the centre of gravity and price setting from the Atlantic
to the Pacific market area. Secondly, coal prices soared between 2006 and 2008 and
have remained relatively high since then. Thirdly, several recent adjustments of national
resource strategies of the People’s Republic of China and Indonesia indicate an increasing
potential for strategic behaviour on a national level in recent years55.
During the period of the 11th Five Year Plan (2005-2010), the People’s Republic of
China has adopted several national policies in an attempt to restructure and streamline
its domestic coal industry (NDRC, 2007). Further, Chinese authorities have significantly
lowered coal export quotas from 100 Mt in 2003 to 47.7 Mt in 2008 and introduced export
taxes for coal during this period, thus increasing their tight control over exports (NDRC,
2008).
Moreover, Indonesian steam coal production and exports have undergone a rapid
expansion in recent years which was paralleled by political efforts to nationalise the
mining industry. Indonesian steam coal exports jumped from 75 Mt in 2003 to an
impressive 200 Mt in 2009 (IEA, 2010a). This development indicates a switch in the
Indonesian national resource policy away from oil exports to coal exports. Indonesia
pulled out of OPEC in early 2009 due to diminishing oil stocks and production as well
as strong domestic oil demand. Therefore, Indonesia may be currently pursuing the
strategy of becoming the dominant player in Asian coal markets to offset its declining
oil revenues. The implementation of national resource policies in China and Indonesia
has led to a structural shift of steam coal supply in the Pacific basin in recent years. It
may have given the authorities of either country the potential to exert market power on
a national level.
The presented paper therefore analyses the export patterns of major national players
in the world steam coal market to identify if Indonesian and Chinese resource policies
support the hypothesis of strategic market behaviour on a national level. It is related
to the empirical literature on strategic trade policy which has been developed since the
seminal papers of Brander and Spencer (1985), and Eaton and Grossman (1986), and
55These developments have severely affected several OECD countries and have increased concerns
about security of supply, as the major coal consuming nations depend heavily on imports of steam
coal. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan import virtually all of their coals and Europe’s average import
dependency amounts to more than 60%.
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others. Empirical literature on strategic trade in energy resource markets has so far been
scarce. Many recent empirical contributions to this topic focus on international markets
for agricultural goods and make use of diverse methods of analysis (see Reimer and
Stiegert (2006) for an overview). Alston and Gray (2000) have developed a simulation
model to investigate wheat market conduct of the Canadian state trading enterprise.
Dong et al. (2006) have found evidence that a quantity setting oligopoly prevails in
the international malting barley market using a menu approach. Using a calibration
approach, McCorriston and MacLaren (2010) assessed the distorting impact of Chinese
state trading enterprises on international agricultural markets.
We develop a static partial equilibrium model to test our hypothesis of non-competitive
market behaviour exercised through strategic trade policy in the global steam coal trade.
The model allows us to simulate perfect competition as well as non-competitive mar-
ket structures where players act under a Cournot behaviour assumption. We design
the model as a Mixed Complementarity Programme (MCP) by deriving the first order
optimality conditions of the associated optimisation problem. Modelling spatial equi-
libria in commodity markets has already been scrutinised since Samuelson (1952) who
applied linear optimisation techniques to competitive spatial markets. Takayama and
Judge (1964) generalised spatial market economics for the non-linear case and multi-
commodity markets and Harker (1986a) and Yang et al. (2002) developed conditions for
various non-competitive spatial market equilibria. The application of such equilibrium
modelling techniques to analyse market conduct is an active field of commodities re-
search, e.g. in gas markets (Egging et al., 2010, Holz et al., 2008), in electricity markets
(Lise and Hobbs, 2008, Mu¨sgens, 2006), or in coking coal markets (Graham et al., 1999,
Tru¨by, 2013).
The literature on non-competitive market conduct of national players in international
steam coal trade so far focuses on the maritime trade market, which is a submarket of
the global market and excludes domestic markets. Kolstad and Abbey (1984) were the
first who applied a partial equilibrium model to analyse strategic behaviour in seaborne
steam coal trade in the early 1980s. The authors find that a non-competitive market
structure consisting of a duopoly and a monopsony simulated the actual trade patterns
well. However, since then the steam coal trade market has changed substantially. In
a recent paper Haftendorn and Holz (2010) analysed a number of major maritime coal
trade routes and applied a mixed complementarity model to test if trade volumes on these
routes fit competitive or oligopolistic behaviour in the years 2005 and 2006. Their results
suggest that the steam coal trade market is better represented by perfect competition in
the analysed periods. However, Tru¨by and Paulus (2012) modelled total trade market
volume in an equilibrium approach and show that competitive models were unable to
reproduce steam coal trade market equilibria in 2008.
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Using our model, we test if national export strategies are consistent with Cournot
behaviour and validate model results for 2008. We validate our results by applying a
series of non-parametric tests such as the Wilcoxon-Sign-Rank test and Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient test, as well as the Theil inequality coefficient. Our main finding
is that perfect competition cannot explain market results, but a market structure setup
with China and Indonesia acting as non-cooperative Cournot players fits observed trade
flows and prices in 2008 best. Official Chinese steam coal export quotas in 2008 were
consistent with simulated Chinese export volumes under a Cournot strategy.
The presented paper extends the existing literature in two important ways: first, we
account for interdependencies and feedbacks between domestic and international steam
coal markets by explicitly modelling all relevant coal fields. Hence, we avoid strong
assumptions on export potentials and extramarginal supply costs on the seaborne trade
market. Second, we outline a rationale and provide empirical evidence for strategic trade
policy on a national level to profitably influence steam coal market equilibria in 2008.
The remainder of the presented paper is structured as follows: in section 4.2 we
outline what implications a trade market-only vs. a global market analysis yields and
then focus on potentials for market power sources of several actors. We describe the
model and data used in section 4.3. Main findings are presented in section 4.4. Section
4.5 concludes the paper.
4.2 Steam Coal Market Economics
The majority of steam coals are not traded internationally but are produced and con-
sumed in domestic markets. In 2008, total global hard coal production was 5850 Mt
(Ritschel, 2009a). The two largest domestic markets are China and the USA, together
comprising more than 65% of total production. About 13% of the global steam coal
production is exported and traded internationally and more than 90% of international
steam coal trade is seaborne.
The seaborne export market can be divided into a Pacific and an Atlantic market
region56. Major importing regions in the Atlantic market are the USA and Europe (in-
cluding neighbouring Mediterranean countries) with the United Kingdom and Germany
at the top. Traditionally these importing regions are primarily supplied by South Africa,
Colombia, and Russia.
The Pacific market has grown more dynamically in recent years. High quantities
are imported by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan – all three of them have virtually no
indigenous coal production and therefore heavily rely on imports. However, most of the
56From a market integration perspective the steam trade coal market can be considered well integrated
(Li, 2008, Warell, 2006). Nevertheless, we use this labelling in a qualitative sense to better structure our
analysis of market actors.
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growth has come from emerging import regions like India, South East Asia, and China.
The supply side is dominated by Australia and Indonesia although the sustained high
prices in Asia have attracted increasing spot volumes from South Africa and recently
also from Colombia.
In the export market two different types of suppliers interact with each other: coun-
tries that have a dedicated export-oriented mining industry and countries with chiefly
inland-oriented mining industries (Bayer et al., 2009, Kopal, 2007).The export-oriented
countries primarily comprised of South Africa, Colombia, Australia, and Indonesia, and
hold most of the supply capacity. These export industries usually have a cost advantage
over domestic industries due to good coal qualities, low mining costs, and economical
access to transport infrastructure. Countries with mainly inland oriented mining sup-
ply are China, USA, India, and Russia. These countries have some dedicated export
collieries but a significant part of the mining capacity can serve both the national and
the international market. However, interaction of dedicated export mines and domestic
mines with export markets is usually limited: coal exporters often face a geographical
disadvantage in supplying domestic markets as they are often located close to the coast
within the vicinity of export terminals. Frequently these export mines are also not well
integrated into the domestic transportation railway system to allow for cost efficient
movement of coals to domestic power plants. Vice versa, mines serving the domestic
markets are often located deeper inland57 and face high transport costs for moving coal
to the export market. Furthermore, coal quality requirements differ significantly be-
tween the export and domestic markets, which means that coal upgrading, washing, and
drying could be necessary to bring domestic coals to export standards.
4.2.1 Market Structure
Before we formally investigate non-competitive behaviour in the steam coal market we
informally discuss if there are indications that participants do indeed have the potential
to exercise market power. Market power may be exerted by large coal producing and
exporting countries in the steam coal market. This holds especially true for China and
Indonesia.
China has increasingly made use of policy instruments, i.e. quotas and/or taxation,
to control participation of Chinese firms in the international trade market in recent
years58. Firstly, political regulations require domestic mining companies to apply for
special licenses which allow for a predefined export volume. Quotas on steam coal are
set and allocated by Chinese institutions annually; nevertheless they may be subject to
readjustments in case of political or economical requirements. The total export volume
57E.g. the Powder River Basin in the U.S., the coal bearing regions of Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia in
China, or several Russian coal production regions (Schiffer and Ritschel, 2007).
58Similar government policies on various raw materials are documented by Hurst (2010).
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restriction for steam coal in 2007 was 70 Mt and was reduced to 47.7 Mt in 2008 (NDRC,
2007, 2008). Secondly, the Chinese government levies export taxes on steam coal. In
2008 export taxes for steam coal were increased to 10% from 0% in 2007 (TRCSC,
2008). These taxes significantly increased costs of Chinese coal on the trade market and
thus may have had an additional impact on actual export volumes. Finally, political
requirements in the coal industry consolidation process have added heavy restrictions on
market entry which have strengthened the position of a few very large state-controlled
coal companies (Sun and Xu, 2009).
While indications for market power executed on a nation-wide level are less obvious in
Indonesia, there exists a mine ownership structure which is quite special: mining rights
were awarded mostly to international mining companies in the early eighties. However,
foreign investors were obliged to offer at least fifty one percent of shares to Indonesian
companies or the government after ten years of mine production (Baruya, 2009). Mining
rights awarded in the nineties and later went exclusively to Indonesian companies. This
led to the current situation, where the majority of steam coal mine production facilities
in Indonesia are owned by large Indonesian consortia59 or the government. The govern-
ment is also actively controlling export volumes to decrease speed of reserve exploitation
as well as to cover rapidly growing domestic demand (Kuo, 2008). An additional aspect
is Indonesia’s geography: a large amount of steam coal can be shipped by barges via
the navigable rivers of Kalimantan to offshore loading terminals or directly to Thailand
or South China (Schiffer and Ritschel, 2007). This means that Indonesian export in-
frastructure is virtually not capacity constrained, which could have allowed Indonesia
to export higher volumes than it actually did in 2008. One possible explanation could
be that Indonesia actively pushed to limit exports in order to keep international market
prices at a higher level.
The exertion of market power may be supported by important barriers to entry
and capacity expansion restrictions in the steam coal market. Firstly, high political
risk and/or the lack of financial resources and technical capability are effective barriers
against the market entry of developing countries with thus far untapped high quality
coal fields like Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar. Secondly, export capacity expan-
sion usually requires coordination of infrastructure and mining capacity upgrading, with
different stakeholders involved. This process can be very slow, as the example of South
Africa shows, where mining companies upgraded production and export terminal facil-
ities but national railway expansion still lags behind. Such restrictions are particularly
delaying for greenfield projects which need access to transport infrastructure.
59One example is PT BUMI Resources which owns the mining companies PT Arutmin and PT Kaltim
Prima Coal which together accounted for 54 Mt in 2007 or 32% of Indonesia’s total steam coal exports.
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4.2.2 Implications of an Export Market Analysis vs. an Integrated
Analysis of Export and Domestic Markets
In the case of the coal market, previous literature has so far focused on testing for non-
competitive behaviour in the export market. Even though interaction between domestic
supply and dedicated export supply is sometimes hampered by transport costs, limited
transport capacity, or coal quality, we argue that interaction between domestic markets
and international trade does exist 60.
Proposition 4.1. If the export market price is sufficiently high, and dedicated export ca-
pacities are constrained, then dedicated domestic production will enter the global market
even if it has a cost disadvantage.
Proof: see appendix C.
Intuitively, domestic supply will enter the export market if marginal costs (including
the cost disadvantage) equal export prices and if the market is competitive. In this case
a setup only taking into account the trade market will be rendered inconsistent. If the
market is not competitive, the same holds true. However, export market prices have to
be higher; in this case marginal export revenues (including a mark-up) have to equal
marginal costs. Coal prices in the export market, and thus marginal revenues, were
particularly high in 2008 (IEA, 2010a) which makes an interaction of domestic supply
and export markets quite likely.
Based on the information about the current market structure we define three hy-
potheses for our investigation of potential non-competitive behaviour in the steam coal
trade market:
H1: Steam coal market results in 2008 correspond to a perfectly competitive market
setting.
H2: Indonesia acts as a strategic national player in the steam coal export market facing
a competitive fringe of other producers.
H3: China and Indonesia both act as non-cooperative strategic national players in the
steam export coal market facing a competitive fringe.
In the following, we will develop a large-scale empirical model to verify which hy-
potheses we can reject.
60This is especially true for some of the large domestic markets like China and the U.S. Historically,
both countries have adjusted their export volume depending on the difference between the export market
price and domestic market prices. Furthermore, transport infrastructure for domestic mines did not seem
to be a bottleneck in 2008: chinese coal exports peaked in 2005 with exports of approximately 80 Mt.
U.S. coal exports were around 100 Mt per year in the early 1990s. Therefore, coal exports in 2008 of
54 Mt in the case of China and 74 Mt in the case of the U.S. were most probably not constrained by
transport capacity.
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4.3 The Model
The model presented in this section is structured to find the spatial equilibrium of prices
and trade flows between a given set of players and assumptions about their objective
functions. We model three types of players: national producers that maximise their pro-
ducer rents from sales to the export market in a Cournot fashion and at the same time
maximising overall welfare in their domestic coal markets (strategic players); producers
which act in a competitive manner as price takers on the export market and also as wel-
fare maximisers in their domestic coal markets (competitive fringe); and demand regions
without significant coal production which act as price-takers. All producers maximise
profits subject to a number of capacity constraints and energy balance equations61.
As demonstrated by Kolstad and Burris (1986), Salant (1982), and recently by Lise
and Krusemann (2008) and by Montero and Guzman (2010), different types of Cournot
games can be mapped by a term which is a producer’s conjecture about the response of
other producers to a change in its output. This term can be inserted in the producer’s
pricing equation to reflect that player’s degree of market power. This term can be viewed
as oligopolistic rent of the producer trading at a price above his marginal costs of supply.
Table 4.1: Model sets and indices
n ∈ N Model region nodes
m ∈M ⊂ N Mining region nodes
e ∈ E ⊂ N Export terminal nodes
d ∈ D ⊂ N Demand region nodes
(i, j) ∈ A ⊂ N ×N Transport arcs
p ∈ P Model players
m ∈Mp ⊂M Mine regions controlled by player p
e ∈ Ep ⊂ E Export terminals controlled by player p
61We model energy flows which accounts for consumers buying energy, not mass. All capacities
and cost functions for production and transport are normalised to a standard coal energy content in
each mining region. This methodology has already been used by Paulus and Tru¨by (2011) and Tru¨by
and Paulus (2012). For the sake of simplicity we suppress the energy-mass parameters in the model
formulation.
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Table 4.2: Model parameters
Cpm Production cost function of player p in mine region m
CapMm Mining capacity in mining region m
CapEe Throughput capacity at export terminal e
CapT(n,n′) Transport capacity between node n and node n
′
cT(n,n′) Transport costs between node n and node n
′
cEe Turnover costs at export terminal e
ad Intercept of inverse demand function in demand region d
bd Slope of inverse demand function in demand region d
tp→d VAT adjustments for exports from player p to demand re-
gion d
rp→d Player p‘s aggregate conjecture for demand region d of how
exports of all other competitors change given a change in
its own export volume
Table 4.3: Model variables
spm Production of player p in mining region m
qp(n,n′) Transport volume of player p from node n to node n
′
vd Import price for player p in region d
xpd Trade-flow from player p from mining region m to demand
region d
λpn Dual variable associated with the energy balance constraint
representing marginal costs of supply of player p to node n
µpm Dual variable associated with the mine capacity constraint
representing mine capacity scarcity rent of player p in min-
ing region m
pe Dual variable associated with the export terminal capac-
ity constraint representing export capacity scarcity rent of
player p in export terminal e
φ(n,n′) Dual variable associated with the transport capacity con-
straint representing transport capacity scarcity rent on arc
an,n′
4.3.1 Model Statement
The model contains a topology of nodes n ∈ N . All nodes can be subdivided into
mining regions m ∈ M , export terminals e ∈ E, and demand regions d ∈ D so that
N = M ∪D ∪E. The roles of nodes are mutually exclusive M ∩D = ∅, M ∩E = ∅ and
D ∩ E = ∅. Furthermore there exists a set of players p ∈ P . In our model, players are
nations with significant steam coal production. Players p ∈ P control mining regions
m ∈Mp, export terminals e ∈ Ep, as well as demand regions d ∈ Dp. Mining regions can
only be controlled by one player Mp ∩Mp′ = ∅, ∀ p 6= p′, p, p′ ∈ P . This relation also
holds true for export terminals Ep ∩ Ep′ = ∅, ∀ p 6= p′, p, p′ ∈ P . Nodes are connected
by transport arcs (i, j) ∈ A ⊂ N ×N . Sets, parameters, and variables of the model are
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listed in table 4.1, table 4.2, and table 4.3 respectively.
The remainder of this section is organised as follows: we first develop the optimisation
problem, then we state the corresponding first-order optimality conditions solved by each
player type. The first-order conditions together with the market-clearing conditions
define the Nash-Cournot game for the worldwide steam coal market.
The variables in parentheses on the right hand side of each constraint are the La-
grange multipliers used when developing the first-order conditions. The complementary
slackness condition is indicated by a ⊥ sign, where 0 = x ⊥ y = 0⇔ xty = 0 for vectors
x and y.
Profit Maximisation of Producers
Player p ∈ P maximises his pay-off which is defined as producer rent from the ex-
port market plus overall welfare from domestic coal markets minus costs of production,
shipping, and turnover. The pay-off function POp (zp) : R
|Mp|+|A|+|D| 7→ R and the
corresponding decision vector zp can then be written as:
max
zp∈Ωp
POp (zp) =
∑
d∈D−p
vd
(
X−d + x
p
d
)
xpd +
∑
d∈Dp
∫ Xd
0
vd(u)du
−
∑
m∈Mp
Cpm(s
p
m)−
∑
(n,n′)∈A
qp(n,n′)c
T
(n,n′) −
∑
(e,n′)∈A
qp(e,n′)c
E
e , (4.1)
with X−d =
∑
p′∈P− x
p′
d . POp being continuously differentiable and concave in the
case that Cpm and vd are continuously differentiable and C
p
m is convex and vd is concave.
Profit maximisation for every producer p ∈ P is constrained by a set of restrictions for
transport and production capacities (dual variables in parentheses):
CapMm − spm ≥ 0, (µpm) ∀p ∈ P, m ∈Mp, (4.2)
CapEe −
∑
(e,n)∈A
qp(n,n′) ≥ 0, (pe) ∀p ∈ P, e ∈ Ep, (4.3)
CapT(n,n′) −
∑
p′∈P
qp
′
(n,n′) ≥ 0, (φ(n,n′)) ∀p ∈ P, (n, n′) ∈ A. (4.4)
Our model incorporates a complex network topology which allows for routing of
sales volumes along different paths and several nodes; we use the notion of path variables
qp(n,n′) (Harker, 1986b). This concept allows us to map trade flows from mines to demand
regions along several intermediary nodes.
Energy balance equations have to hold for mining regions m ∈Mp:
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spm +
∑
(n,m)∈A
qp(n,m) =
∑
(m,n)∈A
qp(m,n) (λ
p
m) ∀p ∈ P, m ∈Mp, (4.5)
for export regions e ∈ Ep:
∑
(n,e)∈A
qp(n,e) =
∑
(e,n)∈A
qp(e,n) (λ
p
e) ∀p ∈ P, e ∈ Ep, (4.6)
and for demand regions d ∈ D:
∑
(n,d)∈A
qp(n,d) = x
p
d +
∑
(e,n)∈A
qp(e,n) (λ
p
d) ∀p ∈ P, d ∈ D. (4.7)
The objective function (4.1) and equations (4.2) to (4.7) define the maximisation
problem Ωp. In the case that the objective function Pp is concave, all constraints are
convex, and all functions are continuously differentiable, the formulated optimisation
problem can be represented by its first order optimality conditions. In this case, the
first order derivatives constitute necessary-and-sufficient equilibrium conditions.
Producer Optimality Conditions
We develop the Lagrangian L of the original problem Ωp. In the following, we derive
the first order optimality conditions of L. The first order partial derivative w.r.t. export
volumes xpd between player p ∈ P and d ∈ D− is given by
vd(Xd)−
(
λpd −
(
∂vd
∂xpd
+
∂vd
∂X−d
∂X−d
∂xpd
)
xpd
)
tp→d ≥ 0 ⊥ xpd ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ D−. (4.8)
The first term is the price in node d. The second term gives the marginal cost of supply
of player p to node d. The third term is the Cournot mark-up depending on the marginal
change of consumer price if player p changes xpd marginally. We adjust prices by value
added tax differences and royalties between different model regions by multiplying export
prices with the term tp→d. In equilibrium, if xpd ≥ 0, the achieved price of exports pd
has to offset marginal costs of supply to node d and the marginal price decrease caused
by this export flow in d.
The Cournot player perceives that the demand function in d is downward sloping
and thus can extract an oligopolistic producer rent. His sales decision for d also depends
on his conjecture on how sales of competitors for d change, given a change in his sales:
∂vd
∂xpd
+
∂vd
∂X−d
∂X−d
∂xpd
=
∂vd
∂xpd
(1 + rp→d). (4.9)
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∂vd
∂xpd
= rp→d is the aggregate conjecture of player p on how export flows from all
other players p∗ ∈ P− change given a change in its own export trade volume to demand
region d. For perfect competition, rp→d equals -1 and for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
this term equals 0.62
P behaves as a welfare maximiser in his domestic national markets. First-order
pricing conditions for P ’s supply xpd in domestic markets d ∈ Dp are defined as:
vd(Xd)− λpd ≥ 0 ⊥ xpd ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ Dp, (4.10)
which means that P is behaving as a price taker in its domestic markets.
Single mining regions are assumed to behave competitively, supplying at marginal
cost levels plus scarcity rents for congested mining capacity
∂Cpm(s
p
m)
∂spm
+ µpm − λpm ≥ 0 ⊥ spm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mp. (4.11)
For the mine production cost Cpm, we choose a function of production volume s
p
m
according to Golombek et al. (1995). In their paper, the authors present a production
cost function, for which the marginal supply cost curve has an intercept αm ≥ 0, then
follows a linear trend with slope βm ≥ 0 until production reaches almost the capacity
limit. As soon as the supply level approaches production capacity limits, the marginal
costs can increase exponentially depending on a parameter γm ≤ 0. The economic
intuition behind this functional form for marginal costs is that prices during periods with
higher demand are in reality often set by older mine deposits. As geological conditions
decline, these mines face significantly higher costs and have to reduce their production
output due to geological constraints and limited reserves. These high-cost mine fields
serve as spare capacity during demand peaks and reduce their output if demand declines.
The strictly convex and continuously differentiable marginal supply cost function
∂Cpm(s
p
m)
∂spm
= cpm : [0, CapMm ) 7→ R+ for player p ∈ P and mine m ∈Mp is defined as:
cpm(s
p
m) = αm + βms
p
m + γm ln
(
CapMm − spm
CapMm
)
, αm, βm ≥ 0, γm ≤ 0. (4.12)
Price efficiency conditions have to hold for every transport connection (n, n′) ∈ A.
Hence price efficiency requires that marginal costs of supply λpn and λ
p
n′ only differ
by transport costs and a possible mark-up for scarcity rents in the case of congested
transport capacity φ(n,n′) if q
p
(n,n′) ≥ 0.
λpn + c
T
(n,n′) + φ(n,n′) − λpn′ ≥ 0 ⊥ qp(n,n′) ≥ 0, ∀n, n′ ∈Mp ∪D ∧ (n, n′) ∈ A. (4.13)
62Kolstad and Burris (1986) elaborate more on this topic. Such games were applied in equilibrium
energy market modeling e.g. by Graham et al. (1999), Chen et al. (2006), or Lise and Krusemann (2008).
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Similar conditions hold for transport connections going out of export terminals but
include an additional scarcity mark-up variable for congested export terminal capacity
pe,
λpe + c
T
(e,n) + φ(e,n) + 
p
e − λpn ≥ 0 ⊥ qp(e,n) ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ Ep, ∧ (e, n) ∈ A. (4.14)
Market Clearing Conditions
In addition to the derived first order optimality conditions, we assume that there is
no market power on the demand side and that all markets in demand regions d ∈ D
are cleared when players have decided on their strategies. We choose a linear, strictly
decreasing demand function vd(Xd) : R
+ 7→ R+ of the form vd = ad + bdXd. The slope
bd is defined as bd =
vrefd
Xrefd
1
σd
, and the intercept ad can be written as
ad = v
ref
d − bdXrefd , where σd, vrefd and Xrefd are the demand elasticity, reference price,
and total reference consumption in demand region d, respectively. This leads to the
following inverse demand function:
vd = v
ref
d +
1
σd
(∑
p′∈P x
p′
d
Xrefd
− 1
)
, vd (free) ∀d ∈ D. (4.15)
We can now calculate:
∂vd
∂xpd
=
prefd
Xrefd
1
σd
= bd. (4.16)
Inserting (4.16) into the profit maximisation condition (4.8) yields:
vd(Xd)−
(
λpd −
prefd
Xrefd
1
σd
(1 + rp→d)xpd
)
tp→d ≥ 0 ⊥ xpd ≥ 0 ∀d ∈ D. (4.17)
If we bundle the equations (4.15) with the first order conditions (4.17), (4.11), (4.13),
(4.14) and capacity constraints (4.2) to (4.7) for all producers p ∈ P , the unique solution
to this set of (non)linear inequalities yields the equilibrium for the market. The resulting
system of inequalities is known as a mixed complementarity problem. This problem is
implemented in GAMS and is solved using the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 1998).
4.3.2 Model Parametrisation
For our analysis, we have to specify the model parameters for costs, capacities, and
demand.
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Our assumptions on reference volumes, and for price elasticities of coal demand in
Europe, are explained in detail in Tru¨by and Paulus (2012)63. Demand elasticities for
other regions are based on a broad literature review of econometric analyses on inter-
fuel substitution. While methodological approaches as well as the age of the reviewed
articles differ, all authors agree that price elasticity of steam coal demand is inelastic
| σ |< 1. In the presented paper, we assume a price elasticity of steam coal demand for
-0.3 for the other world regions besides Europe.
Information on costs and capacities in the steam coal market is only available from
a multitude of heterogeneous sources. We use the extensive steam coal market database
in this analysis that has already been presented and used in two of our former analyses
Paulus and Tru¨by (2011) and Tru¨by and Paulus (2012)64.
We consider it crucial to capture not only isolated steam coal trade market economics
but also the interdependencies between the large domestic markets and the trade mar-
ket. Therefore, we have implemented a detailed network topology consisting of several
dozen mining regions, export terminals, and demand regions (see table 4.4). Note that
our model includes the two largest domestic markets, China and the US, which together
account for about 65% of global hard coal production and about 66% of global consump-
tion. Other major domestic markets are Russia and India, which have also been taken
into account.
4.3.3 Market Structure Scenarios
We simulate the global steam coal trade for 2008 under four different assumptions on
market conduct and the nature of Chinese export quotas to test our hypotheses:
Perfect competition without Chinese export quota: This scenario assumes that
all producers and consumers act in a competitive manner. We further assume no
Chinese export quotas in this scenario to assess how unconstrained Chinese export
63In this article, we use existing large-scale power sector dispatch models for Europe and iteratively
test a high number of steam coal price points. The model returns a minimum cost power plant dispatch
as well as steam coal consumption. The results show that the steam coal demand elasticity in the
European power sector was relatively low, -0.43 in 2008.
64Relevant publications on steam coal markets are available from public institutions like the IEA
(2009) or the EIA (2006, 2010a,b). More specifically, comprehensive information can be found in the
published reports of the IEA Clean Coal Center, e.g.: Baruya (2007, 2009), Minchener (2004, 2007), and
Crocker and Kowalchuk (2008). Furthermore, Ritschel (2010) and Schiffer and Ritschel (2007) depict
recent developments in the hard coal markets. Further publications include analyses from employees
working for international utilities like Bayer et al. (2009) and Kopal (2007). Industry yearbooks provide
useful information as is the case for China (CIRI, 2007, NBS, 2008). National statistics bureaus and
mineral ministries provide high quality information, for example ABARE (2008) and ABS (2006). Not
mentioned are a larger number of coal company annual reports as well as information based on expert
interviews. Information on average energy content is based on IEA (2009), Ritschel (2009a) and BGR
(2008). For Australia, ABS (2006) delivers detailed information and Baruya (2007) compares different
mining input factor structures on the global scale. Furthermore, our analysis is based on several extensive
research projects of Tru¨by (2009) and Eichmu¨ller (2010) at the Institute of Energy Economics at the
University of Cologne.
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Table 4.4: Model topology
Mining regions & export terminalsa Demand regions
Australia 5 Russia 4
South Africa 3 U.S. 7
Indonesia 2 China 8
Russia 8 India 3
Colombia 2 Poland 2
Venezuela 2 Europe 3
Vietnam 2 Japan 1
U.S. 6 Korea (S.) 1
China 10 Taiwan 1
India 6 Other Asia 1
Poland 3
aBold case indicates countries with large domestic steam coal markets which have been explicitly
modelled.
patterns would have looked and how they would have influenced the steam coal
market.
Perfect competition with Chinese export quota: This scenario also assumes per-
fectly competitive behaviour of market players but incorporates the Chinese export
quota as a fixed export restriction. Thus, we assume that the export quota was
not necessarily set under strategic welfare maximisation objectives, but could exist
due to other political objectives like the conservation of domestic resources. With
this scenario, we can test for the competitiveness of the global steam coal market.
Indonesian monopoly with Chinese export quota: In this scenario we assume that
Indonesia, the largest exporter, acts as a strategic national player facing a com-
petitive fringe of other market players. The Chinese export quota is modelled as
a fixed export restriction for the Chinese player. This scenario lets us test for
non-competitive behaviour of Indonesia.
China - Indonesia duopoly: Besides their large market shares, Indonesia and China
face special political, geographical, and institutional characteristics which could
potentially support non-competitive behaviour. We therefore model both coun-
tries as non-cooperative strategic players. With this scenario we can investigate
if Chinese export quota setting is consistent with a profit maximising Cournot
strategy, together with Indonesian market power.
4.3.4 Model Validation Using Statistical Measures
We assess the forecasting abilities of the model by comparing trade flows as well as trade
flow shares as a fraction of total trade with the actual values in 2008. We also validate
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model prices with real price data.
In order to validate which of the market conduct scenarios fits the observed data
best, we employ a series of statistical techniques. Using common parametric tests in
such a setup would lead to the violation of several assumptions, most importantly, that
the error term is normally distributed. Alternatively, it is possible to use non-parametric
tests which do not make the same assumptions on distributions. We use two such tests
to validate our results: the Wilcoxon-Rank-Sign test and Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient test.
The Wilcoxon-Sign-Rank test evaluates on the basis of a paired sample the signed-
rank correlation between the sets (Wilcoxon, 1945). We employ this test on the modelled
trade flow share matrix M and the observed trade flow share matrix O. (mpd, opd) are
the corresponding modeled and observed trade flow shares for all p ∈ P and d ∈ D. The
null hypothesis is that the model results predict actual trade.
An alternative test, which is also distribution-free, is Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient test. Similar to Abbey and Kolstad (1983) and Graham et al. (1999), we
try to find if the observed trade shares and the error between predicted and observed
values has no rank-correlation; this would indicate that there is no association between
the error terms and the actual values. The regression of the observed values opd against
the predicted values mpd yields the regression equation:
opd = α+ βmpd + uˆpd, ∀p ∈ P, d ∈ D
If our model perfectly simulated each trade flow share, then β would equal 1 and α
would equal 0. To test for these parameter values, we let uˆpd = opd −mpd and test the
extent of rank correlation between opd and uˆpd by applying Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between observed values
and the error term between modelled and actual values or, equivalently, that the model
predicts the observed market outcome.
Furthermore, we also employ statistics without testing for interference: the Theil
inequality coefficient is the root mean squared error of two datasets scaled to the [0, 1]
interval (Theil, 1966). It measures how distant both datasets are from each other in a
statistical sense. In case of the Theil coefficient equaling zero, the modelled trade shares
are exactly the same as the actual ones. Therefore, the lower the Theil coefficient, the
better the model suits as an indicator for the real market. Further information can be
obtained by calculating the covariance proportion, the variance proportion, and the bias
proportion of the mean squared error (MSE). A good quality forecast should have a
MSE which is mostly explained by the unsystematic error. In this case, the bias and the
variance proportion should be close to zero and the covariance proportion close to one.
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Table 4.5: Comparison of statistics of actual and modelled trade flows in 2008
Test statisticsa Market structure Actual
market
PC w/o ex-
port quota
PC w. ex-
port quota
Indonesia
monopoly w.
export quota
China -
Indonesia
duopoly w/o
export quota
ρSpearman 0.328** 0.259** 0.186 0.162
zWilcoxon 2.53** 1.80* 1.17 0.62
Theil 0.42 0.352 0.214 0.152
Error term decomposition:
-Covariance proportion 0.934 0.848 0.835 0.935
-Variance proportion 0.078 0.165 0.174 0.063
- Bias proportion 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.018
RMSPE [%] 23.5 16.9 11.6 7.9
Results on market size in Mt
Total trade volume 732 659 645 628 608
aρSpearman is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, zWilcoxon is the statistic for the Wilcoxon
sign rank test, Theil is the Theil inequality coefficient, and Uc is its covariance proportion. Bold case
indicates the lowest Theil statistic or that the covariance (variance,bias) proportion is closest to one
(closest to zero). The same holds for the root mean-squared percentage error (RMSPE). The null
hypothesis for both tests is that the model can predict trade in 2008.
∗Significant on the 90% level. Critical values: ρSpearman=0.213 and | zWilcoxon |=1.650.
∗∗Significant on the 95% level. Critical values: ρSpearman=0.253 and | zWilcoxon |=1.960.
∗∗∗Significant to the 99% level. Critical values: ρSpearman=0.329 and | zWilcoxon |=2.576.
Critical values are based on Zar (1972) and McCornack (1965).
4.4 Results
Table 4.5 reports results on statistical inference, as well as on several other statistics in
the four simulated scenarios. Both perfect competition assumptions are rejected by the
Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test on the 90% confidence level (95% level in the scenario without
export quota). Neither non-competitive scenarios can be rejected at typical confidence
levels. The Spearman rank correlation test rejects the two perfect competition scenarios
as statistically significant estimators for the actual market outcome on the 95% level.
Again neither non-comeptitive scenarios can be rejected at typical confidence levels.
The other statistics further confirm the non-competitive setups: the Theil inequality
coefficient as well as the RMSPE are far lower than in the perfect competition scenarios.
However, for both statistics the China - Indonesia duopoly scenario even outperforms
the Indonesia monopoly scenario. The values for covariance proportion and for the
variance proportion are also the best in the China - Indonesia duopoly setup. The bias
proportion is the lowest (best) in the perfect competition with export quota scenario.
Nevertheless, the bias proportion is also relatively low in the China - Indonesia duopoly
scenario with 2%.
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The international seaborne trade market size is an endogenous variable to the model
as we account for interactions of the trade market with the domestic markets. We
therefore compare how good the model results for the total trade market volume fit the
actual figures. In the perfect competition scenario without export quota, the simulated
trade market volume was 20% larger than the actual market size in 2008. In this
scenario, Indonesia and especially China significantly increase their exports to cover the
high international demand in the year 2008. This leads to a drastic increase in traded
steam coal volumes in the Pacific area. In the perfect competition with export quota
scenario, Chinese export volumes are constrained which leads to a lower total trade
market volume. The China - Indonesia duopoly setting sees the best market volume
fit with the trade market being only 4% larger than in reality. China, as the largest
producer, and Indonesia, as the largest trade market exporter, withhold volumes in a
Cournot manner. Under the Cournot assumption, simulated Chinese exports (43.3 Mt)
almost excatly meet the export quota (47.8 Mt). This means that the Chinese export
policy was consistent with a Cournot-Nash strategy65 in 2008. Additionally, the Cournot
competition leads to a diversification of Chinese exports similar to reality with Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan being the main destinations.66 However, in all scenarios in
which China acts competitively, China exports exclusively to South Korea.
A similar observation can be made for Indonesia: Indonesian supply is similarly di-
versified as actual values in both non-competitive scenarios. In the China - Indonesia
duopoly scenario, simulated Indonesian exports (160.4 Mt ) almost match actual values
(157.4 Mt, energy-adjusted). This is in contrast to the perfect competition scenarios,
where Indonesia’s absolute exports are more than 30 Mt higher. Also, in the competitive
scenarios, exports from Indonesia to China are strikingly higher than in reality. In gen-
eral, the China - Indonesia duopoly setup clearly outperforms both perfect competition
scenarios. The China - Indonesia duopoly setup also performs better than the Indonesia
monopoly with Chinese export quota scenario in all statistics except for the bias propor-
tion. However, neither non-competitive scenarios can be rejected as predictors of actual
market outcomes.
A further relevant indicator to analyse model forecasting quality are prices. The
RMSPE for the perfect competition without export quota (with export quota) scenario
is 21.7% (18.7%). For the Indonesia monopoly with Chinese export quota scenario the
RMSPE is 4% and for the China - Indonesia duopoly scenario 3.6%. Figure 4.1 plots
65Of course this is no hard evidence for China being a strategic player.
66Trade flows are more diversified in the non-competitive equilibrium compared to the perfectly com-
petitive market outcome. In the Cournot game, firms with higher marginal costs of delivery, e.g. due
to high transport costs to distant demand regions, have lower market shares in the respective demand
regions. Lower market shares however imply higher perceived marginal revenues for a player. Since the
Cournot oligopolists equate marginal revenues to marginal costs, the higher perceived marginal revenue
may justify trade with regions that would, cost-wise, not occur in a perfectly competitive market. For
a more sophisticated analysis of this issue refer to Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983).
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of actual and simulated prices for important import regions
actual against simulated prices. We observe that prices in the perfect competition setups
are approximately 15-20 USD/t lower in Europe and up to 40 USD/t lower in the main
Asian importing regions than observed prices. Simulated import prices in China are
higher than in reality. Furthermore, we see that prices in both perfect competition sce-
narios do not differ greatly, even though Chinese exports are 70 Mt lower since Indonesia
is still exporting above its observed values.
Model prices for both non-competitive scenarios fit the observed values better. While
simulated import prices meet the actual European price levels, this scenario also fairly
accurately replicates actual prices in the Asian import regions. The best price fit for
China has the China - Indonesia duopoly scenario: here, the Cournot mark-up of Chinese
exports leads to a larger price difference between other Asian import regions and Chinese
domestic demand regions which basically protects the Chinese coal market and reduces
coal consumer prices.
Simulated Japanese import prices may not be completely explained even in the China
- Indonesia duopoly setup67. Apart from these deviations, both non-competitive scenar-
ios deliver the most accurate reproduction of actual import prices.
Considering the actual and simulated trade flow matrices, the perfect competition
setups feature a less diversified structure of supply than the non-competitive scenarios
(see table C.1 in appendix C).
67Besides statistical errors and differences in energy-mass conversions, coal quality is a factor which
may let model results deviate from real trade patterns. Especially in Japan, newer coal-fired power
plants are highly efficient but very limited in the types of steam coal that they can use for generation.
Coal specifications on sulphur, ash content, moisture, and volatile matter are important determinants for
coal-fired power plants. This dependence may sometimes lead to a certain price inelasticity of demand
for certain coal types. Trade patterns and price effects caused by coal quality requirements beyond
energy content are not explicitly modelled and beyond the scope of this analysis.
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Figure 4.2: Welfare effects in the investigated scenarios (horizontal lines represents
the perfect competition scenario without export quota).
Economic theory suggests that perfect competition, ceteris paribus, leads to a higher
total welfare compared than a scenario with imperfectly competitive market behaviour.
The baseline in figure 4.2 is therefore the perfect competition without Chinese export
constraints scenario.
In the perfect competition scenario with Chinese export quota, China accrues less
welfare due to its export restriction. Indonesian rents increase to a certain extent due
to slightly higher world market prices. In the Indonesia monopoly scenario, Indonesian
rents increase by around 3 bn $ as the withholding of Indonesian supply on top of the
Chinese export quota increases consumer prices significantly. In this scenario, Chinese
welfare effects are close to zero, as positive revenue effects due to higher consumer Asian
prices and negative effects due to the export quota cancel each other out. Overall global
welfare effects are negative due to lower consumer rents especially in the main Asian
importing nations of Japan, Taiwan, and South-Korea, but also in Europe.
In the China - Indonesia duopoly setup, China accrues additional rents68 of 1.4
bn USD while oligopolistic rents of Indonesia decrease slightly. Chinese rents increase
as exports are distributed with regard to profit maximisation targets also supplying
Japan and Taiwan. Consumer prices for steam coal in China are lower compared to the
Indonesia monopoly scenario, which positively affects Chinese consumer rents.
Summarising our findings, we conclude that hypothesis H1 (perfect competition)
can clearly be rejected as prices and trade flow patterns cannot explain the real market
outcome. Neither non-competitive scenarios can be rejected as predictors of actual
trade. Indonesian and Chinese exports are more accurately distributed compared to their
counterparts in the perfect competition setup. Furthermore, total Indonesian export
68We also account for welfare changes in the domestic Chinese steam coal market.
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volumes fit better in the non-competitive setups. Of the two non-competitive setups,
the China - Indonesia duopoly scenario performs slightly better in several statistics,
trade flows, and prices. Interestingly, the Cournot-Nash strategy for China reproduces
almost exactly the Chinese export quota. Additionally, positive welfare effects for China
are the highest in this setup.
Therefore, we cannot reject either H2 (Indonesian monopoly with Chinese export
quota) and H3 (China - Indonesia duopoly). However, the China - Indonesia duopoly
outperforms the Indonesia monopoly scenario in seven of eight statistics. The duopoly
scenario also shows the highest welfare accruement for China. In light of the proactive
national resource-security policy in China, one may therefore even support the accep-
tance of H3.
4.5 Conclusions
Due to the increasing demand for mineral resources in recent years, several resource-rich
nations have reassessed and adjusted their national resource policies. They have applied
different instruments of strategic trade policy, such as export quotas. However, it may
not always be clear if these resource policies serve conservation of natural resources or
maximisation of national rent inflows from resource exports. We empirically investigated
this question for the case of the global steam coal market by testing for non-competitive
market conduct on the part of China and Indonesia. Both countries have implemented
or significantly realigned their coal export strategies in recent years.
For this purpose, we developed a spatial conjectural variations model which allowed
us to model individual nations as strategic players, maximising their domestic welfare
as well as their rents from exports subject to a Cournot-Nash strategy. We described
how China and Indonesia could potentially exercise market power in reality and derived
two non-competitive market conduct setups from this investigation. We applied several
statistical tests to avoid arbitrary modelling results. Therefore, we come to the conclu-
sion that we cannot reject the two non-competitive market setups as predictors of the
actual steam coal market in 2008. Test statistics indicate that the China - Indonesia
duopoly scenario is the better predictor than the Indonesia monopoly scenario. We also
found that Chinese export quotas are consistent with simulated Chinese export volumes
under a Cournot-Nash strategy, which gives further strength to our hypothesis regarding
strategic behaviour of China.
We find that it is crucial to account not only for export markets, but also for the
domestic markets, respecting their interactions and feedbacks if one analyses potential
market power of strategic national players. If export market prices rise high enough, a
national player will redirect domestic volumes to the export market as marginal revenues
are higher. Therefore one may expect that the large Chinese supply compensates for any
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international coal demand shock or export capacities withheld. However, our analysis
shows that this is not the case due to applied Chinese strategic trade policies.
These findings yield implications for policy makers in nations depending on coal
imports: future supply and prices for internationally traded coal might possibly not be
as cheap, stable, and secure as perceived by most if emerging Asian nations increasingly
pursue their national resource export strategies. This could make a re-evaluation of
the future role of coal in energy consumption of such countries necessary, as especially
cost-competitiveness and abundance have often been named as the main advantages of
coal compared to other energy sources.
On a more general level, our findings indicate that the increasing influence of non-
Western countries on world resource markets might change the current world trade
paradigm. Strategic trade policy might become important also for markets which have
been perceived as competitive before.
Possible future research could extend the analysis of strategic national players to
account for the complete fuel complex or to internationally traded non-energy minerals.
A multilateral market power analysis accounting for market power on the importer’s
side may also be an appropriate research venue.
Chapter 5
Coal Lumps vs. Electrons: How
Do Chinese Bulk Transport
Decisions Affect the Global
Steam Coal Market?
5.1 Introduction
Steam coal69 sourcing and costs have not presented a real challenge in the past few
decades. However, this situation could change. The center of gravity and price setting
in the global steam coal trade market has been shifting to Asia since 2005 (Ritschel,
2009a). An important driver for the future evolution of steam coal market economics
will be China as Chinese demand today already makes up 45% of the global market
volume70. Well-established energy outlooks project that Chinese demand might rise by
80% to 130% by 2035 compared to 2007 levels (EIA, 2010b).
In addition to the challenges of providing an additional 2 billion tonnes of steam coal
mining capacity until 2030 and significantly increasing exploration efforts to generate
proven, marketable reserves, the main challenge is that steam coal supply and demand
are spatially separated in China (Minchener, 2007). The majority of the country’s
coal reserves lie in the North-central Chinese provinces of Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Inner
Mongolia, as well as far in the West, in the province of Xinjiang. Inland transport
distances from these regions to the coastal demand centres around Beijing, Hong Kong,
69Steam coal is hard coal of bituminous and sometimes subbituminous or anthracite quality which is
typically used in electricity generation.
70The global steam coal market is defined as total global steam coal production and demand worldwide,
including domestic markets. The global steam coal trade market on the other hand consists of the
internationally traded volumes (mostly by sea transport) which only make up a small fraction of the
global market. The global steam coal trade market volume was 658 Mt while the global steam coal
market volume was 5000 Mt in 2009 (IEA, 2009).
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and Shanghai total up to 3500 km. Coal transport in China mainly takes place by rail,
river barges, and coastal shipping, which significantly increases costs of supply to the
coastal demand centres. Approximately 60% of Chinese coal output was hauled via
railway along distances of more than 500 kilometers to coal-fired power plants in 2005
(CIRI, 2006). Transport costs make up more than half of the delivered costs for domestic
coal in the Southern provinces. Chinese demand centres are located along the coast and
have the opportunity to procure steam coal volumes on the global trade market. Thus,
high domestic transport costs combined with rising mining costs have recently led to an
increase in steam coal imports (Ritschel, 2010).
Future Chinese steam coal demand can be satisfied either through additional domes-
tic steam coal production or by increasing steam coal imports. One important driver
for determining the Chinese supply mix is the future domestic transport costs between
the coal-bearing regions in North-Central China and the coastal areas.
The primary energy carrier coal can be transported via railway or can be converted
on-site to electricity which is then transported via HVDC lines to the main consuming
regions. Currently, China mainly relies on railway expansion projects to significantly
increase its coal transport capacity (Minchener, 2004, Sagawa and Koizumi, 2007) from
the West to the Eastern regions. Even though China has been able to rapidly expand
its railway infrastructure during recent years to cope with the majority of the rising coal
transport, railway transport is comparatively expensive (Minchener, 2004).
Another transport option for China is investment into large-scale HVDC transmis-
sion in combination with mine-mouth coal-fired power plants in the North-central coal-
bearing provinces. Such an energy transport system could significantly reduce variable
transport costs and could supply coal-based energy to the Chinese coastal demand cen-
tres. Unfortunately, large-scale deployment has thus far been hindered by weak central
energy planning institutions as well as regulatory schemes that provide few incentives
for Chinese grid companies to invest in power transmission (Fedor, 2008, MIT, 2007).
Nevertheless, the need for a coherent domestic energy transport strategy remains
pressing, particularly regarding the continuing consolidation process in the Chinese coal
industry (Peng, 2011). Initiated by national reform efforts to enhance work safety and
efficiency of the entire industry, recent policy implementation has led to the closing or
merging of small, inefficient, and unsafe coal mines, thus improving economies of scale
(ESMAP, 2008, NDRC, 2007). Consequently, the share of small coal mines in total
domestic production dropped significantly from 19.9% (342Mt) in 2003 to 2.1% (55Mt) in
2008 (CIRI, 2008). In addition to the permanent increases in national coal trade volume
in recent years, this might have proven to be an additional burden to the prevalent energy
transport system, since the restructuring process results in a concentration of production
in remote regions in the North and North West of China (Lester and Steinfeld, 2006).
Taking these implications of the policy of increased efficiency in the coal industry into
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account, setting up HVDC transmission lines could be regarded as a logical extension
in an overall strategy for improvement of energy efficiency.
The analysis focuses on the two effects of the two outlined bulk energy transport
investment strategies in China: firstly, how is the future Chinese steam coal supply mix
affected by different bulk energy transport modes? Secondly, what are the implications
of the change in the Chinese coal supply mix for the world steam coal market? Hence,
the presented paper will look at the future Chinese coal supply mix, at the global
long-run marginal costs of steam coal in China and several important world market
regions, at the worldwide mining investments and utilisation, as well as at the global
welfare effects. To analyse these aspects, a spatial equilibrium model which minimises
total costs of global steam coal demand coverage is developed and presented. This
global modelling approach makes it possible to obtain answers to the proposed research
questions, including feedbacks and interdependencies between worldwide market actors.
The model is validated for the reference years 2005 and 2006. Then, two scenarios for
possible future transport infrastructure investment decisions in China are investigated:
one scenario assumes continued investment in railroad transport to move coal energy
to the demand centres. The second scenario assumes large-scale investment in HVDC
transmission lines combined with mine-mouth coal-fired power plants and transmission
of electricity to the demand hubs. Then steam coal flows and marginal supply cost
patterns for both scenarios are projected up to 2030.
The remainder of the presented paper includes seven sections: after an outline of
the relevant literature regarding supply cost modelling and coal market analyses in
section 5.2, the current situation in the steam coal trade market will be briefly described
in section 5.3. Then, the model is introduced in section 5.4. Section 5.5 describes the
underlying dataset. Section 5.6 depicts the scenario assumptions, and section 5.7 reports
model results. Section 5.8 concludes the paper.
5.2 Related Literature
The most obvious characteristic of the steam coal world market is its spatial structure.
Steam coal demand regions are not necessarily at the location of the coal fields. Coal
fields are dispersed widely over the globe and internationally traded coal is usually
transported over long distances to satisfy demand.
Researchers have scrutinised the economics of such spatial markets in depth. In an
early approach, Samuelson (1952) combined new insights from operations research with
the theory of spatial markets and develops a model based on linear programming to de-
scribe the equilibrium. Using marginal inequalities as first-order conditions, he models
a net social welfare maximisation problem under the assumption of perfect competition.
Based on Samuelson’s findings, Takayama and Judge (1964) developed an approach that
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uses quadratic programming. Moreover, they present algorithms that are able to effi-
ciently solve such problems also in the multiple commodity case. Harker (1984, 1986a)
is particularly concerned with imperfect competition on spatial markets. He extends the
monopoly formulation as presented by Takayama and Judge to a Cournot formulation
which yields a unique Nash equilibrium and suggests algorithms to solve the generalised
problems. Yang et al. (2002) develop conditions for the Takayama-Judge spatial equi-
librium model to collapse into the classic Cournot model. They demonstrate that, in
the case of heterogeneous demand and cost functions, the spatial Cournot competition
model is represented by a linear complementarity programme (LCP).
One research strand of steam coal market economics has focused on analysing market
conduct either in the global trade market or in regional markets. Abbey and Kolstad
(1983) and Kolstad and Abbey (1984) analysed strategic behaviour in the international
steam coal trade in the early 1980s. In both articles, the authors’ model is an instance
of a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). These models are based on the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions and a number of market clearing conditions. In addition to
perfect competition, they model different imperfect market structures. Labys and Yang
(1980) developed a quadratic programming model for the Appalachian steam coal mar-
ket under perfectly competitive market conditions including elastic consumer demand.
They investigate several scenarios with different taxation, transport costs, and demand
parameters and analyse the effect on steam coal production volumes and trade flows.
Haftendorn and Holz (2010) developed a model of the steam coal trade market in which
selected exporting countries behave as Cournot players in a first scenario and as com-
petitive players in a second scenario. They found no evidence for exporting countries
having exercised market power in the years 2005 and 2006.
Literature on how bulk energy transport modes influence underlying resource or elec-
tricity markets is scarce at best. However, related analyses of such effects on a regional
level exist: Quelhas et al. (2007a) and Quelhas et al. (2007b) developed a multi-period
network flow model for a one-year time period in the integrated energy system in the
United States. They modelled system-wide energy flows, from the coal and natural gas
suppliers to the electric load centres and identify that actors can increase energy system
efficiency if they overcome informational and organisational barriers. Empirical studies
include for example Bergerson and Lave (2005), who investigated in a case study the
lifecycle costs and environmental effects of transporting coal-based energy between the
Powder River Basin (Wyoming) and Texas. They discovered that, depending on energy
volumes and utilisation of existing railway infrastructure, HVDC electricity transmission
is a cost efficient option for long distance transport. Oudalov and Reza (2007) described
a bulk energy transport model for technology assessment and comparative analysis of
bulk energy transport systems. They concluded that for long-distance transport early
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conversion of coal into electricity and transmission with HVDC technologies demon-
strates significant improvements over conventional overland transport. There has been
no publication so far on how large-scale infrastructure investments involving a combina-
tion of HVDC lines and mine-mouth power plants influence the coal supply mix. None
of the mentioned articles venture into the feedbacks of coal energy transport decisions in
China and the global steam coal market including feedbacks of the global market. The
goal of the presented paper is to understand how different future bulk energy transport
configurations for China could shape the steam coal supply mix and market economics
worldwide.
5.3 Structure of the Global Seaborne Steam Coal Trade
Considerable changes have occurred during recent years in the market for steam coal.
The global seaborne hard coal trade market amounted to 839 Mt in 2008 – an increase of
58% compared to the market volume in the year 2000. The majority of global seaborne
hard coal trade consists of steam coal (639 Mt in 2008). The seaborne trade market can
be divided into the Pacific market region and the Atlantic market region71.
The Pacific market basin saw a large increase not only in domestic production and
demand but also in seaward traded volumes (table 5.1). This region has been surpassing
the Atlantic basin in terms of relative market size growth during the last few years.
On the supply side, Indonesia and Australia especially have significantly increased their
exports between 2000 and 2008. New players on the demand side include India and
recently China, whose import volumes are growing rapidly.
Table 5.1: Major players in the Pacific basin in 2008 in Mt
Country Production Consumption Import Export Net-Export
Indonesia 214.9 41.9 0 173 173
Australia 185.3 70 0 115.3 115.3
Vietnam 39.9 19.9 0 20.6 20.6
PR of China 2334 2340.1 34.2 42.7 8.5
India 461.9 491.7 30.9 1.1 -29.8
Taiwan 0 60.2 60.2 0 -60.2
Korea, South 2.8 80.9 75.5 0 -75.5
Japan 0 128.2 128.2 0 -128.2
Source: IEA (2009).
The Atlantic market region is dominated by three large net exporters, Colombia,
Russia, and South Africa (table 5.2). The U.S. have been a swing supplier in the Atlantic
basin, and mid- to high-cost U.S. mines have been marginal suppliers for Europe in
71From a market integration perspective, the steam trade coal market can be considered well integrated
(Li, 2008, Warell, 2006). Yet, this labeling is used in a qualitative sense to better structure our analysis
of market actors.
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recent years (Tru¨by and Paulus, 2010). Main net importers are mostly found in Europe,
with the United Kingdom and Germany at the top. The overall demand for steam coal
is likely to stagnate or slowly decline due to carbon emission restrictions and public
opposition. The goal to phase out of subsidised coal mines (mostly in Germany and
Spain) by 2018 and the stagnation in Polish and British coal production will counter
or even overcompensate for this effect and will most likely expose Germany, Poland,
and other Eastern European nations even more to procurements from the world trade
market (IEA, 2009, Ritschel, 2009a).
Table 5.2: Major players in the Atlantic basin for 2008 in Mt
Country Production Consumption Import Export Net-Export
Colombia 77.3 3.7 0.0 73.6 73.6
Russia 181.9 121.9 25.8 85.8 60.0
South Africa 234.2 172.9 2.9 61.3 58.4
Venezuela 8.8 2.4 0.0 6.4 6.4
United States 949.2 937.1 29.3 35.1 5.8
Brazil 0.2 6.6 6.4 0.0 -6.4
Denmark 0.0 7.1 7.6 0.2 -7.4
Netherlands 0.0 8.3 14.7 6.5 -8.2
Israel 0.0 12.8 12.8 0.0 -12.8
France 0.3 11.9 14.0 0.2 -13.8
Turkey 1.0 16.0 14.9 0.0 -14.9
Spain 7.3 20.8 17.6 1.8 -15.8
Italy 0.1 19.2 19.0 0.0 -19.0
Germany 8.6 45.3 36.9 0.6 -36.3
United Kingdom 16.2 50.2 37.4 0.4 -37.0
Source: IEA (2009).
5.4 The Model
The global steam coal market is modelled as a spatial and intertemporal equilibrium
model. There are three types of model actors: mine owners, port operators, and coal
consumers. Nodes representing port facilities, mining regions, and demand regions are
assigned to each actor72. The nodes are interconnected by arcs representing inland
transportation and sea routes. It is assumed that there is perfect competition between
all actors in the market and that all regional markets are cleared in every period. Mine
owners and port operators decide on optimal levels of production, transport, and invest-
ments in capacity. Transport cost fees represent haulage tariffs which cover full costs73.
The global steam coal market may be considered competitively organised in the years
72Besides the trade market, domestic markets in China and the U.S. with their respective mining
regions and demand regions are also modelled.
73In China for example, fees of state-operated railway companies include charges for the Railway
Construction Fund which contribute to investment costs for future railway projects.
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2005 and 2006 as well as integrated74. Although there may be phases of oligopolistic
conduct, coal markets are generally contestable in the long-run due to the geographical
dispersion and abundance of the resource.
5.4.1 Notation
In this section, the sets, parameters, and variables used in the model formulation are
described. The time horizon of the model T = {2005, 2006, . . . , t, . . . , 2040} includes
one-year time periods from 2005 until 2015 and five-year time periods from 2015 to
2040.75 The model consists of a network NW (N,A), where N is a set of nodes and
A is a set of arcs between the nodes. The set of nodes N can be divided into three
subsets N ≡ P ∪M ∪ I, where m ∈M is a mining region, p ∈ P is an export terminal,
and i ∈ I is a demand node. The three different roles of nodes are mutually exclusive
P ∩M ≡ P ∩ I ≡ I ∩M ≡ ∅. The set of arcs A ⊆ N ×N consists of arcs a(i,j) where
(i, j) is a tuple of nodes i, j ∈ N . Model parameters and variables are depicted in table
5.3 and table 5.4, respectively.
The mine production cost Cm,t is a potentially non-linear function of production
volume Sm,t and is modelled according to Golombek et al. (1995). In their paper, the
authors present a production cost function for which the marginal supply cost curve has
an intercept αm,t ≥ 0 that then follows a roughly linear trend with slope βm,t ≥ 0 until
production reaches almost capacity limit. As the supply level approaches production
capacity limits, the marginal costs increase exponentially depending on the parameter
γm,t ≤ 0. The economic intuition for using this functional form of marginal costs is that
prices during periods with higher demand are in reality often set by older operations.
Coal mining conditions decline over time as cumulated coal production increases and
the low-cost reserves are exploited. Moreover, coal mines may increase their production
within a certain range by increasing their labour and machinery inputs above planned
levels or by mining a coal seam that only becomes profitable if market prices exceed
certain levels.
74Empirical evidence for steam coal market integration is given in Li (2008) and Warell (2006). Haf-
tendorn and Holz (2010) find no empirical evidence for market power of exporting countries in the
international steam coal trade market for the years 2005 and 2006. However, it has so far not been
investigated whether single countries that control large state-owned mine enterprises can exert market
power through volumes or through taxes. In the global steam coal market, a large number of both state-
run mining enterprises and privately owned companies compete with each other. According to Ritschel
(2010), the largest 10 internationally operating mining companies together controlled only about one
quarter of the global hard coal mining production in 2009. Given the availability of additional reserves
and potential mining capacity, the possibility for enterprises to exercise market power on the global
steam coal market seems quite low in the long-run. Theoretically, the spatial price equilibrium in such
a market is fundamentally marginal cost based (Samuelson, 1952).
75Model results will only be analysed until 2030 to ensure stability of results.
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Table 5.3: Model parameters
Parameter Dimension Description
cI,Mm,t M$2009/Mtpa Investment costs in region m for mine capacity investments
Imt in period t
cI,Pp,t M$2009/Mtpa Investment costs in region p for port capacity investments
IPp,t in period t
Cm,t M$2009/Mt Mine production cost function in region m in period t
cS,Mm,t M$2009/Mt Marginal mine production cost function in region m in pe-
riod t
cTa(i,j),t M$2009/Mt Specific transport costs on arc a(i,j) in period t
CapMm,t Mtpa Existing mine capacity in region m in period t
CapM,maxm,t Mtpa Maximum mine capacity investment potential in mine re-
gion m in period t
CapPp,t Mtpa Port capacity in port p in period t
cPp,t M$2009/Mt Specific turnover costs at port p in period t
CapTa(i,j),t Mtpa Transport capacity between node i and node j in period t
Di,t Mt Steam coal demand in import region i in period t
dt - Discount factor for period t
Table 5.4: Model variables
Variable Dimension Description
Sm,t Mt Amount of supply in mining region m in period t
IMm,t Mtpa Mine capacity investment in mine region m in period t
IPp,t Mtpa Port capacity investment at export harbor p in period t
Ta(i,j),t Mt Total transport volume on arc a(i,j) in period t
µn,t M$2009/Mt Marginal costs of supply in node n in period t
λm,t M$2009/Mt Capacity scarcity rent in mining region m in period t
p,t M$2009/Mt Capacity scarcity rent for export terminal p in period t
The marginal supply cost function cS,Mm,t of Cmt is then defined as:
cm,t(Sm,t) = αm,t + βm,tSm,t + γm,t ln
(
CapMm,t +
∑t
t′=2011 I
M
m,t′ − Sm,t
CapMm,t +
∑t
t′=2011 I
M
m,t′
)
,
αm,t, βm,t ≥ 0, γm,t ≤ 0, (5.1)
for Sm,t ∈ [0, CapMm,t +
∑t
t′=2011 I
M
m,t′).
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5.4.2 Model Formulation
The spatial equilibrium in the global steam coal market is modelled by minimising
the total discounted system costs under a set of restrictions. This formulation is the
dual problem of the welfare maximisation problem in a spatial market. The resulting
equilibrium corresponds to a perfectly competitive market outcome with marginal cost-
based allocation at each model node n ∈ N and cost-based trade flows and investments
in the network. The objective function consists of terms for production, transportation,
turnover, and investment costs that every producer and port operator minimises with
respect to satisfaction of demand. Producers sell their coal at export terminals to
exporters and traders who ship the coal via bulk carriers on a least-cost basis to the
demand centres. Turnover costs at coal export terminals are interpreted as marginal
costs. With the mentioned assumptions in mind, this corresponds to minimising the
sum of all cost components:
min
x∈Ω
O(x) =
∑
t∈T
dt
[ ∑
m∈M
(
Cm,t(Sm,t) + c
I,M
m,t I
I,M
m,t
)
+
∑
a(i,j)∈A
cTa(i,j),tTa(i,j),t +
∑
p∈P
(
cPp,t
∑
i∈I
Ta(p,i),t + c
I,P
p,t I
I,P
p,t
)]
, (5.2)
with the decision vector x = (Sm,t, Ta(i,j),t, I
M
m,t, I
P
p,t) and Ω being the set of all feasible
solutions. The objective function is convex, as cm,t is a convex function for γ ≤ 0
(which is always the case), and all other cost components are convex in their respecting
variables. The set of all feasible solutions Ω is restricted by a set of model constraints:
For mining nodes, steam coal production has to equal shipments to the export ter-
minals:
Sm,t −
∑
p∈P
Ta(m,p),t = 0 (µm,t) ∀m, t. (5.3)
For port nodes, all inflows of steam coal from the mining regions have to match
outgoing volumes:
∑
m∈M
Ta(m,p),t −
∑
i∈I
Ta(p,i),t = 0 (µp,t) ∀p, t. (5.4)
Steam coal shipped to the import regions has to match demand:
∑
p∈P
Ta(p,i),t −Di,t = 0 (µi,t) ∀i, t. (5.5)
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Coal production is restricted by mining region capacity limits. However, endogenous
mine investments are possible from 2011 onwards:
Sm,t −
t∑
t′=2011
IMm,t′ − CapMm,t ≤ 0, (λm,t) ∀m, t. (5.6)
The same holds for port capacities:
∑
i∈I
Ta(p,i),t −
t∑
t′=2011
IPp,t′ − CapPp,t ≤ 0, (φp,t) ∀p, t. (5.7)
Furthermore, mine capacity expansions are limited by geographical, geological, po-
litical, and economic parameters. While such potentials are hard to estimate, they are
necessary in order to prevent the most cost efficient mine regions from expanding be-
yond all realistic bounds. Typical estimates can be derived from expert opinions and
market analyses. Maximum investment potential is based on Ritschel (2009b) so that it
is possible to restrict:
t∑
t′=2011
IMm,t′ − CapM,maxm,t ≤ 0, (m,t) ∀m, t. (5.8)
The objective function and the restrictions (5.3) to (5.8) form the optimisation prob-
lem WCM . WCM is a convex minimisation problem with a non-empty set of feasible
solutions. Such a model can be solved by standard non-linear programming solvers
available in the programming package GAMS76.
5.5 Database
To fully specify the model equations, data on costs and capacities are required. The
process of data acquisition is a challenging task in itself, as information on steam coal
markets is available only from a multitude of heterogeneous sources. While there are
some publications on steam coal markets available from institutions like the IEA (IEA,
2009) or the EIA (EIA, 2006, 2010a,b), comprehensive information is especially obtained
from the reports of the IEA Clean Coal Center: e.g. Baruya (2007, 2009), Minchener
(2004, 2007) and Crocker and Kowalchuk (2008). Furthermore, Ritschel (2010) and
Schiffer and Ritschel (2007) publish annual reports on the developments in the hard
coal markets. Further publications include analyses from employees working for interna-
tional utilities, like Bayer et al. (2009), Rademacher (2008), and Kopal (2007). Industry
76Another option is to programme the model in GAMS in the mixed complementarity format by
deriving its equilibrium conditions (for MCP programming with GAMS see also Rutherford (1994) or
Ferris and Munson (1998)). The equilibrium conditions can provide insights of what variables marginal
costs of supply are composed of. The necessary equilibrium conditions can be found in appendix D.
Both approaches yield the same optimal solution.
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yearbooks and governmental reports provide useful information as in the case of China
(CIRI, 2007, CMR, 2010, NBS, 2008). National statistics bureaus and mineral min-
istries provide high quality information, for example, ABARE (2008) and ABS (2006).
Not mentioned is a larger number of coal company annual reports as well as informa-
tion based on expert interviews. Furthermore, the present analysis is based on several
extensive research projects at the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of
Cologne. Tru¨by (2009) calculates marginal cost functions and freight costs for the in-
ternational trade market for steam coal. This analysis is based on these cost functions
for the international trade market. A summary of the findings and the methodology for
computing the cost curves can also be found in Tru¨by and Paulus (2010). Eichmu¨ller
(2010) derives mining and transportation cost estimates as well as mining capacities for
domestic markets in China and the U.S., which are implemented in the model used in
the presented paper.
To account for the varying steam coal qualities worldwide, the WCM converts mass
units into energy flows. All model outputs are therefore given in standardised energy-
mass units with one tonne equaling 25120,8 MJ (or 6000 kcal per kg). Information on
average energy content is based on IEA (2009), Ritschel (2009a), and BGR (2008).
5.5.1 Topology
Table 5.5 gives an overview of all 65 model nodes. To account for their dominant role
in the global steam coal market, domestic markets of China and the U.S. have been
explicitly modelled. Both countries together constitute around 75% of the global steam
coal market supply and demand. For all other mining regions, the export production
capacity is modelled as a residual of total production capacity minus domestic consump-
tion. Each export port can ship coal to each of the importing regions. The term new
mine regions refers to mine-type nodes that represent still-untapped mining potential
in the respective regions. Mining regions are connected by arcs which represent inland
transport infrastructure to the respective export ports in their country.
Transportation routes exist down the value stream from mining regions to the export
terminals and then to the demand centres. In total, 287 transport routes have been
modelled.
5.5.2 Supply Costs
Costs for mining include coal extraction costs, costs for coal processing and washing, as
well as transportation costs within the coal mines. However, public information on the
cost breakdown is mostly (if at all) only available for mine mouth or free-on-board costs.
The data on mine-mouth costs was obtained through coal companies’ annual reports of,
expert interviews, and literature sources. The available data of mine-mouth cash costs
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Table 5.5: Model topology
Mine regions Export terminals Demand regions New mine regions
Queensland UG Queensland North-western Europe Australia invest
Queensland OC New South Wales Mediterranean Europe South Africa invest
New South Wales OG South Africa Japan Indonesia invest
New South Wales UC Indonesia South Korea Russia invest
South Africa OC Russia Baltic Taiwan Colombia invest
South Africa UG Russia Pacific India west coast USA invest
Indonesia Russia med India east coast Venezuela invest
Russia Donezk Colombia USA - North Atlantic China - Xinjiang invest
Russia Kuzbass China USA - South Atlantic PRC - Shaanxi/IMAR invest
Colombia USA east coast USA - SE central
China - Shaanxi Venezuela USA - SW central
China - Shanxi Vietnam USA - Central
China - Shangdong USA - NW central
China - Henan USA - Western
China - IMAR Other Asia
China - other Brazil
USA - Northern Appalachia Chile
USA - Southern Appalachia China - Beijing
USA - Illinois basin China - Shanghai
USA - Northern PRB China - Hong Kong
USA - Southern PRB China - West
Venezuela China - North
Vietnam
Table 5.6: Input factors by relative importance for coal mining production costs in
2005
in % Diesel Explosives Tyres Steel products Electricity Labour Chemicals
Room/Pillar 5-8 0-2 0 24-35 10-18 28-39 8-13
Longwalling 5-10 0-2 0 24-35 10-18 28-45 4-8
Dragline 14-18 15-20 5-10 22-28 5-12 18-32 1-4
Truck/Shovel 18-26 17-22 8-12 19-26 0-3 18-35 1-4
Source: Tru¨by and Paulus (2010). See also Tru¨by (2009).
and mine capacity is fitted to the marginal cost function described in section 5.4 by
ordinary least squares (an overview of marginal mining costs can be found in appendix
D in table D.1). In this way it is possible to model the characteristics and the absolute
level of the production costs for each mining region.
For the projection of marginal mining costs until 2030, future mining costs are cal-
culated by escalating the input factor prices for mining in accordance with their relative
importance in the production process. The relative importance of input factors is de-
rived from a number of sources. Table 5.6 gives an overview of the relevance of different
input factors on mine production costs in 2005. In underground mining mostly long-
walling and room-and-pillar technologies are applied. Open-cast mining sees dragline
and truck-and-shovel operations (or a mix). For a more detailed description of mining
technologies refer to Hustrulid (1982) or Darmstadter (1999).
Many of the relevant input factor prices for mining, including those for explosives,
chemicals, and diesel, are correlated with the oil price. This is obvious, as the main
production input for explosives (in this case ANFOs: Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil),
chemicals, and diesel used in coal mining is oil. Therefore, a high correlation of these
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Figure 5.1: Influence of different oil price projections (left) on the marginal mining
costs in Shanxi, China in 2030 (right)
Table 5.7: Demand figures for 2005 and 2006 and demand projections until 2030
Region 2005 2006 2020 2030
Europe 168 181 168 166
Japan 126 119 104 98
South Korea 63 60 95 111
Taiwan 61 58 69 81
India 22 25 72 107
Latin America 10 11 18 22
USA 990 978 914 968
People’s Republic of China 1761 1932 3127 4190
Source: EIA (2010b).
input factor prices with the oil price for the future is also assumed. The analysis is based
on the reference oil price projections published in EIA (2010b) as well as historical input
factor price evolutions to estimate future factor prices. This methodology enables us to
get consistent mining cost projections depending on different oil price projections. Figure
5.1 demonstrates how the oil price projections of the EIA for the ’high’, ’reference’, and
’low’ oil price cases influence marginal coal production costs for Shanxi (PR of China)
in the year 2030.
5.5.3 Demand
For the necessary demand projections up to 2030, hard coal demand growth projections
of EIA (2010b) are used. The growth projections were taken from the reference case.
Demand figures shown in table 5.7 are absolute demand figures for China and the U.S.
For the other demand regions, these figures should be interpreted as import demand.
5.6 Scenario Design
In the scenario analysis, the feedback of two different Chinese bulk energy transport
strategies on the coal supply mix in China and the repercussions on the global steam
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coal market are investigated. Bulk energy transport costs are an important determinant
for the competitiveness of Chinese steam coal supply in the coastal demand centres
where an opportunity for international coal imports exists. High domestic transport
costs could lead to increased amounts of steam coal imports. This expansion of imports
leads to higher global production and mines with higher costs becoming price setting.
The slope of the global steam coal supply function determines how high the increase in
marginal costs is.
Two scenarios are investigated: in the first scenario, it is assumed that current
railway expansion plans continue and that regulatory and organisational hurdles for
large-scale HVDC investments are not overcome. Additional coal transportation will
then be handled by investment into railway capacity between the coal-bearing provinces
and the coastal demand centres. In the second scenario, it is assumed that China rapidly
overcomes the current barriers for HVDC investment by developing efficient incentive
regimes for transmission operators and by empowering a national energy planning in-
stitution which is able to coordinate stakeholders and execute such a nationwide infras-
tructure project. Demand growth for coal transportation will therefore be covered by
the installation of mine-mouth power plants in combination with HVDC transmission
lines. Then the analysis shows how these bulk energy transport configurations affect the
future Chinese steam coal supply and global steam coal market economics, focusing on
marginal cost effects and on mining investments. Welfare effects accrued in China and
worldwide between both scenarios, including the investment cost of the HVDC trans-
mission lines, will also be considered. Both scenarios can be interpreted as bounds for a
possible range of future market evolutions with regard to energy transport decisions in
China.
5.6.1 Scenario ’coal-by-train’
In the first scenario, called ’coal-by-train’, it is assumed that China will rely mainly on
additional railway capacity to transport the additional coal output from the coal-bearing
regions to the consumption areas. This will require massive amounts of investments
into railway tracks, engines, rolling stock, and into the railway electricity grid. The
investments into transport capacity will mainly take place from the central coal-bearing
regions to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Beijing (figure 5.2). While the mining capacity
limits in the central Chinese regions can still be further extended, many of the mines are
already operating deep underground at elevated costs. As Dorian (2005) and Taoa and
Li (2007) state, future prospects could lie in the desert province of Xinjiang, where coal
reserves are plentiful and could be mined in low-cost open-cast operations. Therefore,
further investments will take place between the Western coal fields in Xinjiang and the
central provinces. This scenario is in line with a number of railway expansion projects
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that have been issued by the Chinese government over the past decade to cope with the
rising coal transport demand (Fedor, 2008, Sagawa and Koizumi, 2007). While railway
transportation tariffs are high, these tariffs already include mark-ups for investment
costs for railway expansion projects77.
5.6.2 Scenario ’coal-by-wire’
In the second scenario, called ’coal-by-wire’, it is assumed that, for new mining capacity
in Shaanxi and the Autonomous Republic of Inner Mongolia (IMAR), China will build
mine-mouth coal-fired power plants in combination with HVDC lines which transport the
electricity to the demand centres in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. Mine-mouth
coal-fired power plants in combination with large-scale HVDC lines, which transport
electricity to the coastal demand hubs, already exist to some degree and are increasingly
the focus of Chinese grid planning authorities (Qingyun, 2005, Yinbiao, 2004). How-
ever, until now, long-range HVDC infrastructure from the West to the East has not been
expanded on a very large scale in China for several reasons: so far, transmission and dis-
tribution tariffs are not necessarily determined competitively or cost-based so that the
state-oriented grid companies have little direct incentive to increase infrastructure
investment (Fedor, 2008, Minchener, 2007). China lacks the central energy planning in-
stitution necessary for the large-scale efficient realisation of HVDC grid infrastructure.
Approval of large infrastructure investment projects is divided among many different
departments. The weakness of central Chinese institutions regarding energy system
planning and the fact that decisions are often made on the grass-roots level, has so far
partly hindered the implementation of HVDC transmission lines (MIT, 2007).
The benefit of this approach is that the variable costs for transporting electricity
via HVDC lines are practically zero. However, electricity losses apply, which are up to
3% depending on transmission distances (Bahrmann and Johnson, 2007). The Western
province of Xinjiang is not suited for direct HVDC line connection as it is an arid, almost
desert-like region. Therefore, it is unlikely that sufficient water for the cooling circuits
of large-scale coal-fired generation capacity will be available there. It is assumed in this
scenario that coal energy from Xinjiang will therefore be transported by a combination of
transport modes; first coal will be moved via railway to the mine-mouth power plants in
Shaanxi/IMAR. As a second step, the western coal will be combusted, and the generated
electricity will be transported with HVDC lines to the demand centres along the coast.
As only the steam coal market is modelled, all numbers on coal trade flows in the
coal-by-wire scenario from the new mining regions Shaanxi/IMAR invest and Xinjiang
77Transporting one tonne of coal by railway from Shanxi to Hong Kong cost about 36 $ in 2005
(CMR, 2010). The Chinese Ministry of Railways annually publishes their tariff quotas and the main
components of these tariffs. They state one component for ’railway expansion projects’ that reflects the
costs necessary to cover full operating costs, including investments.
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Chinese import volumes are heavily influenced by inland transportation 
costs and capacities
Coal-by-wire 2030Coal-by-train 2030
We analyze two scenarios with different assumptions on Chinese domestic transport infrastructure
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Figure 5.2: Topology of the scenario setup for China
Table 5.8: Domestic steam coal transport costs for new-built mines in both scenarios
2005 2020 2030
in $2009/t coal-by-wire coal-by-train coal-by-wire coal-by-train
costs from new mines in
Shaanxi/IMAR invest to:
Hong Kong 36 0 59 0 69
Shanghai 26 0 43 0 53
Beijing 6 0 11 0 13
costs from Xinjiang invest
to:a
Hong Kong 67 51 85 59 108
Shanghai 59 51 74 59 95
Beijing 54 51 69 59 87
aNote that in the ’coal-by-wire’ scenario railway costs still apply for transporting coal volumes from
Xinjiang to the mine-mouth coal fired power plants in Shaanxi/IMAR.
invest to the demand regions have to be understood as electricity equivalents. These
coal trade flows are used in electricity generation at the mine-mouth power plants in
Shaanxi/IMAR, and generated electricity is then transported via HVDC transmission
to the coastal demand centres.
5.6.3 Scenario Parameters
Domestic transportation costs on the selected routes change between both scenarios
as HVDC lines operate with zero variable transport costs. This does not reflect the
full costs of the HVDC lines, as costs are allocated typically to electricity consumers.
Later, welfare effects and the required HVDC investments will be compared. Secondly,
transmission losses caused by the long-distance electricity transmission will be accounted
for. Table 5.8 shows how transport costs differ between both scenarios.
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The parameter settings for production costs, demand, port costs, and all other trans-
port costs remain unchanged in both scenarios. Regarding the assumptions of future oil
price evolution, the oil price projection of the reference case of EIA (2010b) is used in
the analysis.
5.7 Results
In this section, the main model results for the two analysed scenarios, coal-by-train and
coal-by-wire, will be outlined. The model is validated for the base years 2005 and 2006.
Then the effects of the different Chinese bulk energy transport configurations on the
future steam coal supply mix in China as well as on investments and welfare worldwide
for 2020 and 2030 are analysed. A comprehensive overview of model trade flows and
marginal costs for all model regions can be found in appendix D.
5.7.1 Coal Supply in China
The results for the years 2005 and 2006 show that the model is fairly accurately calibrated
and can reproduce the historic transportation flows; the mean percentage error of all
model trade flows in 2005 (and 2006) is 8.4% (8.6%). The root mean squared percentage
error of all model trade flows in 2005 is 8.8% (8.5%).
Table 5.9 shows how Chinese coal demand is covered in both scenarios until the
model year 2030. Model results for Chinese export volumes are less diversified than real
export figures78.
In the coal-by-train scenario, the main coal suppliers are the central Chinese provinces
Shanxi, Shaanxi, and IMAR in 2030. A large proportion of the coal production is hauled
via railway to the coastal demand centres. About 1155 Mt of Chinese production is
transported to the Northern export terminals of Qinhuangdao and shipped via smaller
bulk vessels or coastal barges to the Shanghai and Hong Kong demand regions. Western
coalfields in Xinjiang province supply roughly 355 Mt of steam coal via overland trans-
ports in 2030. The production in the rest of China amounts to approximately 936 Mt
and is therefore slightly above today’s levels.
Imports play a significant role in the coal-by-train scenario, amounting to as much
as 264 Mt. While this seems to be a fairly small volume compared to overall Chinese
demand of more than 4 billion tonnes in 2030, it will make up 30% of the seaward traded
78In addition to statistical errors and differences in energy-mass conversions, coal quality is a factor
which may cause model results to deviate to from real trade patterns. In Japan and South Korea,
newer coal-fired power plants are highly efficient but very limited in the types of steam coal that they
can use for generation. Coal specifications on sulphur, ash content, moisture, and volatile matter are
important determinants, especially for newer coal-fired power plants. This dependence may sometimes
lead to long-term bilateral contracts between single mines and plant operators as well as a certain price
inelasticity of demand for certain coal types. Trade patterns caused by such coal quality requirements
are not explicitly modelled and are beyond the scope of this analysis.
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Table 5.9: Steam coal production, imports, and exports in China
2005 2006 2020 2030
in Mt Referencea Model Referencea Model by-wireb by-train by-wireb by-train
Shaanxi 154.4 143.8 184.9 149.5 132.2 171.1 177.0 177.0
Shanxi 426.7 417.6 454.9 478.3 540.8 605.6 650.5 662.9
Shandong 125.1 116.7 125.5 121.3 122.5 137.2 140.4 143.6
Henan 176.0 164.8 183.2 171.3 193.7 201.7 167.0 202.8
IMAR 165.3 198.1 192.1 207.7 185.0 210.7 228.4 246.1
China - Other 771.5 760.9 779.6 791.0 930.0 936.4 936.4 936.4
Shanxi/IMAR invest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 659.9 639.1 1259.8 1220.1
Xinjiang invest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 397.8 45.6 758.9 355.9
Imports:
Indonesia 13.0 2.7 13.4 26.1 0.0 101.8 0.0 88.9
Australia 2.3 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 145.4 0.0 150.6
China (reimports)c n/a 140.4 n/a 159.1 0.0 650.5 0.0 1155.4
Viet Nam 11.5 17.9 22.1 29.1 11.7 24.9 0.0 24.9
Exports:
South Korea 18.5 62.9 17.2 44.2 16.2 95.3 68.5 22.9
Taiwan 20.9 0 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China (reimports)c n/a 140.4 n/a 159.1 0.0 650.5 0.0 1155.4
Japan 15.9 0 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
aThe reference data for the years 2005 and 2006 stem from NBS (2009) and CIRI (2007) and may
include some coking coal volumes.
bEnergy equivalents for HVDC transmission losses are included in the figures for Shaanxi/IMAR
invest and Xinjiang invest for the years 2020 and 2030.
cChina (reimports) also includes Chinese coastal coal shipping by river barges or handysize bulk
carrier vessels. Typically, the coal comes from the northern Chinese coal export terminals of Qinhuangdao
and is shipped to the southern Chinese demand centres.
steam coal market. The main suppliers to China are Australian exporters with 151
Mt and Indonesian exporters with 89 Mt. Indonesian mines will experience significant
cost increases until 2030 because of rising production costs. This is mainly caused by
rising diesel prices as Indonesian mining operations are mostly open-cast truck-and-
shovel operations and therefore are heavily exposed to oil price increases. Furthermore,
Indonesian coal mining faces deteriorating geological conditions of coal deposits and
qualities. Due to these elevated costs, Indonesia is the marginal supplier to China in the
coal-by-train scenario and Indonesian mining costs plus transport charges constitute the
marginal costs of supply to the Shanghai and Hong Kong regions.
In the coal-by-wire scenario, the situation is different. Investment in the Western
province of Xinjiang is significantly higher. The construction of HVDC lines between
central China’s coal-bearing provinces and the coastal areas reduces transportation costs
for the Western provinces and therefore incentivises investments. Therefore, the scenario
results show a strong increase in mining capacity in the West as the mining costs in this
region are fairly low, lying in the range of 11 to 22 $2009/t by 2030. With the reduced
transport cost burden, these mines are among the cheapest suppliers in China in the
scenario coal-by-wire in 2030. Re-imports do not play a role, as inland transportation of
coal-based electricity is far more cost competitive than coastal shipping. Imports from
foreign countries will be replaced completely by cheaper domestic production by 2030.
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Table 5.10: Evolution of long-run marginal costs of supply for demand regions in
Europe, China, and Japan
2005 2006 2020 2030b
in $2009/t (of coal) Reference
a Model Referencea Model by-wire by-train by-wire by-train
Beijing 52 51 50 54 63 67 76 97
Shanghai 62 60 58 63 83 88 84 122
Hong Kong 62 60 58 63 83 93 84 126
PRC - West n/a 53 n/a 56 72 81 108 112
PRC - North n/a 40 n/a 44 81 85 97 118
Japan 63 60 63 63 83 90 97 121
Northwestern Europe 69 67 69 67 97 102 110 120
Mediterranean Europe 73 66 69 67 88 93 102 121
aThe reference data for the years 2005 and 2006 stem from IEA (2009) and from EIA (2006). The
IEA only publishes an average import price for each country. The reference country for the model region
’Northwestern Europe’ are the Netherlands, while the reference country for ’Mediterranean Europe’ is
Italy. The EIA only publishes consumer prices for coal in general not distinguishing between anthracite,
lignite, and bituminous coal. The reference price for China in 2005 and 2006 is estimated on the basis
of coal reports from McCloskey. Note that deviations may arise as model results are standardised
energy-mass units (25,120 MJ per tonne) while IEA data is in metric tonnes.
In this scenario, China is even able to export 69 Mt.
5.7.2 Long-run Marginal Costs of Steam Coal Supply
With the different allocation of volumes between both scenarios, the marginal costs of
supply also change79. As cheaper volumes become available, high-cost suppliers are
pushed out of the market and the marginal costs of supply to import regions decline.
Table 5.10 depicts the evolution of long-run marginal costs (LRMC) of supply for
both scenarios until 2030. Two observations can be made: firstly, the LRMC are growing
more similar over time in China, Europe, and Japan in both scenarios. Secondly, the
LRMC are different in the two scenarios, with the coal-by-train scenario generally having
higher marginal costs.
The two main drivers for the cost increase over time are the input price evolution of
mine costs and the growing global demand for steam coal. The increase in input prices
is mainly linked to the assumptions made on the oil price evolution, which affects coal
mining costs. The increase in demand leads to increasing investment in mine capacity
and a higher utilisation of existing mines. Both drivers have a cost-raising effect, as
investments have to be refinanced and the higher utilisation rates of mines or utilisation
of thus far extra-marginal mines, raises marginal production costs.
The lower LRMC in Europe, Japan, and especially China in the scenario coal-by-wire
in 2030 are caused by the additional Chinese mining capacity which is developed in the
Western province of Xinjiang. This mining capacity becomes highly cost competitive
79Marginal costs deducted from the model can be interpreted as the cost for supplying an additional
unit of coal to a specific geographical region. They therefore cover all costs in the model: mine production
costs, transport costs, turnover costs. The projected marginal costs for 2020 and 2030 also cover mine
and port capacity investments.
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Figure 5.3: Cumulated mining investments in millions of tonnes per year in the global
steam coal market until 2030
through the installation of HVDC lines within China that reduce transport costs of
steam coal. However, the gap in LRMC between both scenarios is different for China
and for Europe; the marginal cost supplier for Europe in this scenario changes from the
U.S. to Russia. Russian mines are operating in a very broad cost range between 27 and
91 $2009/t in 2030. However, long railway haulage distances to the export terminals
in the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, or the Pacific significantly increase costs of supply.
Therefore, the difference in marginal costs of supply to Europe of Appalachian mines
and the Russian mines is not too large. The difference in European LRMC between both
scenarios of approximately 10% to 20% can be basically interpreted as the difference of
marginal costs of supply to Europe between the U.S. Appalachian mines and Russian
mines in 2030.
The situation for China, however, is different. Here, the marginal supplier changes
from high-cost foreign mines to lower-cost domestic Chinese mines. The difference in
LRMC of supply between those foreign imports and Chinese mines is significant and in
the range of 37 $2009/t to 42 $2009/t in 2030.
5.7.3 Investments and Utilisation of Mining Capacity
Figure 5.3 shows the cumulated mining investments for both scenarios until 2030. Global
mining capacity additions in the coal-by-train scenario amounts to 1927 Mtpa and in the
coal-by-wire scenario up to 2254 Mtpa. The difference in mining investments between
both scenarios is largely explained by the higher investments in Xinjiang. Investments
into mining capacity in Western China are by about 380 Mt higher in the coal-by-wire
scenario. Mining investments in the rest of the world are approximately 50 Mtpa lower
in the coal-by-wire scenario. Fewer investments mainly take place in the U.S., Russia,
and Indonesia.
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Table 5.11: Utilisation rates of U.S. and Chinese mines
2020 2030
in [%] coal-by-wire coal-by-train coal-by-wire coal-by-train
USA - Northern Appalachia 57 62 69 84
USA - Southern Appalachia 64 69 75 89
USA - Illinois basin 100 100 100 100
USA - Northern PRB 97 97 98 99
USA - Southern PRB 39 39 64 86
Shaanxi 75 97 100 100
Shanxi 82 91 98 100
Shandong 85 96 98 100
Henan 96 99 82 100
IMAR 75 86 93 100
The difference in mining investments leads to a change in mine utilisation rates. On a
global scale, supply and demand intersect in the flat part of the global supply cost curve
in the coal-by-wire scenario due to the availability of additional mining capacity. Existing
high-cost mines have a lower output since the new, cheaper Chinese capacity coming
on-line partly crowds them out. Table 5.11 shows mine utilisation levels for Chinese and
US mining regions for both scenarios. The main differences in mine utilisation can be
found in the Appalachian regions, the Southern Powder River Basin, and the Chinese
provinces of Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Shandong. Supply-wise, the Appalachian mines are
amongst the most expensive capacities in existence. In China, the high-costs mines
in Shanxi, Shandong, and IMAR provinces experience a decrease of utilisation levels in
2020. Shanxi coal deposits have already been mined for a long time with most operations
being deep underground at elevated costs. Therefore, the cheaper western mines reduce
the output of existing Chinese mines by 160 Mt in 2020 and another 70 Mt in 2030.
5.7.4 Welfare Effects
Overall lower marginal costs in the coal-by-wire scenario lead to welfare effects and
changes in the spatial distribution of rents80 (figure 5.4). In total, gross welfare effects are
positive and amount to 248 billion $2009 in 2030. However, while consumers, especially in
China, benefit with regard to allocation of welfare changes, producer rents are shrinking
worldwide. As the intersection of global demand and supply moves to the flat part
of the global supply cost curve, producer rents decrease. In the coal-by-wire scenario,
producer rents in countries other than China are dropping by 163 billion $2009. This is
mainly caused by lower global marginal cost levels as well as lower utilisation of high-cost
U.S. mines, which cut into producer surpluses. Producer rents for China also slightly
80Spillover welfare effects for downstream electricity markets are not accounted for.
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Figure 5.4: Cumulated net present welfare and cost effects between both scenarios
until 2020 and until 2030 (horizontal axis represents the coal-by-train scenario).
decrease in the scenario coal-by-wire. If argued from the point of view of the coal-by-
train scenario, producers outside China benefit from high prices and the Chinese need
for imports.
Consumers benefit on a global scale in the coal-by-wire scenario. The difference in
consumer rent makes up 456 billion $2009 cumulated until 2030. The biggest portion of
this increase is allocated to China, as the difference in marginal costs of supply between
both scenarios is the largest there.
To analyse welfare effects of HVDC investments, the net present value of welfare
gains or losses and investment costs is computed81. The additional HVDC grid which
interconnects the mine-mouth coal-fired power plants at new mines in Shaanxi and
IMAR with the coastal demand regions of Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong amount
to 186 billion $2009 until 2030. While these investment figures seem to be high, one must
keep in mind the assumption that China is facing an increase of steam coal demand
of 2 billion tonnes by 2030. The assumed increase in Chinese coal demand is equal to
roughly 40% of the current global steam coal consumption.
On a global scale, the ’coal-by-wire’ configuration leads to cumulated net present
welfare gains of -5 billion $2009 by 2020 and 62 billion $2009 by 2030. This may seem
quite modest compared to the investment costs and welfare changes involved. However,
81HVDC investment cost data, as well as loss ratios for HVDC configurations, are based on Bahrmann
and Johnson (2007). They investigate different configurations for power transmission between coal
production sites in Utah and California. A +2x 500 kV double bipole DC configuration with maximum
transmission losses of up to 3.35% at full load depending on transmission distance is assumed. HVDC
investments are annuised over a period of 30 years. All welfare effects are present values discounted with
a 7% interest rate. Discount rates aligned to values for less-developed countries with high growth rates
found in Evans and Sezer (2005). It is also assumed that new coal-fired power plants in China run 6,800
full load hours per year on average and have efficiency levels of 43%. Avoided investments into railway
capacity are not accounted for, as the transport rates used in the model runs already reflect full costs
of operation, including railway construction costs.
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if the welfare analysis just focuses on China, the picture changes; cumulated net welfare
surplus including HVDC investments for China amounts to 28 billion $2009 by 2020 and
149 billion $2009 by 2030. Producers in the rest of the world would be worse off in
the coal-by-wire scenario. Production of high-cost mining companies in the U.S. could
be crowded out, and cost-competitive suppliers in Australia, South Africa and domestic
U.S. suppliers could face severely reduced profits as a result of the price pressure induced
by new mines in Xinjiang, Shaanxi, and IMAR.
5.8 Conclusions
The presented paper analyses the influence of Chinese bulk energy infrastructure invest-
ment decisions on the steam coal supply mix in China and on investment and welfare
spillover effects in the world market. A spatial equilibrium model which includes do-
mestic markets for China and the U.S. as well as the main importers and exporters is
presented. Proxies for future marginal costs of supply are based on a rigid cost struc-
ture decomposition which allows us to deduct future supply cost estimates based on
assumptions of input price evolutions. The presented paper then analyses two scenarios
with different assumptions of future Chinese energy transport investment policy; in one
scenario it is assumed that current railway expansion will continue in the future as rapid
realisation of HVDC transmission lines is hindered by existing organisational and regu-
latory barriers. In the other scenario, it is assumed that hurdles for HVDC investments
in China are reduced. Thus, rapid implementation of transmission lines in combination
with new coal-fired power stations close to the mines can take place on a very large
scale.
According to the results, such infrastructure decisions yield a significant change in
LRMC for China by up to 33% in 2030. China is able to feed its domestic steam coal
demand through domestic production in the scenario with HVDC build-up. Therefore, it
crowds out foreign steam coal volumes mainly originating from Australia and Indonesia.
In the case of coal transport by railway, China will have to import significant quantities
that make up about 30% of the steam coal trade market volume in 2030. LRMC for
steam coal in Europe and Japan change only moderately between both scenarios. The
reason for this is that one high-cost supplier (USA) is exchanged for another (Russia).
The analysis shows that large-scale investments into HVDC transmission until 2030
yield mostly positive economic effects, especially for China. This result should encourage
Chinese policy makers to rapidly overcome the hindrances this large-scale infrastructure
project currently faces; China’s national institutions engaged in energy are fragmented
and do not coordinate well. Aspects like setting electricity and fuel prices as well as the
approval of large infrastructure investments are divided among many different depart-
ments. To give such a large-scale national infrastructure project a good chance of rapid
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realisation, the national government would have to cut into this well-established web of
local decision makers and form a central energy planning institution which has enough
executive power.
As steam coal consumers benefit on a global scale from the Chinese HVDC trans-
mission lines, results should encourage large utilities or energy-intensive industries to
support Chinese grid investment efforts. Support could mean either helping to finance
such projects or to provide, if needed, technological expertise in the field of high-voltage
or even ultra-high-voltage transmission.
International mining companies will face increasing price pressure from the higher
competitiveness of Chinese steam coal supply in the case of HVDC investments. This
implies the need for mining companies to strengthen their exploration efforts in order
to generate reserves which are mineable at low costs.
It is suggested that further research investigates in more detail how the steam coal
supply mix of the other key world market actors like Europe, Japan, and the U.S. is
influenced by Chinese infrastructure decisions. In this context, it would be especially
interesting to see how such feedback affects power plant investment decisions in the
important import regions in the long-run. Another research venue could be to investi-
gate how potential future market players like Mozambique, Botswana, or Madagascar
influence these results, especially regarding spatial distribution of mining investment
decisions.
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Computational details
The model described in section 2.3.3 is implemented in GAMS and solved as a non-
linear programme using the convert tool NLPEC for MPECs (Ferris et al., 2002, see also
GAMS, nd). In essence, this tool automatically reformulates MPECs as standard non-
linear programmes, hence enabling solution using existing non-linear programming algo-
rithms. The convert tool provides various reformulation options of an original MPEC.
The original MPEC in this paper has 5,140 variables, 69,169 nonzero elements, and
4,240 single equations. I test several reformulation methods as described in Ferris et al.
(2002) and GAMS (nd) with the MPEC described in this paper, and identify candi-
dates that produce satisfactory solutions.82 Although there are several more, a set of
five key options essentially defines the reformulation method applied.83 These are 1)
RefType which defines the reformulation type, 2) slack which determines what type of
slacks to put in, 3) constraint which determines if certain constraints are written down
using equalities or inequalities, 4) aggregate which determines if certain constraints are
aggregated or not, 5) NCP bounds which puts explicit bounds on arguments of NCP
functions.
Table A.1 gives an overview of selected reformulation settings as tested in this paper.
The reformulation methods 1 to 3 are invoked by the option mult and are based on prod-
uct reformulation. These three reformulations deliver equal locally optimal solutions.84
82Criteria for identifying satisfactory and consistent solutions were: price convergence in import regions
(as well as generally positive prices), positive output of at least one follower and positive output of the
leader, lower prices in the Stackelberg model compared to the Cournot cartel model, higher profits for
the leader compared to being a player in the Cournot cartel scenario, lower profits for the followers in
the Stackelberg model as compared to the Cournot cartel solution.
83The description of the reformulation methods in this section closely follows GAMS (nd).
84The model is implemented as a minimisation problem in GAMS and consequently the optimal
objective value is negative.
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Table A.1: Selected reformulation methods as applied to the original MPEC
Reformulation RefType slack constraint aggregate NCP bounds Other options Solution objective value
1 mult none inequality none none locally optimal -45152.14757
2 mult none equality none none locally optimal -45152.14757
3 mult positive/one equality/inequality none none locally optimal -45152.14757
4 min positive equality none function intermediate 4111.272474
infeasible
5 fFB free equality none none initmu 1e-2 locally -33595.09814
infeasible
6 fBill positive equality none none intermediate 23930.2628
infeasible
7 Bill positive equality none none intermediate 10580.54758
infeasible
8 CMxf positive equality none function intermediate 27392.4249
infeasible
9 penalty positive equality none none intermediate -45354.28784
nonoptimal
10 penalty/mult none/positive equality partial/none none initmu 1.0 locally optimal -45152.14758
numsolves 2
updatefac 0.1 0.2
The solutions are economically consistent and not refuted by the test model for optimal
follower behaviour (see below). CONOPT solves these reformulated models in about 38
seconds.
Reformulations 4 to 8 are based on NCP functions. The used settings are: min
(minimisation of the NCP function), fFB (Fischer Burmeister NCP function), fBill and
Bill (Billups function for doubly-bounded variables), CMxf (Chen-Mangasarian NCP
function). This class of reformulation methods does not deliver satisfactory results.
Reformulation approaches 9 and 10 use the penalty option which penalises non-
complementarity in the objective function. The latter of the two reformulations delivers
a locally optimal solution that deviates from solutions 1 to 3 only in the fifth decimal
point. Yet, the computation time is significantly longer, about three minutes .
Test model for optimal follower behaviour
To test for ex-post optimal follower behaviour in the Stackelberg model, objective func-
tion (2.3) and inequalities (2.4) and (2.5) are reformulated with ZMPECj = X
MPEC
−i,j +
QMPECj being the optimal quantities of the other market participants from the solution
of the original MPEC (as oulined in section 2.3.3), and Xtesti,j =
∑
m∈Mi x
test
m,j being the
output decision of the test problem.
maxm∈Mi
∑
j∈J
[
Pj
(
ZMPECj +X
test
i,j
) ·Xtesti,j − τm,j · xtestm,j − cm,j · xtestm,j] (2.3a)
Subject to:
Capm ≥
∑
j∈J
xtestm,j (2.4a)
xtestm,j ≥ 0 (2.5a)
Quasi-concave equation (2.3a) and linear inequalities (2.4a) and (2.4a) form a non-
linear (konvex) optimisation problem with a unique solution which is solved in GAMS
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using CONOPT. The follower’s profits in the test problem being equal to the follower’s
profits from the Stackelberg model Πtesti = Π
MPEC
i is a necessary (though not sufficient)
condition for the solution of the in section 2.3.3 outlined MPEC being optimal. The
results described in this paper satisfy this condition and generally also Xtesti,j = X
MPEC
i,j
but not necessarily xtestm,j = x
MPEC
m,j .
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Table B.1: Comparison of actual and simulated trade flows in million tonnes (energy ad-
justed) for eta= -0.5
South
Africa Russia Venezuela Vietnam Indonesia Colombia China USA Australia Poland Norway
Actual trade flows 2008
Europe 44 64 3 1 14 32 2 15 2 3 3
North America 1 2 2 31 1
Latin America 2 1 1 1 8 1 1
China 1 19 25 1
Taiwan 1 29 11 19
Japan 1 11 2 27 11 67
Korea 1 9 1 26 16 19
India 12 22 1 1
South East Asia 2 26 2 1 5
Total 64 87 6 23 172 73 42 16 116 3 3
Cournot oligopoly with fringe 2008 (eta = -0.5)
Europe 21 69 32 25 1 28 5 4
North America 3 5 7 6 9 7
Latin America 2 4 3 3 3
China 5 5 13 4 5 11
Taiwan 7 14 15 6 7 13
Japan 13 7 27 13 14 22 25
Korea 9 11 18 8 10 16
India 6 10 5 4 9
South East Asia 5 3 11 4 4 9
Total 72 88 9 22 135 74 45 31 121 5 4
Actual Cournot oligopoly with fringe
Total seaborne trade 606 606
Source: IEA (2010a), own calculations.
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Proof of Proposition in section 4.2.2: We consider a setup with a national player A
which controls two firms which can produce a single commodity x: F1 (exporter) and F2
(domestic supplier). Further, there exists a domestic market D and an export market E
where x can be sold to (price-taking) customers. Let x1,D, x1,E and x1 = x1,D +x1,E be
the supply of F1 to the domestic market, the supply of F1 to the export market and its
total supply, respectively. The same holds for F2. C1 and C2 are the respective convex
cost functions of F1 and F2 with c1(x1) =
∂C1(x1)
∂x1
> 0 ∀x1 and c2(x2) = ∂C2(x2)∂x2 >
0 ∀x2. The maximum production capacity of F1 is limited to K. We assume that
the exporter faces a cost disadvantage if supplying the domestic market and that the
domestic supplier faces a cost disadvantage if supplying the export market. This cost
disadvantage of both firms is represented by constant cost terms t1,D > 0 ∀x1,D and
$ = t2,E > 0 ∀x2,E for F1 and F2, respectively. The cost terms are defined such that
c1(x1) + t1,D > c2(x2) ∀x1, x2 ∈ [0,K] and c2(x2) + t2,E > c1(x1) ∀x1, x2 ∈ [0,K] hold.
Let further U and V be the volume supplied to the export and the domestic market,
with U = x1,E + x2,E and V = x1,D + x2,D. The inverse demand functions in both
markets are decreasing in volumes.
We consider that A maximises welfare in the domestic market D plus his producer
rent from sales to the export market E less costs. His payoff function WA is:
WA =
∫ V
0
pD(V )dV + pE(U)U − c1(x1)− c2(x2)− T (x1, x2.
In the following, we will compare a setup where A controls F1 and F2 and has access
to export and domestic markets (export&domestic setup) with a setup that only accounts
for the export market and A only controlling F1 (export-only setup). We will show that
x2,E can actually be greater zero rendering the export-only setup inconsistent.
120
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Let µ be the capacity scarcity mark-up (dual variable) associated with the production
constraint K for F1. In case of a binding export capacity constraint K the equilibrium
condition for firm A to supply the export market in the export-only setup is:
pE(K) = −∂pE(U)
∂U
K + c1(K) + µ
∗′ if x∗
′
1,E = K, x
∗′
2,E = 0. (C.1)
which simply means that marginal revenue equal marginal costs plus the scarcity
rent. Equilibrium conditions for A in the export&domestic setup are:
pE(K + x
∗
2,E) = −
∂pE(U)
∂U
(K + x∗2,E) + c1(K) + µ
∗ and (C.2)
pE(K + x
∗
2,E) = −
∂pE(U)
∂U
(K + x∗2,E) + c2(x
∗
2) + t2,E
if x∗1,E = K. x
∗
2,E > 0. (C.3)
From (C.2) and (C.3) we can see that
x2,E =
{
> 0, if µ∗ = c2(x∗2) + t2,E − c1(K)
= 0, if µ∗ < c2(x∗2) + t2,E − c1(K)
(C.4)
in the export&domestic setup. Capacity scarcity is a function of the difference in
export supply costs between both firms. In case of x2,E > 0, F2 covers the residual
export market demand after F1’s maximum export market supply has been deducted
(see Figure C.1). F2 will start supplying the export market as soon as its marginal
export revenue equals marginal costs. In this case, the resulting price bias is:
pE(U
∗′)− pE(U∗) = µ∗′ −
(
c2(x
∗
2) + t2,E − c1(K)−
∂pE(U)
∂U
x∗2,E
)
, (C.5)
which is always greater zero in the case of a decreasing demand function as total
export market supply U∗ = K + x2,E in the export&domestic setup is greater than
export supply in the export-only setup U∗′ = K.
The same inconsistency occurs if A acts in a competitive manner in the export
market. However, the price bias is even higher: A would not account for the export
price reduction inferred by delivering additional supply to the export market if it acts as
a price taker. Thus, marginal revenue from supplying the export market equals export
price leading to a even higher redirection of domestic supply. In this case, domestic
supply to the export market acts as a backstop for export market prices in the case we
also consider the domestic market. The price bias in a competitive setup would therefore
be:
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Figure C.1: Export market equilibrium for the export-only setup(left) vs. ex-
port&domestic setup (right).
pE(U
∗′)− pE(U∗) = µ∗′ − (c2(x∗2) + t2,E − c1(K)) . (C.6)
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Table C.1: Actual and modeled steam coal trade market flows in million tonnes in
2008
Japan Korea (S.) Taiwan U.S. China Europe India Other
Actual trade volumes in Mt
Indonesia 24.4 23.2 23.7 2.1 22.2 19.1 19.0 23.8
Colombia 27.8 35.9 9.5
Australia 74.1 20.5 20.6 0.1 1.7 2.8 0.8 6.2
South Africa 0.1 1.0 0.8 48.2 7.9 3.7
Russia 8.9 6.4 0.9 0.5 68.4 0.6
U.S. 0.3 0.3 0.2 13.5 0.1 4.0
China 11.8 16.7 11.2 0.1 1.7 0.8 1.6
Other 2.0 0.9 2.5 16.8 11.0 7.5
Trade shares for China - Indonesia duopoly without export quota
Indonesia 16.1 15.9 19.9 38.7 21.5 25.0 23.2
Colombia 25.9 40.0
Australia 79.3 27.5 23.7
South Africa 6.4 42.0 14.1
Russia 23.4 69.3
U.S. 21.6 10.4 6.5
China 12.6 8.9 6.4 7.3 5.2 2.9
Other 4.1 15.1 15.3
Trade shares for Indonesia monopoly with export quota
Indonesia 15.3 15.9 19.9 55.4 19.8 22.9 22.6
Colombia 25.9 40.0
Australia 93.9 36.6
South Africa 39.0 22.2 1.3
Russia 12.0 11.4 69.3
U.S. 8.7 22.9 6.9
China 48.6
Other 4.1 15.1 14.9
Trade shares for perfect competition with export quota
Indonesia 36.7 32.2 64.7 29.3 26.0
Colombia 25.9 40.0
Australia 77.0 53.5
South Africa 8.1 54.4
Russia 23.4 69.3
U.S. 28.7 9.8
China 48.6
Other 19.2 12.1
Trade shares for perfect competition without export quota
Indonesia 0.5 15.9 65.4 79.9 27.2
Colombia 34.3 31.5
Australia 58.7 71.8
South Africa 2.7 59.9
Russia 23.4 69.3
U.S. 27.3 11.2
China 55.9 66.1
Other 19.2 12.1
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Equilibrium conditions
The equilibrium conditions are derived by the first-order derivatives of the Lagrangian L
(Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions). For the WCM these conditions are then defined by
the equations (5.3) to (5.8) found in section 4.3 and the following additional equilibrium
conditions (D.1) to (D.5) .
The Lagrangian multipliers µm,t and µp,t are the shadow prices at mine node m and
port node p in period t and represent the costs of an additional unit of steam coal at
that node. In equilibrium, the difference between µm,t and µp,t are the transport costs
for transporting one unit of coal between both nodes (if the transport route exists).
Equation (D.1) defines the equilibrium condition for inland transport:
µm,t + dt · cTa(m,p),t − µp,t ≥ 0 ⊥ Ta(m,p),t ≥ 0 ∀m, p, t. (D.1)
The shadow prices µp,t and µi,t differ in equilibrium by bulk carrier transport rates
cTa(m,p),t, by port turnover costs c
P
p,t and also by the Lagrangian multiplier φp,t. φp,t
represents the value of one additional unit of port turnover capacity at port p. φp,t can
be interpreted as scarcity rent of constrained port capacity. Equation (D.2) gives the
equilibrium condition for sea transport between port node p and import node i:
µp,t + dt · cTa(p,i),t + dt · cPp,t + φp,t − µi,t ≥ 0 ⊥ Ta(p,i),t ≥ 0 ∀p, i, t. (D.2)
The Lagrangian multiplier λm,t gives the value of one additional unit of production
capacity. It is non-zero in the case that the capacity restriction (5.3) has no slack; e.g.,
when production is at the capacity limits. The shadow price µm,t is defined by the
marginal production costs function cm,t (the first-order derivative of the production cost
124
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function Cm,t) plus λm,t which can be interpreted as the scarcity rent at mine m in period
t if the mine is at maximum production. The equilibrium condition for production at
mine nodes is defined by the following equation:
dt · cm,t(Sm,t) + λm,t − µm,t ≥ 0 ⊥ Sm,t ≥ 0 ∀m, t. (D.3)
In equilibrium, for the case that IMm,t > 0, the sum of shadows prices for capacity
over the remaining model horizon
∑T
tˆ=t λmtˆ + m,t has to be equal to investment cost
dt · cI,Mm,t . The shadow price of the maximum mine investment constraint described in
equation (5.8) is m,t. This equilibrium condition ensures that investment costs are al-
ways amortised and allows us to interpret µm,t as the long-run marginal costs of mine
production including costs for capacity expansions. The same holds for the investment
equilibrium conditions for ports (D.5). The equilibrium condition for ports does not in-
clude a Lagrangian multiplier for maximum investments, as maximum port investments
are not constrained. Equations (D.4) and (D.5) define the equilibrium conditions for
mine and port capacity investments:
dt · cI,Mm,t + m,t −
T∑
tˆ=t
λmtˆ ≥ 0 ⊥ IMm,t ≥ 0 ∀m, t, (D.4)
and
dt · cI,Pp,t −
T∑
tˆ=t
φptˆ ≥ 0 ⊥ IPp,t ≥ 0 ∀p, t. (D.5)
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